James v. Dalhart Consol. Independent School Dist.
| Decision Date | 23 June 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 6223,6223 |
| Citation | 254 S.W.2d 826 |
| Parties | JAMES v. DALHART CONSOL. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
B. N. Richards, Dalhart, for appellant.
King Fike, Dalhart, for appellee.
This case is to determine the ownership of a tract of land 300 feet square situated in Dallam County, Texas. On April 10, 1920, the appellant, A. M. James, the owner of a number of sections of land situated in Dallam County, coveyed to the trustees of Common School District No. 4 this small tract of land. The conveyance, a general warranty deed, contained this clause:
'In the event said property is abandoned for school purposes the grantee herein shall have the right to remove any improvements which have been placed on said land by the grantee.'
The school trustees constructed buildings and improvements on the school tract and classes were held there until the fall term of 1945, when the trustees arranged to send their scholastics to the schools operated by the appellee, Dalhart Consolidated Independent School District. Since the school year 1944-1945, the tract of land and the improvements have not been used for school purposes. On July 6, 1949, Common School District No. 4 was consolidated with the appellee, Dalhart Consolidated Independent School District. Thereafter, so that the premises could be used as a community center, the last board of trustees of the Common School District and the appellee entered into a contract which allowed the board of trustees to retain $2,500 of the school district funds and, in return for the repair of the school building and teacherage, the appellee has permitted the property to be used as a community center. As a result of this agreement, the school tract and its improvements were taken over by the Andy James Community Center and since then it has been used as a community center.
It appears that after the appellant conveyed the land to the school district, he and others on January 31, 1922, executed a deed of trust covering approximately 131 sections of land to Charles C. Woods, trustee for the Inter-State Cattle Loan Company. Among these sections was Section 28, which contains the school tract. The deed of trust, which was to secure the payment of a note in the amount of $250,000, contains this provisions:
'It is specifically understood and agreed that this trust deed is secondary and inferior to encumbrances now of record against said lands.'
On May 31, 1923, the appellant, his wife and others, by general warranty deed conveyed all of section 28, and other tracts of land, to the James Ranch Company, a corporation. This deed contained this provision:
'In consideration of the sum of $1.00 and other valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, sold and conveyed and by these presents do grant, sell and convey, unto the James Ranch Company, a Texas corporation of the County of Dallam, State of Texas, its successors and assigns, subject to encumbrances now of record in said county, all the following described * * *.'
On June 18, 1925, the Inter-State Cattle Loan Company, as against A. M. James and others, foreclosed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Amarillo Division, the deed of trust dated January 31, 1922, which secured the payment of the note in the amount of $250,000. Under the foreclosure proceedings the property was sold to the Inter-State Cattle Loan Company and later, by general warranty deed, was conveyed by that company to the James Ranch Company. Still later, the James Ranch Company conveyed Section 28, less the school tract, to John G. Brown, Jr., and after the dissolution of the James Ranch Company, its stockholders conveyed the school tract by quitclaim deeds to the appellee, Dalhart Consolidated Independent School District.
In August or September, 1951, the appellant, contending that the appellee had had a reasonable time to remove the improvements from the property after it had ceased to be used for school purposes, started to remove one of the buildings from the school tract. The appellee, alleging that it owned the property in fee, filed this suit in which it sought to enjoin the appellant from removing any of the buildings. A temporary injunction was granted, and later the cause was tried before the court without a jury. In its judgment the court decreed that the title to the school tract was in the appellee, awarded appellee damages for the appellant's attempt to remove the school building, and permanently enjoined him from interfering with or attempting to remove the improvements from the property. From this judgment the appellant excepted and has duly perfected his appeal to this court.
The appellee insists that the appellant lost whatever interest he may have had in the school tract when he executed the deed of trust to secure the loan from the Inter-State Cattle Loan Company and when, later, he executed the general warranty deed to the James Cattle Company. The appellant does not agree with the appellee for two reasons: first, because the interest he retained in the school district was neither alienable nor transferable and therefore any later transaction he may have had did not divest him of a 'possibility of reverter,' which he maintains remains in him; and second, because the language of the deed of trust, dated January 31, 1922, is broad enough to exclude the school tract from the conveyance. We shall discuss the appellant's contentions in their order.
First, the appellant takes the position that when he executed the warranty deed conveying the tract of land to the school trustees, he conveyed nothing more than a fee simple title with a qualification annexed to it, i. e., 'in the event said property is abandoned for school uses or purposes, the title to the same shall revert to the grantor herein.' At common law such a fee was called a 'determinable fee'-an estate which could remain forever or which could terminate on the happening of the contingency limiting the estate. Although the whole estate was in the grantee or owner, the possibility of reverter remained in the grantor. Tiffany, Real Property, Third Ed., Vol. 1, para. 220. At common law the possibility of reverter was not an estate in land; it was incapable of alienation or devise but it did descend to the grantor's heirs. University of Vermont and State Agricultural College v. Ward, 104 Vt. 239, 158 A. 773, 776. The...
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