Jacques v. State, 3D12–1735.
Decision Date | 15 August 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 3D12–1735.,3D12–1735. |
Citation | 95 So.3d 419 |
Parties | Jean Yves JACQUES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jean Yves Jacques, in proper person.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before WELLS, C.J., and SHEPHERD and SALTER, JJ.
Jean Yves Jacques appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, claiming here that the court below erred in failing to continue his youthful offender status when he was resentenced following revocation of probation. Because the sentencing order does not confirm continuance of his youthful offender status, we reverse and remand for correction of that portion of the order.
Jacques was initially charged with trafficking in cocaine in violation of section 893.135(1)(b) 1 of the Florida Statutes. After pleading guilty to one count of trafficking in cocaine, he was sentenced as a youthful offender to six years probation. Thereafter, an affidavit of probation violation was filed alleging both technical and substantive violations on Jacques' part. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court below determined that Jacques had violated the terms of his probation by engaging in a number of serious crimes (kidnapping with a weapon, armed burglary, armed robbery and sexual battery with a weapon).1 His probation was revoked and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years in prison.
In his postconviction motion, Jacques claimed that the lower court erred in failing to continue his status as a youthful offender and in imposing a sentence beyond the permissible sentence of no more than six years for a technical or non-substantive violation of probation. See§ 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2012). The lower court denied the motion on both points. Jacques appeals the denial of his postconviction motion.
We find no error in the imposition of a sentence exceeding six years as section 958.14 provides that, for a substantive probation violation, a youthful offender may be sentenced to the maximum sentence allowed for the crime for which he or she was found guilty. See§ 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2012) ( )(emphasis added); Lee v. State, 67 So.3d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) () In this case, Jacques was on probation for trafficking in cocaine, a first degree felony, which permits a term of imprisonment not exceeding thirty years. See§ 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012); § 893.135(1)(b) 1, Fla. Stat. (2012). Because Jacques committed a substantive violation of his probation, the thirty year sentence imposed was an authorized sentence.
We cannot, however, discern from the new sentencing order that Jacques' youthful offender status was continued as required. See Lee, 67 So.3d at 1202 .2 We therefore reverseand remand the sentencing order on...
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