James v. Marshall
| Decision Date | 11 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | C. A. 1:22-cv-241-TFM-N |
| Parties | JOE NATHAN JAMES, JR. AIS 0000Z610, Plaintiff, v. STEVE MARSHALL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction. See Doc. 1. In the motion, Plaintiff requests the Court enter a preliminary injunction against Defendant to stay his scheduled execution. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss which contained a response to the preliminary injunction. See Doc. 8. The motion is ripe for the Court's review. After the Court considered the motion and response, the Court ORDERS the motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED.
Plaintiff is Joe Nathan James, Jr. (“Plaintiff” or “James”), an Alabama Inmate whose execution is set for July 28, 2022. He filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Steve Marshall in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Alabama. The district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and there are adequate allegations to support both.
The history of the crime is discussed in great length in the September 30, 2014 opinion issued in James' habeas appeal. See James v. Culliver, Civ. Act. No. 10-S-2929, 2014 WL 4926178, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139696 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2014). In short summary here, James was convicted of murdering his former girlfriend, Faith Hall, after breaking into the apartment where she was located and shooting her several times in the head, chest, and abdomen. He was tried twice and found guilty both times. The first conviction was reversed due to the judicial error in the admission of certain evidence. However, after retrial, he was again convicted of capital murder on June 16, 1999. The jury then returned a sentencing verdict recommendation by unanimous vote that James be sentenced to death. On July 9, 1999, the trial judge conducted the formal sentencing hearing, adopted the sentencing recommendation, and sentenced James to death. James appealed the second conviction and sentence which were affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on April 28, 2000. See James v. State, 788 So.2d 185 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari on December 15, 2000, and the United States Supreme Court did the same on May 21, 2001. See Ex parte James, No. 1991959, 2000 Ala. LEXIS 1511 (Ala. Dec. 15, 2000), James v. Alabama, 532 U.S. 1040, 121 S.Ct. 2005, 149 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2001).
On May 7, 2002, James then commenced collateral review proceedings in the state system under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. He was represented by counsel through these proceedings. The Court entered a final order denying post-conviction relief on October 28, 2004. James appealed the ruling to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals which affirmed. See James v. State, 61 So.3d 332 (Ala.Crim.App.2006). The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision for additional proceedings to develop and review the issue of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Ex parte James, 61 So.3d 352, 356 (Ala. 2009). Following remand, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals again affirmed the denial of the claims from the Rule 32 petition and denied the application for a rehearing. See James v. State, 61 So.3d 357 (Ala.Crim.App.2010). The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition for writ of certiorari on October 15, 2010 without opinion.
On October 29, 2010, James filed his federal habeas petition in the Northern District of Alabama and amended the petition on December 31, 2010. See James v. Culliver, Civ. Act. No. 10-S-2929, generally. The same counsel served as counsel in this proceeding. After careful review and with a detailed opinion, on September 30, 2014, the court denied his habeas petition and dismissed the petition. Id., 2014 WL 4926178, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139696. James' appeal of that judgment was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, James v. Warden, 957 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2020), and his petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on March 1, 2021. James v. Raybon, 141 S.Ct. 1463, 209 L.Ed.2d 180 (2021). As a result, at this point, his conviction and sentence are final because he completed the direct appeal, state postconviction review, and federal habeas review.
On April 12, 2022, proceeding pro se, James filed a second and successive petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as an unauthorized successive petition. James v. Raybon, Civ. Act. No. 1:22-cv-152-JB, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113260, 2022 WL 2308917 (S.D. Ala. June 27, 2022).
Once the conviction and sentence became final, on March 17, 2022, the State of Alabama (“the State”) filed a motion to set his execution date with the Alabama Supreme Court. On June 7, 2022, the Alabama Supreme Court granted the State's motion and set the execution for July 28, 2022.[1]
On June 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed this case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the first of several lawsuits pertaining to his upcoming execution.[2] In his present case, the complaint alleges only a few facts and claims. In sum, Plaintiff claims that the Defendant entered into an agreement with the Federal Defenders of the Middle District of Alabama to end a civil suit which allowed only the Federal Defender's clients to exercise an option to elect nitrogen hypoxia that was previously waived. See Doc. 1 at 4. Defendant incentivized these Federal Defender's clients by agreeing to not seek execution dates for those who signed a form created by the Federal Defenders which then created a protection for them that is unavailable to Plaintiff. Id. As a result, Defendant set James' execution date which he claims violates his due process and equal protection rights. He further states as facts that Defendant “entered into an agreement affording others similarly situated as the Plaintiff the opportunity to exercise a right that they waived while excluding the Plaintiff because of his representation.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff requests the Court stay the pending execution to allow Plaintiff the right to make a fair and informed election regarding his method of execution. Id. at 7.
The Court granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and construed the complaint as also containing a motion for preliminary injunction. See Doc. 4. Defendant was ordered to file a response to the motion for preliminary injunction on or before July 5, 2022. Id. On July 1, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) which included a detailed response to the motion for preliminary injunction. See Doc. 8. The Court construed the motion as both a motion to dismiss and a response to the motion for preliminary injunction. See Doc. 9. Though briefing on the motion to dismiss is ongoing, the Court considers the request for a preliminary injunction ripe for the Court's review.
The standard governing a stay of execution mirrors that for a preliminary injunction. See Valle v. Singer, 655 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2011).
“The chief function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the controversy can be fully and fairly adjudicated.” Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) ). The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction “is within the sound discretion of the district court.” Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The party seeking the preliminary injunction bears the burden of establishing its entitlement to relief. Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010).
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish the following prerequisites: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is issued; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs possible harm that the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) that the injunction would not disserve the public interest.” GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 788 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Burk v. Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 365 F.3d 1247, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Am. Red Cross v. Palm Beach Blood Bank, Inc., 143 F.3d 1407, 1410 (11th Cir. 1998) (). “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that should not be granted unless the movant clearly carries its burden of persuasion on each of these prerequisites.” GeorgiaCarry.Org, 788 F.3d at 1322 (quoting Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (11th Cir. 2001)); accord Cafe 207, Inc. v. St. Johns Cnty., 989 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir. 1993) (); see also Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975) (). The moving party's failure to demonstrate a single element may defeat the request regardless of the party's ability to establish any of the other elements. See, e.g., Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d...
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