Jaime v. State

• Decision Date: 01 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. 08-01-00195-CR.,08-01-00195-CR.
• Citation: 81 S.W.3d 920
• Parties: Raymundo JAIME, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

81 S.W.3d 920

Raymundo JAIME, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 08-01-00195-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.

August 1, 2002.

Rehearing Overruled August 28, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

M. Clara Hernandez, El Paso County Public Defender, El Paso, for Appellant.

Jaime E. Esparza, District Attorney, El Paso, for Appellee.

Before Panel No. 1, LARSEN, McCLURE, and CHEW, JJ.

OPINION

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Justice.

Appellant Raymundo Jaime was indicted for aggravated assault while he was on probation for the offense of driving while intoxicated (subsequent). The State sought to revoke probation, alleging Appellant had committed an aggravated assault and had violated various conditions of his probation. After the trial court denied the motion to revoke, Appellant sought pretrial habeas relief with regard to the aggravated assault, contending that collateral estoppel barred his prosecution. This appeal stems from the trial court's denial of his pretrial writ of habeas corpus. We reverse.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Raymundo Jaime was convicted of the offense of driving while intoxicated (subsequent) in September 1999. He was placed on ten years' probation under certain terms and conditions. On January 18, 2001, he was charged by indictment with an aggravated assault that purportedly occurred on December 13, 2000. The indictment alleged that Appellant:

[D]id then and there intentionally and knowingly threaten YOLANDA CARPIO with imminent bodily injury and did then and there use and exhibit a deadly weapon during the commission of said assault, to-wit: a motor vehicle, that in the manner of its use and intended use was capable of causing death and serious bodily injury, [a]nd it is further presented that the said Defendant used and exhibited a deadly weapon, to-wit: a motor vehicle, during the commission of and immediate flight from said offense....

On February 15, 2001, the State filed a motion to revoke probation alleging that Appellant violated several conditions of his community supervision, including committing the assault, violating curfew restrictions, failing to fulfill his community service requirements between May 2000 and January 2001, and operating a motor vehicle that was not equipped with a device that uses a deep-lung breathing analysis mechanism.

At the revocation hearing, the trial judge asked Appellant if he operated a motor vehicle in violation of his terms of probation. Appellant responded that he did not.¹ Officer Sergio Martinez of the El Paso Police Department testified that he was on duty December 13, 2000 when he was dispatched to a call regarding an aggravated assault involving a motor vehicle. When Officer Martinez arrived at the scene, the complainant told him that as she drove on Interstate 10, Appellant approached from behind in his vehicle and hit her vehicle several times. The officer obtained the complainant's statement, went to look for Appellant at his apartment complex, but was unable to locate him. As defense counsel began cross-examination of the officer, the trial judge denied the State's motion to revoke.²

Thereafter, Appellant filed a joint writ of habeas corpus and motion to dismiss indictment, contending that the issue of his operating a motor vehicle on December 13, 2000 was litigated in the revocation hearing. Because the State presented no evidence, Appellant argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibits the State from further litigating the issue of whether Appellant was operating a motor vehicle.

The State responded that the court had not made a final determination that the factual allegation was "not true" and because the trial court could deny the motion to revoke without making a decision on the particular factual allegation, there was a basis to proceed with the aggravated assault. The State also claimed to have abandoned the allegation with regard to the aggravated assault before it went on the record³ in the revocation hearing and insisted it was only moving forward at the hearing on the curfew violation and on the community service hours violation. The State further claimed that an off-the-record discussion about why it would not proceed with the motion to revoke followed the court's oral decision.⁴

The trial court issued the following written order:

The Court FINDS the allegation that the defendant was driving a motor vehicle on or about December 13, 2000, was litigated in the revocation of probation hearing on February 23, 2001, in Cause 990D03645. No evidence of the defendant driving a motor vehicle was presented. The Court made no specific finding on the issue, but the motion to revoke was DENIED. After consideration of the evidence and argument of counsel, it is the ORDER of this Court that the defendant's Writ of Habeas Corpus, Motion to Dismiss Indictment is DENIED.

In his sole point of error, Appellant contends that because the State failed to prove at the probation revocation hearing that he drove a motor vehicle on December 13, 2000, collateral estoppel precludes the State from re-litigating the issue in the subsequent indictment for aggravated assault.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for writ of habeas corpus, appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard. Ex parte Ayers, 921 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.); Ex parte Pipkin, 935 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, pet. ref'd). The reviewing court accords great deference to the trial court's findings and conclusions and views the evidence in a light most favorable to the ruling. Ex parte Pipkin, 935 S.W.2d at 215.

COGNIZABILITY OF PRETRIAL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

The writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary writ and neither a trial court nor an appellate court should entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus when there is an adequate remedy by appeal. Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617, 619 (Tex.Crim. App.2001); Ex parte Culver, 932 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, pet. ref'd). A defendant may raise by pretrial habeas corpus claims concerning double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, and bail, because if he were not allowed to do so, those protections would be undermined if review were not permitted until after conviction. Ex parte Culver, 932 S.W.2d at 210. The applicant must establish his entitlement to habeas corpus relief. Id. at 212. The writ of habeas corpus is not available where judicial determination of the question presented, even if resolved in favor of the applicant, would not result in immediate release. Ex parte Ruby, 403 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1966); Headrick v. State, 988 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

The State suggests that we must dismiss Appellant's claim because he may not use a pretrial writ and interlocutory appeal to assert a collateral estoppel claim that does not allege a constitutional double-jeopardy violation. The Court of Criminal Appeals has indeed held that a collateral estoppel claim must allege a double jeopardy violation in order to be cognizable on a pretrial writ of habeas corpus. Headrick, 988 S.W.2d at 228.

In Headrick, the defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Id. at 227. She was charged by information for the misdemeanor offense. Id. A hearing proceeded before an administrative law judge who concluded that the Department of Public Safety had failed to prove the arresting officer had probable cause to stop the defendant. Id. Consequently, Headrick's driver's license was not suspended. Id. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence in the DWI prosecution, claiming the State was collaterally estopped from litigating the issues of reasonable suspicion and probable cause due to the conclusions of the administrative law judge. Id. The motion was denied. Id. She then filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, alleging the administrative finding of "no probable cause" estopped the State from proving that reasonable suspicion existed to arrest her. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately determined that Headrick failed to present a double jeopardy question and that she had an adequate remedy at law — to raise her pretrial motion to suppress on direct appeal. Id. at 228.

We find Headrick distinguishable. We construe Appellant's claim as relying upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel embodied in the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443-44, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194-95, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). Unlike the prosecution in Headrick, the State in this case would have been prevented from pursuing the pending prosecution for aggravated assault if it were prohibited from re-litigating the factual issue of whether Appellant was driving a motor vehicle. A finding that Appellant was driving a motor vehicle is necessary to obtain a conviction for the offense of aggravated assault under the indictment.⁵ Because conviction would be impossible without the fact that he was driving a motor vehicle, Appellant can establish that he is being unlawfully confined by virtue of the violation of collateral estoppel. Culver, 932 S.W.2d at 213. Thus resolution of the question presented would result in Appellant's immediate release and a writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate vehicle to raise his claim.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Having established that Appellant is permitted to bring his claim through a pretrial writ application, we must determine whether he is entitled to relief. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, "when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443, 90 S.Ct. at 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469. The doctrine must not be applied hypertechnically, but requires that the reviewing court examine the record to determine what issues have been foreclosed between the parties. Id.; Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The reviewing co...