James v. Gaffney Mfg. Co.
Decision Date | 25 October 1930 |
Docket Number | 13009. |
Parties | JAMES v. GAFFNEY MFG. CO. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Cherokee County; J. Henry Johnson, Judge.
Action by John B. James against the Gaffney Manufacturing Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
T. B Butler and W. S. Hall, both of Gaffney, for appellant.
Barron Barron & Barron and John K. Hamblin, all of Union, for respondent.
This is an action for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff while in the employment of the defendant company.
The complaint alleges that on or about March 28, 1922, while working as a roll coverer and belt man in the defendant's weave room, the plaintiff fell from a wooden bench, sometimes called a "work horse," from which he was working, a distance of about seven feet to the floor, and was thereby seriously and permanently hurt. It was further alleged that his injuries were proximately caused by the negligence and willfulness of the defendant in the following respects, among others:
The defendant, answering, pleaded the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
The record contains the following statement as to some of the testimony adduced on trial of the case:
The jury found for the plaintiff, and, from judgment entered on the verdict, the defendant appeals.
The appellant, by its first and second exceptions, complains of the following portions of the charge of his honor, Judge Johnson, who presided at the trial:
The contention is that under this charge the jury could find actionable negligence on the part of the defendant to be true, and could also find contributory negligence and assumption of risk on the part of the plaintiff to be true; and that it would thus become their duty to weigh these truths and determine which was the heavier, resulting in the adoption of the rule of comparative negligence in a confused manner.
This contention is without merit. In making the charge to which the appellant objects, the court was not instructing the jury as to contributory negligence or assumption of risk, but was charging them as to the degree of proof imposed by law on the plaintiff in making out his case. He further told them, in defining the term, that the greater weight of the evidence did not mean, or depend upon, the swearing of the greater number of witnesses, for the jury might find the truth to lie in the mouth of a single witness in the case. Following this charge, he told them what it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he could recover, and later he instructed them fully and clearly as to contributory negligence and assumption of risk. When these portions of the charge are considered together, it is difficult to see how the jury could have been misled or confused by the instructions complained of; certainly, they could not have been confused in the manner and for the reasons stated by the appellant. We see no error as alleged in these exceptions.
The third exception alleges error in the following instruction:
The appellant contends that this charge made the impression on the minds of the jury that it was the plain duty of the master to warn the...
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