Jamborsky v. Baskins

• Decision Date: 15 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 930711,930711
• Citation: Jamborsky v. Baskins, 247 Va. 506, 442 S.E.2d 636 (1994)
• Parties: Richard J. JAMBORSKY, Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County v. Tiko A. BASKINS. Record
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 636

442 S.E.2d 636

247 Va. 506

Richard J. JAMBORSKY, Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County v. Tiko A. BASKINS.

Record No. 930711.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

April 15, 1994.

H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellant.

Patrick N. Anderson, Vienna, for appellee.

Present: All the Justices.

KEENAN, Justice.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether compliance with the 21-day time period specified in Code § 16.1-269(E) is a jurisdictional requirement for the transfer of a juvenile to the circuit court for trial as an adult.

Tiko A. Baskins, a juvenile, was charged with rape, aggravated sexual battery, and abduction of a 12-year-old girl. Felony petitions on these charges were filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Fairfax County (the juvenile court). On July 31, 1992, after hearing evidence on these charges, the juvenile court found, pursuant to Code § 16.1-269(A)(3), that there was probable cause to believe that Baskins had committed an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult. The juvenile court continued the case for a hearing to determine whether it should certify Baskins for trial as an adult in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County (the circuit court).

On August 14, 1992, after conducting a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order certifying Baskins to the circuit court for trial as an adult. Baskins appealed this decision and the juvenile court's file was delivered to the circuit court for review pursuant to Code § 16.1-269(E). That section provides, in material part, that the judge of the juvenile court shall forward to the circuit court all papers connected with the case, including the report required by this section, as well as a written order setting forth the reasons for the juvenile court's opinion. The circuit court shall, within twenty-one days after receipt of the case from the juvenile court, examine all such papers, reports and orders to determine if there has been compliance with this section, but without redetermining whether the juvenile court had sufficient evidence to find probable cause, and enter an order either remanding the case to the juvenile court or advising the attorney for the Commonwealth that he may seek an indictment.

(Emphasis added.)

On September 8, 1992, the circuit court entered an order authorizing the Commonwealth's Attorney to seek an indictment against Baskins. Baskins was indicted for rape and aggravated sexual battery. Baskins moved to quash the indictment, arguing that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction since it had not entered its order within the 21-day time period specified in Code § 16.1-269(E). The circuit court denied the motion.

Baskins petitioned the Court of Appeals for writs of prohibition and mandamus pursuant to Code § 17-116.04. A panel of the Court of Appeals granted the writ of prohibition and denied the writ of mandamus. In re Baskins, 16 Va.App. 241, 430 S.E.2d 555 (1993). The Court of Appeals relied on Bea v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 977, 980, 420 S.E.2d 255, 257 (1992), in which the 21-day time period of Code § 16.1-269(E) was held to be mandatory and jurisdictional, and issued a writ "prohibiting further proceedings in the circuit court and directing the circuit court to remand this case to the juvenile court for further proceedings if the Commonwealth be so advised." Id., 16 Va.App. at 246, 430 S.E.2d at 558. This Court awarded Richard J. Jamborsky, Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, an appeal from that decision.

The Attorney General, on behalf of Judge Jamborsky, argues that the Court of Appeals erred in issuing the writ of prohibition, because compliance with the 21-day time period provided in Code § 16.1-269(E) is not a jurisdictional requirement for the transfer of a juvenile to the circuit court for trial as an adult. He asserts that the language of the statute specifying a 21-day period is directory, rather than mandatory. In support of his position, the Attorney General contends that this Court has held provisions of the juvenile transfer statutes to be jurisdictional only when non-compliance with those provisions violates the substantive rights of the juvenile.

In response, Baskins argues that because Code § 16.1-269(E) uses the word "shall," the statute must be interpreted in mandatory terms. Baskins contends that any other construction would permit the circuit court to delay action indefinitely, in violation of the juvenile's right to due process. Thus, in accordance with the holding in Bea, Baskins argues that the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction because it did not order the transfer within 21 days after it received his juvenile court records. We disagree with Baskins.

When asked to determine whether various provisions relating to juvenile transfer proceedings are jurisdictional in nature, this Court has analyzed those provisions to determine whether they impart a substantive right to the juvenile or merely impose a procedural requirement. The overriding principle governing this inquiry is that the provisions should be construed to protect the unique substantive rights of the juvenile.

Applying this principle in Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 79-80, 147 S.E.2d 739, 743 (1966), this Court held that the statutory requirement of a transfer hearing in the juvenile court conferred a substantive right. This provision allows the juvenile an opportunity to request that the juvenile court exercise its discretionary authority to retain jurisdiction over the offenses charged.

Since French was not given a transfer hearing in the juvenile court, this Court held that he was denied the opportunity to present evidence and to be heard on the issue whether his case should be certified to the circuit court, and that the juvenile court's failure to comply with the statute violated French's constitutional guarantee of due process. In reaching this result, this Court determined that the statutory requirement at issue was jurisdictional and not procedural. Id. at 80, 147 S.E.2d at 743.

Similarly, in Tilton v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 774, 85 S.E.2d 368 (1955), this Court held that a substantive right was created by a statutory requirement that, upon indictment of a juvenile on certain offenses, the circuit court "shall require a full and complete investigation of the physical, mental and social condition and personality of the child or minor and the facts and circumstances surrounding the violation of the law which is the cause of his being before the court." Id. at 782, 85 S.E.2d at 373. This statute afforded the juvenile the substantive right to advise the circuit court of circumstances upon which the court might exercise its discretion to remand the case to juvenile court. The investigation also provided information to assist the circuit court, if it retained jurisdiction of the case, in determining whether to sentence the defendant as a juvenile or as an adult. Id. at 787-88, 85 S.E.2d at 375-76.

In concluding that this statutory provision imparted a substantive right, this Court recognized that the required report had an "additional and broader purpose" than...