James v. Rhode Island Auditorium, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 May 1938
• Docket Number: No. 7915.,7915.
• Citation: 199 A. 293
• Parties: JAMES v. RHODE ISLAND AUDITORIUM, Inc.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

199 A. 293

JAMES

v. RHODE ISLAND AUDITORIUM, Inc.

No. 7915.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 5, 1938.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Herbert L. Carpenter, Judge.

Action of trespass on the case for negligence by Helena M. James against the Rhode Island Auditorium, Inc., for injuries sustained while witnessing a hockey game under defendant's supervision. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and defendant took exception to denial of its motion for a directed verdict.

Exception overruled and case remitted for entry of judgment on the verdict.

Arthur L. Conaty of Providence, for plaintiff. Clifford A. Kingsley and Francis V. Reynolds, all of Providence, for defendant.

CAPOTOSTO, Justice.

This is an action of trespass on the case for negligence. It was tried before a justice of the superior court, sitting with a jury, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $500. The case is before us solely on the defendant's exception to the denial by the trial justice of its motion for a directed verdict, all other exceptions being expressly waived.

The defendant maintains and operates the Rhode Island Auditorium, in the city of Providence, as a place for public use, entertainment and assembly, "capable of being used for skating and other ice sports." The plaintiff, who had paid the required admission fee, claims to have been struck and injured by a "flying hockey puck" while witnessing a hockey game between two professional teams which were playing under the defendant's supervision in that building on the evening of November 28, 1935. The plaintiff contends that the defendant is liable because it failed to protect her against such injury by screening that part of the auditorium where she was seated, or to warn her of the danger to which she was exposing herself by occuping the seat that defendant had provided for her as a spectator.

Ice hockey as played on artificial ice in auditoriums or rinks is known mainly to those who have witnessed the game in such places. The construction of the rink and the object of the game is not so general as to be a matter of common knowledge. The testimony in the instant case shows that the playing surface in the defendant's auditorium is 192 feet long and 85 feet wide, with a "cage" as the goal at each end; that there is a dashboard around the rink 52 inches high from the ice surface to the top rail of the dashboard; that the dashboard at both ends of the rink and behind the goals has a wire screen on top of the dashboard for its entire length, the combined height of dashboard and screen being 10 feet 5 inches; that there is no screening of any kind above the dashboard on the sides of the rink; and that seats, in rising tiers, are provided for the spectators behind the dashboard on all sides of the rink.

The testimony further shows that in a hockey game the players of the opposing sides using a long curved stick, try to drive a hard rubber block or disk, about 1 inch thick and 3 inches in diameter, known as a "puck," along the ice and into the opponent's cage or goal. The screen above the dashboard behind each goal is placed there to protect the spectators at both ends of the playing surface from the danger of being struck by a "flying puck," which means a puck that leaves the playing surface of the rink.

The plaintiff's testimony, in substance, is that she and her husband, residents of New London, Conn., came to Providence to spend Thanksgiving Day with some friends; that she had never seen a professional hockey game played in a rink and was, therefore, unaware of any danger to a spectator in connection with such a performance; that on the evening in question she was one of a party that had purchased box seats for the game at the auditorium, which seats were behind the dashboard on the side of the rink and close to the playing surface; that she occupied the seat indicated by her ticket; and that, while she was so seated watching the game, she was struck in the face by the puck and suffered substantial injury.

The principal witness for the defendant was the architect and engineer under whose direction its auditorium was built. His testimony, as an expert in the construction of skating rinks for professional hockey games, is that the rink in the defendant's building was similar to all other such rinks that he had constructed, which included the Madison Square Garden in New York and the Boston Garden; that there is no definite standard as to the length or width of rinks, for in this respect "Hockey is different from base ball"; and that he had "tried to standardize everything in ice-rink construction" since he built the Madison Square Garden in 1908 and rebuilt it in 1920. (Italics ours.)

The testimony of the defendant's general manager, in so far as material to the issue before us, is that 3,133 tickets were printed for the game in question, with prices of $1.50 and $1.35 for seats along the sides and of $1 for 908 seats at the ends behind the "wire netting screen behind the goal"; that some 160 of these latter seats remained unsold, any one or more of which might have been occupied by spectators lawfully on its premises; that the defendant had charge of the seating arrangement on the evening of the accident; and that there were no signs about the rink warning of danger from a flying puck, which danger was not obvious to one who may not have been acquainted with the game. This witness further testified as follows:

"Q. The puck is propelled up and down the rink ordinarily, but in some of the games do they (meaning pucks) fly off the sides? A. Occasionally.

"Q. You have knowledge of that, haven't you? A. I have seen pucks go into the stands at times."

In this state of the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. Upon the denial of this motion, the trial justice left it for the jury to determine whether the defendant was negligent and also whether the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury from a flying puck by occupying the seat which had been sold to her by the defendant, especially if they believed her testimony that she was ignorant of any danger from such cause. The jury, as already stated, found in favor of the plaintiff.

In an action of trespass on the case for negligence against the proprietor or operator of a place of amusement, an invitee for compensation is ordinarily entitled to the exercise of reasonable care by the defendant in protecting such invitee against dangers which the defendant knew or reasonably should have foreseen in the exercise of such care. An invitee ordinarily assumes the risk of an obvious danger or of one that is a matter of common knowledge; conversely, such a person does not assume the risk of a hidden or undisclosed danger, not of common knowledge, in the absence of warning or personal knowledge. The defendant in the instant case was not required to anticipate and protect the plaintiff against the unlikely or the improbable, but it was bound to use such measures and means, in the use of its premises, as the ordinary prudent person, in its position and with its knowledge of hockey games, would have reasonably employed in protecting an invitee from dangers reasonably to be apprehended.

The defendant strongly contends that the trial justice erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict on the facts in this case. It directs our attention particularly to three cases, two in New York and one in Canada. The plaintiff, in opposing the defendant's contention, relies mainly on a recent Massachusetts decision. The cases cited by both parties present facts quite similar to those in the instant case. In all of the cases cited to us, the plaintiff, a spectator for compensation, was injured by a flying puck while sitting in an unscreened portion of a hockey rink. An examination of the grounds upon which these decisions rest is of assistance.

In Hammel v. Madison Square Garden Corporation, April 25, 1935, 156 Misc. 311, 279 N.Y.S. 815, 816, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, Second Department, holds that a directed verdict for the defendant was proper. In a short opinion the court says: "No case has been found which passes upon this exact situation. There are, however, a number of cases where spectators at baseball games have been injured by batted balls coming into the stand. The consensus of opinion in those cases is that there is no liability; that the proprietors of a baseball park are not obliged to screen all the seats; that spectators occupying seats...