Jairath v. Dyer

• Decision Date: 24 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 1:96-CV-1987 JEC.,1:96-CV-1987 JEC.
• Citation: 972 F.Supp. 1461
• Parties: Vimal JAIRATH, Plaintiff, v. Dr. Wallace DYER, M.D., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

972 F.Supp. 1461

Vimal JAIRATH, Plaintiff, v. Dr. Wallace DYER, M.D., Defendant.

No. 1:96-CV-1987 JEC.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

July 24, 1997.

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Milton D. Rowan, Rowan & Neis, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Michael A. Pannier, Sullivan, Hall, Booth & Smith, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

AMENDED ORDER

CARNES, District Judge.

This case is presently before the Court on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [13]. The Court has reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties and, for reasons set out below, concludes that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

In March of 1996, plaintiff Vimal Jairath contacted defendant's office to have a Gore-Tex implant procedure performed. When defendant learned that plaintiff is HIV positive, defendant declined to perform the operation.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Fulton County, State of Georgia, on July 3, 1996. Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA") because medical services provided to others were not equally available to him and because these services were denied as a result of his disability. (Compl.(1) at 6 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 12101).) Defendant states that he did not operate on plaintiff because the requested procedure was too threatening to plaintiff's health.

Though framing his case around a violation of the ADA, plaintiff does not seek relief under that statute.¹ Instead, he seeks damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6. (Compl. [1] at 4.) This code section authorizes recovery of damages under certain circumstances where a legal duty has been breached.

Defendant filed a Notice and Petition for Removal to this Court on August 7, 1996, based on federal jurisdiction over ADA claims. On September 19, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion to remand this action to the Superior Court of Fulton County, arguing that because he seeks to recover under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6, his suit is predicated on state, not federal, law. The Court denied plaintiff's motion on December 13, 1996. Defendant now files a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting that the Court find as a matter of law that plaintiff is restricted to recovery under the ADA because O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 does not apply to this case. Additionally, defendant asks the Court to find that because plaintiff would only be entitled to prospective injunctive relief under the ADA, he does not have standing to prosecute this action. Finally, assuming plaintiff does have standing, defendant contends that summary judgment would still be appropriate as plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a violation of the ADA.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is not properly viewed as a device that the trial court may, in its discretion, implement in lieu of a trial on the merits. Instead, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of every element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, as a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53.

The movant bears the initial responsibility of asserting the basis for his motion. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Apcoa, Inc. v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 906 F.2d 610, 611 (11th Cir.1990). However, the movant is not required to negate his opponent's claim. The movant may discharge his burden by merely "`showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54. After the movant has carried his burden, the non-moving party is then required to "go beyond the pleadings" and present competent evidence<sup>2</sup> designating "`specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). While the court is to view all evidence and factual inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir.1988), "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

A fact is material when it is identified as such by the controlling substantive law. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. The nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. ... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citations omitted). An issue is not genuine if it is unsupported by evidence, or if it is created by evidence that is "merely colorable" or is "not significantly probative." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Thus, to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must come forward with specific evidence of every element material to that party's case so as to create a genuine issue for trial.

II. Liability Under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6

Plaintiff alleges that defendant's violation of the ADA is a violation of a legal duty within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6.³ Plaintiff relies upon Mangin v. Westco Security Systems, Inc., 922 F.Supp. 563 (M.D.Fla.1996), for the proposition that, in most circumstances, the ADA does not preempt state discrimination laws. See Mangin v. Westco Security Systems, Inc., 922 F.Supp. 563, 567 (M.D.Fla.1996) (holding that remedies under Florida Civil Rights Act were not preempted by ADA). Mangin, however, is distinguishable from the case at bar most notably because O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 is simply not a state discrimination statute. Rather, it operates in conjunction with a statute that recognizes a breach of duty but provides no express cause of action regardless of whether discrimination is involved.

Plaintiff further relies on Mangin to establish "[C]ongress' intent to allow `simultaneous recovery' under compatible state and federal statutes." Id. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, however, the Court has previously determined that O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 and the ADA are not compatible statutes. (See generally Order [12] at 10.) Accordingly, simultaneous recovery is not authorized. While the Court recognizes that "O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 is designed to allow recovery where a statutory breach is established, although the applicable statute does not expressly provide a cause of action," the Court also recognizes that the ADA provides an express cause of action. (Order [12] at 10, n. 6.) Indeed, as the Court noted in its prior order, "Congress clearly intended the ADA to provide a private cause of action ... [and] the only way plaintiff seeks to establish a legal duty, a breach of that duty, and injury resulting from that duty is through sole reliance on [the ADA]." (Order [12] at 8.) O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 by its very terms does not permit recovery of compensatory damages where an express cause of action already exists. The Court, thus, reaffirms its prior determination that the ADA and O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 are incompatible and that the reasoning of Mangin is inapplicable to the present case.

Plaintiff attempts to avoid the import of the express language of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 by arguing that Georgia precedent leaves room for his interpretation of the statute. He relies on three cases where O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 provided a basis for recovering money damages. Plaintiff's argument, however, is derived from an unreasonable interpretation of these cases.

For example, plaintiff contends that in no part of the Georgia Court of Appeals decision, St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens, Inc. v. Radiology Prof'l Corp., 205 Ga.App. 121, 421 S.E.2d 731 (1992), did the court imply that a private cause of action had to be unavailable before § 51-1-6 could be utilized. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that the failure of the defendant, a private hospital, to comply with hospital by-laws when terminating plaintiff's staff privileges was a violation of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6. St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens, Inc., 205 Ga.App. at 127, 421 S.E.2d 731. The court found that the hospital had a duty to comply with its own by-laws though no private cause of action for a breach of this duty existed. Accordingly, the court found that recovery could be had pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6. Id. Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, the Georgia Court of Appeals implicitly recognized that only in the absence of an express cause of action could O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 be invoked. See generally St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens, Inc. v. Radiology Prof'l Corp., 205 Ga.App. 121, 421 S.E.2d 731 (1992).

Similarly, plaintiff contends that because the Georgia Court of Appeals, in Landis v. Rockdale County, 206 Ga.App. 876, 427 S.E.2d 286 (1992), failed to indicate expressly that it allowed recovery under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 only because no private cause of action existed, the Court of Appeals endorses the use of that statute even when a private cause of action is available. The plaintiff in Landis sued a police officer whose failure to detain or arrest a drunken...