James v. Sec'y, Case No: 8:11-cv-640-T-27MAP
| Decision Date | 31 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 8:11-cv-640-T-27MAP |
| Parties | RAY JAMES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner, an inmate in the Florida Department of Corrections proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. 1). He challenges his convictions for attempted lewd or lascivious molestation and battery entered in 2003 in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, Florida. In its response (Dkt. 26), Respondent argues that the petition should be denied. Upon review, the petition must be denied.
Petitioner was charged with one count of lewd or lascivious molestation (count one) and one count of attempted lewd or lascivious molestation (count two). On November 14, 2003, a jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of attempted lewd or lascivious molestation on count one and of the lesser-included offense of battery on count two. On March 19, 2004, Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment on count one and time served on count two. The Second District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed Petitioner's judgment and sentence on September 28, 2005. James v. State, 915 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (table).
Petitioner filed a motion for postconviction relief, as well as an amended motion for postconviction relief, under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The state court entered orders summarily denying several of petitioner's claims and granting an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims. Following the evidentiary hearing, the state court filed its final order denying Petitioner's Rule 3.850 motion on March 20, 2008.
On July 16, 2010, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Petitioner's Rule 3.850 with the exception of part of claim five. The appellate court reversed and remanded as to the portion of claim five alleging that the fine imposed on Petitioner exceeded the statutory maximum. James v. State, 44 So.3d 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). The mandate issued on October 25, 2010.1 Respondent acknowledges that the habeas petition is timely.
This petition is subject to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") effective April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d) sets forth a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court's findings of law and fact. It provides that habeas relief may not be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless such determination:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
The Supreme Court has explained the deferential review of a state court's findings:
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A state court's factual findings must also be given deference. Specifically, a state court's determinations of fact "shall be presumed to be correct," and the habeas petitioner "shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 890-91 (11th Cir. 2003).
In order to pursue federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must exhaust every available state court remedy for challenging his conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). "[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). A federal habeas petitioner "shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State ... if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c); Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003).
To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must make the state court aware of both the legal and factual bases for his claim. A petitioner must "fairly present" his federal claim in state court. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995). "To present a federal constitutional claim properly in state court, 'the petitioner must make the state court aware that the claims asserted present federal constitutional issues.'" Zeigler v. Crosby, 345 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998)).
"[T]he prohibition against raising nonexhausted claims in federal court extends not only to broad legal theories of relief, but also to the specific assertions of fact that might support relief." Kelley v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1344 (11th Cir. 2004). Exhaustion therefore requires that the petitioner present the state court with the particular legal basis for relief, as well as the facts supporting the claim. See Snowden, 135 F.3d at 735.
The doctrine of procedural default provides that "[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). See also O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848; Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 1999).
Additionally, a federal habeas petition must involve a question of federal law. A state court's interpretation of state laws or rules, when no federal constitutional issue is addressed, does not provide a basis for federal habeas relief. Therefore, a claim that solely involves state law is not cognizable in a § 2254 petition. See Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Carrizales v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1053, 1054-55 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To obtain relief under Strickland, a petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687. In order to show deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 690. To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show Id. at 694.
Counsel is presumed to have provided effective assistance. Id. at 690. Further, "a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Id. If a reviewing court can dispose of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on one prong of the Strickland test, the court need not consider the other prong. Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir. 1998).
Petitioner presents fourteen grounds for relief. His claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, raised in Grounds Two through Twelve, will be addressed first, followed by his claims concerning errors in the state court proceedings, raised in Grounds Thirteen and Fourteen, and his claim of actual innocence, raised in Ground One.
Ground Two: "Unreasonable and substandard investigations of James alibi and exoneratingevidence."
This case involved one count of lewd or lascivious molestation and one count of attempted lewd or lascivious molestation that occurred on May 8, 2002, at a swimming pool at the apartments where Petitioner and the two minor victims lived. The charging document specified that these offenses took place in Hillsborough County. Petitioner argues that counsel failed to obtain and present documentary evidence showing that he was at work in Pinellas County on the date and time when the offenses occurred. He argues that the state court erred in applying Strickland to this claim when it denied his Rule 3.850 motion.
In ground one of his Rule 3.850 motion, Petitioner argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to present alibi evidence in the form of sign-in and sign-out logs from his place of employment that would have shown he could not have committed the offenses. Therefore, Petitioner raised essentially the same claim in his Rule 3.850 motion that he now presents as Ground Two of his habeas petition. Accordingly, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present alibi evidence was raised in state court and his petition, liberally construed, presents an exhausted claim.2
The state court conducted an evidentiary hearing on this claim. At...
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