O'Keefe v. Cheyenne Chamber of Commerce

• Decision Date: 12 September 1940
• Docket Number: 2147
• Citation: 105 P.2d 279,56 Wyo. 170
• Parties: O'KEEFE v. CHEYENNE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

105 P.2d 279

56 Wyo. 170

O'KEEFE v. CHEYENNE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

No. 2147

Supreme Court of Wyoming

September 12, 1940

APPEAL from the District Court, Laramie County; SAM M. THOMPSON Judge.

Action by Pattric Ruth O'Keefe against the Cheyenne Chamber of Commerce for personal injuries. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

For the appellant, there was a brief by Greenwood and More of Cheyenne, and oral argument by Mr. Greenwood.

Agricultural societies are obligated to provide reasonably safe places for persons lawfully in attendance at their public exhibitions. 1 R. C. L. 786. Although they are not insurers of the safety of their patrons, they are bound to use reasonable care to keep all parts of the grounds and approaches thereto reasonably safe for the protection of their patrons. 2 C. J. 995; 2 Am Jur. 450; 52 A. L. R. 1400, 1402; Higgins v. Society, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1132; Redmond v. National Association, 138 N.Y.S. 364. Such associations are obligated to properly enclose tracks for the protection of patrons from runaway horses. Windeler v. Association (Ind.) 59 N.E. 209; 22 A. L. R. 616; annotation in 29 A L. R. 30. The same rule applies to seats and places of entrance. Blanchette v. Union Street R. Co. (Mass.) 143 N.E. 310; annotations 38 A. L. R. 358; Durning v. Hyman, 53 A. L. R. 851; Magruder v. Columbia Amusement Company (Ky.) 292 S.W. 341; Carney Coal Company v. Benedict, 22 Wyo. 362; Sand Park v. Shrader (Okla.) 198 P. 983. The court erred in directing a verdict for defendant. Hester v. Coliseum Motor Company, 41 Wyo. 345; Rosson v. Hylton, 45 Wyo. 540; Galicich v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Company (Wyo.) 87 P.2d 27. Plaintiff's evidence established a prima facie case. Defendant's evidence was conflicting. Gannon v. Laclede Gas Light Company (Mo.) 43 L. R. A. 505. The trial court improperly excluded evidence offered by plaintiff with reference to the negligence of defendant in leaving parked areas unguarded on the south. There was no evidence of negligence on the part of plaintiff and plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury on her theory. Collins v. Anderson, 37 Wyo. 275.

For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument by Albert D. Walton of Cheyenne.

It is the duty of a trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant when the whole evidence, with all reasonable inferences therefrom, is not such as would warrant or support a verdict for the plaintiff. Miller v. Farmers Bank and Trust Co. (Colo.) 260 P. 112; Scherer v. Schlaberg (N. D.) 122 N.W. 1000; Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116; Meyer v. Houck (Iowa) 52 N.W. 235; Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U.S. 278; Loudon v. Scott (Mont.) 194 P. 488; Diamond v. Weyerhaeuser (Cal.) 174 P. 38; Weed v. Clark (Me.) 108 A. 8; McCormack v. Oil Co. (N. J.) 37 A. 617; Boswell v. First Nat. Bank, 16 Wyo. 161; In re Lane's Estate, 50 Wyo. 119; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Arbogast, 53 Wyo. 275; Calkins v. Coal Mining Company, 25 Wyo. 409; Wilde v. Amoretti Lodge Company, 47 Wyo. 505; Galicich v. R. R. Co. (Wyo.) 87 P.2d 27. In view of the state of the evidence in this case, the court properly directed a verdict for the defendant. The defendant was not an insurer of the safety of those invited on the premises, but was only charged with reasonable care to prevent injury and to see that the grounds were reasonably safe. Radcliffe v. Baseball Co., 81 P.2d 625; Worcester v. Enterprise Corp., 82 P.2d 68; Morrison v. Union Park Association (Me.) 149 A. 804; Lemos v. Madden (Wyo.) 200 P. 791; Hildebrand v. R. R. Co. (Colo.) 17 P.2d 651; Hines v. Sweeney, 28 Wyo. 57; Amusement Co. v. Plfug, 2 F.2d 961; Wells v. Association (Minn. ) 142 N.W. 706; James v. Auditorium, 199 A. 293; 62 C. J. 863, 867, 874, 879; 45 C. J. 740, 748; Morris v. Terminal Company, 198 S.E. 272; Flanagan v. Goldberg, 122 N.Y.S. 205. The trial court ruled properly on the questions and offers of proof referred to in appellant's alleged errors numbered one to eight, inclusive. Respondent contends that it took every reasonable precaution, as shown by the evidence, for the protection of persons attending the Frontier Show. Defendant was not negligent as a matter of law.

RINER, Chief Justice. KIMBALL and BLUME, JJ., concur.

OPINION

RINER, Chief Justice.

Pattric Ruth O'Keefe, as plaintiff below and appellant here, brought her action in the district court of Laramie County against the Cheyenne Chamber of Commerce as defendant and respondent in this proceeding, seeking to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been incurred by her as a result of asserted negligence on the part of the defendant. The case was tried by the court aforesaid, with a jury in attendance, and at the conclusion of the trial the jury was instructed by the court to bring in a verdict in favor of the defendant. Judgment was duly entered upon this verdict. As already indicated the cause was brought here by direct appeal. The only question involved is whether there was sufficient evidence which required the case to be submitted to the jury. The proper solution of this problem requires a consideration of the claimed negligence in connection with the submitted proofs of the parties. As to these matters the record discloses as follows:

The defendant aforesaid, a Wyoming corporation, conducts each year, on grounds which it exclusively controls and which were and are inclosed, a show generally known as "Frontier Days." This show consists of horse racing, the riding and roping of wild horses and cattle, features common to a type of western exhibition known as a rodeo, with other amusement features. The public in general is invited, but each person attending said show is expected and required to pay an admission fee thereto in order to obtain entrance to the grounds upon which it is conducted. These grounds were and are surrounded by wire fencing, in which are located certain gates for the admission and convenience of those attending the exhibition. There were and are two southerly gates, the easterly one, which we shall designate "A", designed for the admission and convenience of busses, taxicabs, police cars and concession trucks. The other southerly gate, which may be designated "B", was and is designed to be used as an exit gate by this class of traffic.

On the west side of these grounds were and are also two other gates, the most southerly of which was and is the main entrance gate, which shall be referred to herein as "C", and the other hereinafter designated as "D". The entrance last mentioned was for the admission of cowboys, contestants in the races, etc., and the horseback riders to the large corral opposite a steel grandstand which was designed for the paying guests of the show. This grandstand was erected upon the premises and equipped with seats, to which attending guests were permitted to purchase tickets and thereby to enter the inclosed grounds and occupy same during the performance for which these tickets were purchased. In order to gain entrance to this grandstand after being admitted within said inclosure, each person holding an admission ticket was required to present same at certain so-called pedestrian gates located within said inclosed area but established in a wire fence that is placed at the rear of said steel grandstand and in front of its several entrances and exits. Passing through these pedestrian gates the holders of tickets obtained entrance into the grandstand to the seats for which they had paid.

The steel wire fence in which these pedestrian gates are placed runs lengthwise approximately north and south, paralleling the rear of said grandstand. Immediately west of the steel wire fence just mentioned there was maintained and set apart by the defendant a tract of ground about 150 yards wide, running in an easterly and westerly direction and about 750 yards long, running in a northerly and southerly direction, within which guests entering said grounds inclosed by the general fence first above referred to were required to park their automobiles and then walk to one of the pedestrian gates already described. The south boundary of this parking area ran parallel with the south side of said interior steel wire fence located at the rear of the steel grandstand aforesaid, as already indicated. The defendant required automobiles in said area to be so arranged as to leave lanes with room between the rows of parked cars, within which lanes pedestrians might walk. These lanes ran approximately north and south in direction, with the first or easterly lane located between said interior steel wire fence and the first row of parked automobiles, this lane being about 6 feet in width.

On July 30, 1937, when the annual 1937 Frontier Days show was being held and about 1:30 P. M., the plaintiff, having paid the necessary admission fee to defendant and thereby being in possession of a ticket to a seat in the grandstand, was admitted into the general inclosure grounds through the westerly main gate "C" aforesaid in an automobile and was directed by the defendant's employees in the parking of said vehicle in the particular space hereinabove described. She was thus entitled to be admitted through one of the pedestrian gates to occupy a seat in the grandstand and witness the show. While standing in a line of pedestrians to the west of one of the gates leading through said interior fence to the grandstand already described and waiting her turn to be admitted through said gate, plaintiff was suddenly, and, as she testified as a witness in her own behalf "struck with terrific force," knocked violently to the ground and injured by a horse running in a northerly direction along one of the lanes next to the cars, to which reference has already been made. This unfortunate occurrence was brought about thus:

Two...