James v. Brooks
| Decision Date | 30 September 1871 |
| Citation | 53 Tenn. 150 |
| Parties | William James v. John Brooks et al. William James v. D. N. Tate et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
FROM GRAINGER.
Appeal from the decree of the Chancery Court, April Term, 1870.
JAMES T. SHIELDS for Complainant.
BARTON, MOFARLAND & EVANS for Defendants.
These two causes, involving the same questions of law and of fact, were consolidated and heard together in the Chancery Court at Rutledge.
Actions of ejectment had been instituted in the Circuit Court of Grainger county by the complainant against the defendants, and they were pending at the time of the filing of said bills.
The complainant alleges that his remedy at law may be embarrassed by reason of the omission by mistake of one call in one of the deeds under which he claims title to the land in controversy, and prays that said mistake be corrected, and that he be put in possession of the land described in the bills of which he had been wrongfully dispossessed by the defendants, and have an account against each of them for the rents and profits thereof.
The defendants to the two bills answered, Brooks and Tate denying the right of complainant to the land claimed, and insisting that no error nor mistake was committed in the conveyance by Manly to complainant.
Manly, who conveyed to complainant by deed, in which the mistake is alleged to have been made, also answers and admits the accidental omission of a call in said deed as alleged in the said bills. The defendants in their answer submit to the jurisdiction of the court, and agree that the question of title to the land may be determined in the Chancery Court, one principal question of controversy being as to locality of what is described in the pleadings as the “““Calhoun line.”
At the April Term, 1870, of the Chancery Court, parties entered of record an agreement that these two causes should be heard together, the court reserving the power to make such decree “as the equities of the parties arising upon the facts may require.” It is further recited that “the parties desiring that a jury shall be empannelled to try the issues of fact presented in the pleadings, the court is pleased to order and decree that the parties plead and make specific issues of record.”
Thereupon the complainant filed formal declarations in ejectment, claiming title to the land described in the bills, and alleging that the defendants entered upon it and ejected him; to which declaration defendants pleaded not guilty, and issue was taken on said plea. This was of course a material issue between the parties. It was thereupon ordered by the court that a jury come to try the issue joined.
It was further agreed by the parties that said issue be tried as in case of an ejectment at law. The two causes were accordingly submitted to a jury at the same term of the court, and they returned a verdict of “not guilty” in each case.
A motion was made for a new trial by complainant, which motion was overruled by the court. A bill of exceptions was tendered, and sealed and signed by the court, and a decree pronounced in favor of defendants, from which complainant appeals to this court.
The record is voluminous, and elaborate and able arguments have been made upon both sides, but we do not deem it necessary to discuss or determine all the questions which have been made in the arguments of counsel.
Complainants insist that there are material errors in the charge of the court to the jury, and that for this reason the decree of the Chancellor should be reversed, and the causes remanded for a new trial upon a proper charge; while, for defendants, it is maintained that even if there were errors in the charge of the court, this court may disregard the verdict of the jury and decide the cause upon the law and facts presented in the record just as if no issue had been submitted for the determination of the jury.
Such was the English chancery practice, the purpose of ordering such issues out of chancery to be tried in a court of law appearing to be for the “information of the conscience of the Chancellor.” Upon the coming in of the verdict of the jury, the Chancellor, if not satisfied with it, might set it aside and proceed to decrees upon the law and the facts as if no such issue had been submitted to a jury.
Our own practice conformed to the English practice until modified by statute.
Judge Green, in Orgain v. Ramsey, delivering the opinion of the court, says: “A Chancellor is not bound by the finding of a jury upon an issue of fact out of chancery submitted to them, and may disregard the finding and decide the cause ‘in the teeth of the verdict,’ yet it does not follow that it is to have no weight with him, and much less does it follow that this court is to be uninfluenced thereby”: 3 Hum., 580.
In the case of Timmons v. Garrison, Judge Turley says: “The finding of an issue of fact in chancery is not as obligatory upon the court as the finding of a verdict upon an issue at common law, but still it has much weight”: 4 Hum., 149.
The cases cited above, in 3 and 4 Hum., were decided respectively in 1842 and 1843.
In 1846 the Legislature passed “An Act to amend the practice in the Chancery Courts,” by the 14th section of which it is enacted, “that from and after the passage of this act it shall be the duty of the Chancellors of this State, upon the application of either of the parties, to empanel a jury to try and determine any issue of fact involved in any case pending in said courts; the finding of which jury shall be final and conclusive upon the Chancellor so far as the facts involved in the issue are concerned; provided, the Chancellor shall have power to grant new trials under the same rules and regulations that the Circuit Courts now have power to grant new trials:” Nich. Sup., 125.
In Gass v. Mason, 4 Sneed, 509, upon a rehearing of...
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Davis v. Mitchell
...returned in such a trial is not merely advisory but is entitled to the same weight and effect as a verdict in a court of law. James v. Brooks, 53 Tenn. 150; McElya v. Hill, 105 Tenn. 319, 59 S.W. 1025; Beatty v. Shenck, 127 Tenn. 63, 152 S.W. 1033, and cases cited; see also, Mutual Life Ins......
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Davis v. Mitchell
... ... merely advisory but is entitled to the same weight and effect ... as a verdict in a court of law. James v. Brooks, 53 ... Tenn. 150; McElya v. Hill, 105 Tenn. 319, 59 S.W ... 1025; Beatty v. Shenck, 127 Tenn. 63, 152 S.W. 1033, ... and cases ... ...
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State ex rel. Webster v. Daugherty
...legislature passed an Act to amend the practice in chancery courts so as to entitle either party to a right to trial by jury. James v. Brooks (1871) 53 Tenn. 150. The 1846 statute (later codified as the now repealed T.C.A. § 21--1102) was the only source of right to trial by jury in chancer......
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Davis v. Mason & Dixon Tank Lines, Inc. and Teamsters Local Union No. 549
...jury trials at law. T.C.A. Section 21--1016; Davis, et al. v. Mitchell, et al., 27 Tenn.App. 182, 178 S.W.2d 889; and James v. Brooks, et al., 53 Tenn. 150, 156 (1870). His Honor the Chancellor was required either to approve these findings of the jury and award judgment against the defendan......