Jaffrey v. Mathews
Decision Date | 19 February 1894 |
Citation | 25 S.W. 187,120 Mo. 317 |
Parties | Jaffrey et al., Appellants, v. Mathews et al |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. -- Hon. R. H. Field, Judge.
Affirmed.
Henry Wollman for appellants.
(1) The instrument before the court, when read between its four corners, is a voluntary assignment. If there were any doubt caused by the fact that defendants have attempted by inserting a sham "defeasance" clause, to create an ambiguity as to its meaning, then when it is read in the light of surrounding circumstances, it is an assignment. Whenever courts are in doubt as to whether an instrument is an assignment or not, that doubt should be resolved in favor of holding it an assignment and bringing it within the operation of the statute governing assignments, because that is remedial legislation of the highest and most beneficent character. Kiser v. Daunenberg, 88 Ga. 541; Harkrader v. Leiby, 4 Ohio St. 602; Winner v Hoyt, 66 Wis. 234; Preston v. Spaulding, 120 Ill. 208; White v. Cotzhauzen, 126 U.S. 329; Lucas v. Railroad, 32 Pa. St. 458; Sexton v Anderson, 95 Mo. 373; Larabee v. Bank, 114 Mo. 592. (2) The word "voluntarily" as used in the statute means nothing except that it is a conveyance voluntarily made by the party himself and not by a court, as an assignment in bankruptcy is. Manny v. Logan, 27 Mo. 528. (3) Where a conveyance is to a third person and aims and designs to create a fund immediately and without any conditions out of which the defendant shall be paid eventually, it constitutes an assignment. State v. Benoist, 37 Mo. 500; Crow v. Beardsley, 68 Mo. 435. (4) This instrument contains what is called a "defeasance" clause, which simply provides that in case the debts are paid the conveyance should become void. Every assignment is subject to such a condition whether the parties write it in or not, and putting it there adds nothing to and takes nothing from the instrument. It does not change its character at all, the other provisions showing that the parties intended to make what in legal effect is an assignment. Penzel Co. v. Jett, 54 Ark. 428.
John R. Walker and Peak & Ball for respondents.
(1) After executing the deeds of trust, Mathews could not affect the instruments or change their nature by his statements and declarations. Gates v. Labeaume, 19 Mo. 17; Sutter v. Lackmann, 39 Mo. 91; Weinrich v. Porter, 47 Mo. 293; Bank v. Russell, 50 Mo. 531; Steward ex rel. v. Thomas, 35 Mo. 202; Albert v. Besel, 88 Mo. 150; Douglass v. Cissna, 17 Mo.App. 44; Meredith v. Wilkinson, 31 Mo.App. 1; Farrar v. Snyder, 31 Mo.App. 93; Zeliff v. Schuster, 31 Mo.App. 493. (2) Hargadine v. Henderson, 97 Mo. 375; Murray v. Cason, 15 Mo. 378; Ames v. Gilmore, 59 Mo. 537; Shelly v. Boothe, 73 Mo. 74; Dougherty v. Cooper, 77 Mo. 528; Foster v. Mill Co., 92 Mo. 79; Larrabee v. Franklin Bank, 114 Mo. 592; Singer v. Goldenburg, 17 Mo.App. 549; Gummersell v. Hanbloom, 19 Mo.App. 274; Shapleigh v. Baird, 26 Mo. 322; Sampson v. Shaw, 19 Mo.App. 274. (3) The instrument in controversy is a deed of trust, and not an assignment. It possesses all the features which distinguish a deed of trust from an assignment. Very few of the debts secured were due at the time, and on the day it was agreed to execute it, May 26, 1890, a note was made to the First National Bank of Kansas City in the sum of $ 6,176.53, for borrowed money due in ninety days and the bank surrendered a deed of trust then held by it on the real estate; and the past due notes held by Hawkins were surrendered and a new note payable in sixty days was given him for $ 8,135. This money advanced, surrender of deed of trust, and extension given was the consideration for the deeds of trust. It contains a clause of defeasance which clearly and definitely characterizes it a deed of trust and not an assignment. Crow v. Beardsley, 68 Mo. 435; Hargadine v. Henderson, 97 Mo. 375; Larrabee v. Franklin Bank, 114 Mo. 592; Sampson v. Shan, 19 Mo.App. 274; Mills v. Williams, 31 Mo.App. 447; Smith v. Thurman, 29 Mo.App. 186; Assignment of Zwang, 39 Mo.App. 356; Bank v. Bank, 136 U.S. 223; May v. Tenny, 148 U.S. 60. (4) The fact that immediate possession was delivered to the trustee, does not change the nature of the instrument from a deed of trust to that of an assignment. Crow v. Beardsley, 68 Mo. 435; State ex rel. v. Cooper, 79 Mo. 464; Hargadine v. Henderson, 97 Mo. 375; Smith v. Thurman, 29 Mo.App. 186; Assignment of Zwang, 39 Mo.App. 356; Bank v. Bank, 136 U.S. 223; May v. Tenny, 148 U.S. 60.
OPINION
On the twenty-seventh of May, 1890, William T. Mathews, a merchant of Kansas City, executed and delivered to the defendant, Robert L. Yeager, a deed of trust conveying to the said Yeager, as trustee, all his interest in certain real estate in said city, to secure the payment of certain debts due the other defendants herein. On the same day he executed and delivered to said Yeager the following instrument of writing:
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