James Q. Comm'r of the Office for People With Developmental Disabilities v. & Suffolk Cnty. Dist. Attorney

• Decision Date: 17 August 2017
• Citation: 61 N.Y.S.3d 369
• Parties: In the Matter of JAMES Q. Commissioner of the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities, Petitioner; James Q., Appellant, and Suffolk County District Attorney, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

154 A.D.3d 58

61 N.Y.S.3d 369

In the Matter of JAMES Q. Commissioner of the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities, Petitioner; James Q., Appellant, and Suffolk County District Attorney, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Aug. 17, 2017.

Sheila E. Shea, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Albany (Brent R. Stack of counsel), for appellant.

Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead (Guy Arcidiacono of counsel), for respondent.

Before: EGAN JR., J.P., LYNCH, DEVINE, CLARK and AARONS, JJ.

CLARK, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Feldstein, J.), entered February 8, 2016 in Franklin County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPL 330.20, denied respondent James Q.'s motion to seal the record of the proceeding.

Respondent James Q. (hereinafter respondent) is confined to a secure facility operated by the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities. Respondent has been confined since his 2010 plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect to the charges of rape in the third degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, criminal mischief in the third degree, menacing in the second degree, assault in the third degree, criminal mischief in the fourth degree and endangering the welfare of a child. A first retention order was issued in March 2011, followed by a second retention order in March 2012 and two subsequent retention orders in

September 2013 and January 2015, all of which found that respondent suffered from a dangerous mental disorder (see CPL 330.20[1][c] ; [6], [8], [9] ).

In July 2015, petitioner filed an application for a two-year subsequent retention order pursuant to CPL 330.20(9), asserting that respondent continued to suffer from a dangerous mental disorder. As required, petitioner's application was accompanied by the sworn affidavit and written report of Suzanne Fraser, the psychiatric examiner who evaluated respondent (see CPL 330.20[20] ). Thereafter, petitioner, respondent and respondent Suffolk County District Attorney (hereinafter the DA) stipulated to the entry of a subsequent retention order not to exceed 18 months from the expiration of the prior order, thus disposing of petitioner's application without a hearing. However, while there was a consensus that Fraser's written report should be sealed, the parties disagreed as to the sealing of the July 2015 petition, Fraser's sworn affidavit and the subsequent retention order, thus prompting respondent to move for an "order sealing the record" of his retention proceeding. On January 19, 2016, while respondent's motion was pending, Supreme Court entered the subsequent retention order, which, among other things, ordered that Fraser's report, along with "[s]uch additional portions of the record as [the] [c]ourt may order in response to [respondent's] motion," be sealed. The court subsequently denied respondent's motion, ordering that the petition, Fraser's sworn affidavit and the subsequent retention order, "together with this [d]ecision and [o]rder, be filed by the Clerk of this [c]ourt in unsealed fashion." Respondent appeals.¹

Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13 does not, as respondent contends,² require that the record of his retention proceeding be sealed. To the extent that this Court's decision in Matter of

John Z. (Commissioner of N.Y. State Off. of Mental Health),

128 A.D.3d 1249, 9 N.Y.S.3d 720 (2015) can be read to require that the record, which includes the retention petition, Fraser's sworn affidavit and the January 2016 subsequent retention order, be sealed as part of respondent's "clinical record," as that term is defined in Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13(a), such decision should no longer be followed.

Respondent accepted a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect and, therefore, "avoid[ed] criminal penalties and ... [became] subject to the CPL 330.20 scheme" (Matter of Jamie R. v. Consilvio, 6 N.Y.3d 138, 142 n. 2, 810 N.Y.S.2d 738, 844 N.E.2d 285 [2006] ; see CPL 330.20[2] ). As the Court of Appeals has consistently recognized, "[t]his places insanity acquittees in a significantly different posture than involuntarily committed civil patients" and, thus, justifies "rational differences between procedures for commitment and release applicable to defendants found not responsible and persons involuntarily committed under the Mental Hygiene Law" (Matter of Jamie R. v. Consilvio, 6 N.Y.3d at 142 n. 2, 810 N.Y.S.2d 738, 844 N.E.2d 285 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Oswald N., 87 N.Y.2d 98, 105, 637 N.Y.S.2d 949, 661 N.E.2d 679 [1995] ; People ex rel. Thorpe v. Von Holden, 63 N.Y.2d 546, 555, 483 N.Y.S.2d 662, 473 N.E.2d 14 [1984] ; see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 [1983] ). The distinction between an insanity acquittee, as we have here, and an involuntarily committed civil patient is apparent by the Legislature's enactment of a separate statutory scheme— CPL 330.20 —to address the commitment and retention procedures for persons found not responsible for their crimes by reason of mental disease or defect. The detailed statutory framework of CPL 330.20³ does not include a provision that requires, or even contemplates, the sealing of these commitment and retention proceedings. Nor does the relevant legislative history indicate that the Legislature intended for these proceedings—which arise only after a criminal defendant affirmatively places his or her mental competency in issue—to be sealed from the public (see L. 1980, ch. 548). The absence of a court sealing provision in CPL 330.20, or any discussion of sealing in its legislative history, is significant, given the many references to the Mental Hygiene Law in CPL 330.20 and the fact that sealing provisions are included in

Mental Hygiene Law articles 9 and 15 (see Mental Hygiene Law §§ 9.31[f] ; 15.31[f] ).⁴ Thus, it stands to reason that, had the Legislature intended for CPL 330.20 commitment and retention proceedings to be sealed, it would have included such a provision within CPL 330.20.

Although CPL 330.20 affords respondents "the rights granted to patients under the [M]ental [H]ygiene [L]aw" ( CPL 330.20[17] ), and Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13(c) grants patients confidentiality in, among other things, their clinical record, the statutory language of Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13 does not support sealing the record of respondent's retention proceeding. It is a fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation that " ‘the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text’ " and that, therefore, " ‘the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof’ " ( People v. Golo, 26 N.Y.3d 358, 361, 23 N.Y.S.3d 110, 44 N.E.3d 185 [2015], quoting Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 [1998] ).

Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13(c) provides that "information about patients or clients reported to the [Office of Mental Health or the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities], including the identification of patients or clients, clinical records or clinical information tending to identify patients or clients, ... at office facilities ^{[5 ]} shall not be a public record and shall not be released by the offices or [their respective] facilities to any person or agency outside of the offices," subject to certain exceptions (emphasis added).

A patient's clinical record "shall contain information on all matters relating to the admission, legal status, care, and treatment of the patient or client and shall include all pertinent documents relating to the patient or client" ( Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13[a] ). By its own language, the prohibition contained in Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13(c) applies solely to the Office of Mental Health, the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities and any facility that provides services to Mental Hygiene Law patients. It is a confidentiality provision, not a sealing provision, and it does not require the county clerk to seal court documents that may ultimately become part of a patient's "clinical record." To hold that court documents must be sealed because they may, at some later date, be included in the clinical record and be afforded confidentiality under Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13 is to engage in circular logic.

Nor can a sealing requirement be reasonably read into Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13(c). In matters of statutory interpretation, courts must avoid a construction that renders superfluous provisions within the overall statutory scheme (see McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 98[a]; Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d at 588, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 ). Were Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13(c) intended to operate as a court sealing provision, Mental Hygiene Law §§ 9.31(f) and 15.31(f) —which require the county clerk to seal court documents in proceedings regarding the involuntary admission of patients by medical certification under Mental Hygiene Law articles 9 and 15—would be unnecessary and redundant. Mental Hygiene Law § 33.14 would also be rendered superfluous. Under that provision, Mental Hygiene Law patients are provided with a mechanism by which to "commence a special proceeding ... for an order directing the sealing of ... records held by the [O]ffice of [M]ental [H]ealth, a facility, or any other individual or public or private entity ..., which identify the [patient] as a recipient of services for mental illness" ( Mental Hygiene Law § 33.14[a][1] [emphasis added] ).

Moreover, sealing the record of respondent's retention proceeding is contrary to longstanding public policy disfavoring limitations on public access to court proceedings (see Judiciary Law § 4 ; Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 715, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 [1980] ; People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 416, 418 N.Y.S.2d 359, 391...