St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens, Inc. v. Radiology Professional Corp.
Decision Date | 08 July 1992 |
Docket Number | No. A92A0237,A92A0237 |
Parties | ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL OF ATHENS, INC. v. RADIOLOGY PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION et al. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Blasingame, Burch, Garrard & Bryant, J. Ralph Beaird, Lesley A. Troope, Milton F. Eisenberg II, McLeod, Benton, Begnaud & Marshall, Larry McLeod, Andrew Marshall, Lyndon & Gilley, John F. Lyndon, Athens, for appellant.
Henry & Pearson, J. Hue Henry, Athens, for appellees.
Alston & Bird, Kevin E. Grady, Jack Spalding Schroder, Jr., Atlanta, Barry Sullivan, Chicago, Ill., amici curiae.
St. Mary's Hospital of Athens, Inc. ("St. Mary's") brought a declaRatory judgment action against Radiology Professional Corporation ("RPC") and its principal, Dr. Larry Cohen, to establish St. Mary's' rights under its contract with RPC to terminate the contract and withdraw Cohen's hospital staff privileges. RPC and Cohen filed counterclaims asserting causes of action for tortious interference with existing and prospective contractual relationships, intentional infliction of emotional distress, deprivation of due process rights, and abusive litigation. St. Mary's' motion for summary judgment on all counterclaims except the abusive litigation count was denied, and we granted its application for interlocutory appeal.
St. Mary's is a private, nonprofit hospital organized pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Department of Human Resources (DHR). St. Mary's granted hospital staff privileges to Cohen in the late 1960s. In 1971, he incorporated RPC, which then entered into a contract with St. Mary's as the exclusive provider of radiological services for the hospital. The contract obligated RPC to provide radiological services through its employee physicians and required St. Mary's to furnish equipment and non-professional personnel. The contract also stated that either party could terminate the contract without cause upon giving the requisite notice to the other party. Cohen's relationship with St. Mary's also was governed by the hospital staff bylaws promulgated pursuant to DHR Reg. § 290-5-6.-01(7), which provided, inter alia, for notice and a hearing before termination of staff privileges and for appellate review thereafter. The one-year term of the contract between St. Mary's and RPC was extended each year pursuant to the contract's automatic renewal clause. Beginning in 1981, the letter sent to Cohen each year concerning renewal of his staff privileges stated that his privileges would be revoked should RPC's contract be terminated (although Cohen denies that he agreed to this limitation).
The voluminous record in this case reveals that in the mid-1980s, St. Mary's and RPC, through Cohen, became enmeshed in a series of disputes concerning Cohen's management practices, the range and quality of equipment provided by St. Mary's, and the scope of duties to be performed exclusively by RPC. As a result of these ongoing conflicts, St. Mary's sought to renegotiate its contract with RPC. These efforts proved unsuccessful, and in January 1989 St. Mary's filed this action to determine its rights under the contract to terminate RPC and withdraw Cohen's privileges so that it could enter into an exclusive relationship with another radiology group. RPC continued its role as the provider of radiological services, but in the summer of 1990 it lost several physician employees and ultimately informed St. Mary's that it could not provide the level of service required. St. Mary's then notified RPC that its contract would be terminated and Cohen's privileges would be revoked.
1. We agree with St. Mary's that summary judgment improperly was denied on Cohen's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This tort arises only when (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gordon v. Frost, 193 Ga.App. 517, 521, 388 S.E.2d 362 (1989). See Georgia Farm, etc., Ins. Co. v. Mathis, 197 Ga.App. 324, 325, 398 S.E.2d 387 (1990). Moses v. Prudential Ins. Co., 187 Ga.App. 222, 225, 369 S.E.2d 541 (1988).
Cohen bases his claim on four occurrences: (1) the imposition of allegedly unreasonable conditions on RPC's employees; (2) an attempt by St. Mary's to solicit a large contribution from him during a hospital fund-raising campaign that occurred while contract negotiations were occurring between RPC and St. Mary's, which Cohen considered as a "shakedown" of him; (3) the alleged statement of a hospital administrator that St. Mary's did not have to treat Cohen fairly and would force him out; and (4) derogatory references allegedly made by representatives of St. Mary's during contract negotiations. Construing this evidence in favor of Cohen as respondent on motion for summary judgment, we nonetheless agree with St. Mary's that this conduct failed utterly to rise to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness. Hospital administrators have broad authority to make decisions and implement policies concerning the administration, operation, maintenance, and control of the hospital and the management and treatment of patients. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth. v. Prince, 242 Ga. 139, 144-147, 249 S.E.2d 581 (1978). Disputes between the hospital and its physicians over the exercise of this authority inevitably will arise. Such conflicts, however, do not give rise to a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but instead constitute power, control, and management issues to be resolved between the parties rather than in a court of law. Accord Kornegay v. Mundy, 190 Ga.App. 433, 435(1), 379 S.E.2d 14 (1989). In addition, the alleged insulting and derogatory references cited by Cohen also are not actionable, for (Emphasis omitted.) Moses, supra 187 Ga.App. at 225, 369 S.E.2d 541. See Kornegay, supra 190 Ga.App. at 434-435, 379 S.E.2d 14. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred by denying St. Mary's' motion for summary judgment on this claim.
2. To establish a cause of action for tortious interference with existing and prospective contractual relations, a claimant must show (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Perry & Co. v. New South Ins. Brokers, 182 Ga.App. 84, 89-90, 354 S.E.2d 852 (1987). This court has authorized the grant of summary judgment to a defendant on a tortious interference claim if the defendant pierces the pleadings with respect to any single element of the cause of action. See Jenkins v. Gen. Hosp. of Humana, Inc., 196 Ga.App. 150, 151, 395 S.E.2d 396 (1990).
Appellees base their claim upon acts of St. Mary's that they assert caused radiologists in RPC's employ to leave their positions and substantially impaired RPC's ability to recruit new physicians. Appellees have detailed numerous incidents arising out of disagreements between St. Mary's and RPC, through Cohen, concerning the purchase and management of equipment, the imposition of allegedly unjustifiable administrative and procedural requirements on RPC's physicians, and the allocation of professional responsibilities among the various medical specialists staffing the hospital. The record also includes testimony from Cohen and a professional staff recruiter engaged by RPC concerning the difficulties they encountered in recruiting radiologists to join RPC as a result of the allegedly unreasonable and disruptive conduct of St. Mary's.
We conclude that these allegations, even if proven at trial, would not establish a claim for tortious interference as a matter of law because they do not establish the essential element of inducement of adverse actions by third parties. Each alleged wrongful incident arose out of performance of the contractual relationship between St. Mary's and RPC, not as a result of any inducement directed toward RPC's employee physicians or recruits. Appellees do not allege that St. Mary's induced radiologists not to enter into or continue their contracts with RPC. Instead, appellees claim that the unreasonable performance by St. Mary's of its contracts with appellees caused such a result. While such acts might provide a basis for a breach of contract claim (and we offer no opinion on the merits of such a claim), they cannot provide the basis for a claim of intentional interference with RPC's contractual...
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