Jacques v. Jacques, 92-245
| Decision Date | 19 November 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-245,92-245 |
| Citation | 609 So.2d 74 |
| Parties | 17 Fla. L. Week. D2619 Linda P. JACQUES, Appellant, v. Jeffrey M. JACQUES, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Elaine N. Duggar of Gardner, Shelfer & Duggar, P.A., Tallahassee, for appellant.
Kristin Adamson and Jerome M. Novey of Novey & Mendelson, Tallahassee, for appellee.
Appellant, Linda Jacques, appeals an order of marital dissolution, contending that the trial court erred in awarding alimony to her based upon appellee's salary under a nine-month teaching contract, rather than including summer employment; in failing to require the husband, Jeffrey Jacques, to provide for appellant's health insurance; in requiring husband to maintain only $60,000, rather than $100,000, of life insurance for the wife's benefit; and in awarding her only $1,500 in attorney's fees. We reverse and remand for further findings.
The parties were married approximately 24 years at the time of dissolution and have no minor children. Appellant does not work, having suffered variously from Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, adrenal insufficiency, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and environmental illness since graduating from college. Environmental specialist Dr. Allan Lieberman and clinical psychologist Dr. Joyce Ducas each testified that appellant is unable to work and that neither knew of any way to improve or change appellant's condition. Appellee is a tenured professor at Florida A & M University, earning $45,616 under a nine-month contract, and, although he obtained summer employment during the summers of 1989 and 1990, the record discloses that the summer position would not in all probability be available in the future because of budget shortfalls.
In its final judgment, the court concluded that the marriage was irretrievably broken and divided the parties' marital assets. It also directed the former husband to pay permanent alimony to appellant in the amount of $1,500 per month; to maintain the former wife as beneficiary of no less than $60,000 of the proceeds from appellant's life insurance policy, as long as his alimony obligation continues; and to pay $1,500 of appellant's attorney's fees.
The difficulty that we have with the first two issues raised in appellant's brief is that the lower court's reasons for the alimony award are not contained in the trial court's amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Instead, appellant relies in large measure upon oral statements the trial judge made during the dissolution proceeding. In support of her arguments that the trial court erred in awarding the amount of alimony based on husband's salary under a nine-month teaching contract and without considering the wife's medical expenses, the appellant refers to the trial judge's oral comments stating that if the husband obtained summer employment, such would be to his benefit and not the wife's, and that the court would not require husband to be responsible for any of appellant's medical costs. As already observed, none of these statements was reduced to writing in the trial court's final judgment. Even if they had been, we do not consider that they would be binding on any future petition for modification brought by either party. See Allison v. Allison, 554 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (). Whether the husband's income and/or the cost of the wife's medical insurance will substantially increase is speculative at this time.
Appellant also refers to certain oral statements made by the trial judge pertaining to extraordinary contributions the husband made in behalf of his wife during the term of their marriage, causing a sacrifice of his own career opportunities. Again, such statements were not reduced to writing, and we refuse to indulge in any presumption that the court's reason, orally stated, provided the basis for the amount of alimony awarded.
Because the lower court's order lacks written findings of fact to support the alimony award, we are unable to reach any reasoned decision in regard to whether any of the points appellant raised requires reversal on the merits, including issues three and four. In failing to reduce its reasons to writing in the final judgment, the trial court violated that portion of Section 61.08(1), Florida Statutes (1991), providing: "In all dissolution actions, the...
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Kennedy v. Kennedy
...assets and liabilities in a contested dissolution action. Sec. 61.075(3), Fla.Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). But see Jacques v. Jacques, 609 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (requiring written findings of fact under section 61.08(1) without discussing the distinction between the two statutes).3......
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