James v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

Decision Date04 February 1942
Docket Number15367.
PartiesJAMES v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

McEachin & Townsend, of Florence, for appellant.

Woods & Woods, of Marion, and Willcox, Hardee, Houck &amp Wallace, of Florence, for respondent.

BONHAM Chief Justice.

This action is brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-59, to recover damages for the death of appellant's intestate, a railroad conductor in the employ of respondent, and who was the conductor in charge of the movement of a large new type of engine, without cars attached, from Rocky Mount, North Carolina, to Florence, South Carolina. While the engine was still in motion, and shortly before it was contemplated that it would be brought to a complete stop upon clearing the umbrella shed to the south (in fact, west) extending over the several tracks adjacent to the passenger station of respondent at Florence, appellant's intestate, by the use of the ladder-like steps on the side of the engine, attempted to dismount, and in so doing, came into contact with the front of two baggage trucks chained together with locked wheels, that is the "standard" on the nearest truck, standing on the concrete walkway adjacent to the track of respondent, knocking him from the side of the engine to a space between the track and the concrete walkway, resulting in injuries from which he died the following day.

The engine upon which the decedent was riding and of which he had charge, reached the passenger station at Florence at between 6:50 and 7 o'clock P. M., on March 30, 1938, and while the sun had set, the visibility was good according to all witnesses, and if appellant's intestate had looked in the direction in which the engine was being driven before or while dismounting, he could have seen the baggage trucks, and observed their position in regard to the track upon which the engine was travelling. This new type engine was 5 1/4 inches wider on each side than the usual engine in use by the respondent, but the appellant's intestate knew that it was wider and larger, in fact it had the appearance of being even wider than the specifications show, and he had gotten off and on this engine at several stops between Rocky Mount and Florence. The only duty appellant's intestate had to perform in reference to this engine after it reached its destination (Florence, insofar as he was concerned) was to register at the passenger station, and if he had remained on the engine until it came to the point where he had been informed it would be stopped by the engineer at the throttle, he would have had to walk back only fifty steps in order to reach the walkway to the passenger station. And he was in charge of the engine until it came to a stop at its destination.

There are one or two other minor details to which we attach no significance, and we have therefore set out only the essential, and we might say, undisputed facts. While there is some testimony that the engine was from ten to eleven inches wider on each side, such testimony came from witnesses who had made no measurements and were merely estimates, whereas the specifications from which the engine was built show five and one-quarter (5 1/4) inches.

The case was tried at a special term of Court before the Honorable L. D. Lide Presiding Judge, and a jury, and resulted in a verdict for the respondent. Motion for a new trial was made and thereafter heard by Judge Lide. After taking the matter under advisement Judge Lide, with his usual painstaking care considered the grounds of the motion, fifteen in number, and overruled the same. From the verdict and the order overruling this motion for new trial, appellant appeals.

The principal ground of the appeal is alleged error in excluding evidence of a claimed custom of the respondent as to the distance from the center of the track and from the edge of the crossties observed in placing obstacles, such as baggage trucks near its tracks in and around its passenger stations.

A proper consideration of this question requires a careful analysis of the complaint. It alleges that on or about March 30, 1938, appellant's intestate, a passenger conductor, was sent as one of a crew from Rocky Mount, North Carolina, to deliver at Florence, South Carolina, a large new engine, wider by about ten inches than ordinary engines, which had that day been put into service by the respondent; that appellant's intestate came down the ladder-like steps at the side of the engine backward in order to dismount while the engine was moving and came "in contact with a truck of the defendant standing with locked wheels in a position too close to the track on which the engine was moving." The specifications of negligence submitted to the jury involved in the questions now under consideration, are as follows:

"(2) In placing its truck too close to the track on which its new engine was running;

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"(4) In placing its truck in such close proximity to the track on which plaintiff's intestate's engine was moving as to strike and cast the plaintiff's intestate between the engine and the concrete walkway;

"(5) In failing to furnish the plaintiff's intestate with a safe place to work in that its truck was placed with locked wheels too close to a track on which its new engine was moving;

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"(7) In failing to warn the plaintiff's intestate by signs, instructions, or otherwise, of the care and precautions necessitated by the width and construction of its new engine;

"(8) In failing to maintain its station yard in proper condition to meet the requirements of its new engine;

"(9) In failing to park its truck a sufficient distance from its track to clear the plaintiff's intestate or anyone else ascending or descending the steps of its moving locomotive."

A fair consideration of the complaint can only lead to the conclusion that respondent was thereby advised that appellant intended to charge respondent with negligence in placing a truck too close to the track in view of the special and unusual conditions brought about by this new, larger and unusual type of locomotive engine, the theory being that new and special duties, wholly different from any that might have previously existed, rested upon respondent in regard to the placing of trucks by reason of the size and peculiarities of this new type of engine.

It was not alleged or even intimated by the complaint that there was then or previously in existence any rule, custom or standard of fixed clearance, and that such rule, custom or standard was violated. The trial Judge, however, repeatedly gave appellant the opportunity of producing and introducing in testimony any rule of the respondent requiring a fixed standard of clearance, a ruling, as will be later seen, probably more favorable to appellant than she was entitled to, but it was apparently conceded that there was no rule of respondent on the subject.

Appellant was permitted to show at what distance from the track the truck was actually placed; that it would not clear a person descending the ladder-like steps of this new and larger type of engine; and (on cross-examination of respondent's witness, W. D. Quarles) that it was necessary in placing trucks to require some distance for clearance.

From a careful analysis of the complaint and the particular specifications of negligence, it would seem that the trial Judge correctly interpreted the complaint to charge that the truck was placed closer to the track than a person of ordinary reason and prudence would place it under the circumstances of this particular case, without regard to any other case. Indeed, the allegations of the complaint may be said to have fairly implied that any previous rule or practice was beside the point, and that on account of new conditions, a new and different standard of due care was required, measured by what a person of ordinary reason and prudence would do under the special circumstances. The trial Judge correctly held that the appellant could prove all of the circumstances surrounding the situation, and that it would then be for the jury to say whether under all of the facts and circumstances of this particular case the truck was placed by respondent too close to the track.

In any view, under the peculiar circumstances here existing, testimony as to any custom or standard governing the placing of these trucks was wholly irrelevant and has no bearing on the case. The testimony on behalf of appellant showed that these trucks were placed for the purpose of serving passenger trains coming into the station, and that any custom or standard of placing them had relation to passenger trains and not to what is termed a "light engine," or an engine without cars. On this subject appellant brought out on the direct examination of her witness, L. C. Miller, the following:

"Q. On a light engine--do you know what is understood by the term light engine? A. Yes, sir.

"Q. What is it? A. An engine without cars.

"Q. On a light engine coming into the passenger yard, there is, of course, no baggage or express to come off it, is there? A. No, sir.

"Q. In placing the trucks on the yard, what is the purpose of placing them out there? A. To meet the requirements of the night trains.

"Q. To meet the requirements of the passenger trains that might be coming in? A. Yes, sir."

It is evident from this testimony that the claimed custom or...

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1 cases
  • Harwell v. Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • August 17, 1945
    ... ... discretion of the trial judge. James v. Atlantic Coast ... Line R. Co., 199 S.C. 45, 18 S.E.2d 616; Neal v ... ...

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