James v. State, 5D98-3311.
| Decision Date | 28 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 5D98-3311.,5D98-3311. |
| Parties | Alton JAMES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Rosemarie Farrell, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
After James was convicted, following a jury trial, of aggravated assault with a firearm and carrying a concealed firearm,1 he appealed to this court. We remanded the case to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to whether juror misconduct had occurred which was sufficient to require a new trial pursuant to Marshall v. State, 664 So.2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), rev. denied, 675 So.2d 122 (Fla.1996). The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied James' motion for new trial based on juror misconduct. James now appeals this ruling, and we affirm.
In this case, a juror, Anderson, failed to respond to the question posed by the prosecutor, whether any prospective juror had a family member or close relative who had been accused or convicted of a crime. Several jurors responded they had, but Anderson made no response. In fact, she had two close relatives who had been convicted of crimes.
The trial court concluded that Anderson's failure to disclose was not material. The prosecutor's general question had produced nine jurors who had relatives who had been convicted of crimes, but three of them ultimately served on the jury. Further, defense counsel did not ask questions of the responding prospective jurors as to what kinds of crimes the various relatives had committed, except one who thought her son had been wrongfully charged. Had this issue been important to the defense, counsel would have made efforts to inquire further into the nature of the offenses. Two chose not to disclose the nature of the crimes involved, and yet they were selected for the jury.
Also, Anderson was asked whether she knew James or Rawls, the victim in the case, or members of their families, or two defense witnesses. She denied knowing them. At the hearing below, Anderson testified that she was a life-time resident of Winter Garden, as were James and Rawls and their families. But she denied she recognized James at trial, or knew who his family members were. She knew one of them only by a nickname. She also denied she knew Rawls, or knew that he worked at Disney World where she also worked, or any of the defense witnesses, who also worked there. The trial judge found Anderson knew members of James' family, but not by their family names, and she did not connect any of them to James at trial.
A juror's nondisclosure of information during voir dire warrants a new trial only if the defendant establishes the information is relevant and material to jury service in the case, the juror concealed the information during questioning, and failure to disclose the information was not attributable to the defendant's lack of diligence. Lebron v. State, 724 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Marshall v. State, 664 So.2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), rev. denied, 675 So.2d 122 (Fla.1996); Blaylock v. State, 537 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), rev. denied, 547 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 1989). Nondisclosure is considered material if it is substantial and important so that if the facts were known, the defense may have been influenced to peremptorily exclude the juror from the jury. See Blaylock, 537 So.2d at 1106-07
.
In this case, the trial court found Anderson did not fail to disclose her knowledge of the defendant, victim, or their families, nor the defense witnesses. We are bound by that fact finding.2 We agree with the trial court that, based on defense counsel's lack of interest in whether prospective jurors had relatives who had been convicted of crimes, Anderson's failure to disclose that information was not material.
AFFIRMED.
I recognize the authority of this court and other courts of appeal of this state that a juror's nondisclosure of information during voir dire even when the questions require such disclosure warrants a new trial only if the undisclosed information is relevant and material to jury service.3 I agree with the majority that based on defense counsel's actions in this case, even if the juror had acknowledged that two close relatives had been convicted of a crime, she most likely would have been kept on the jury. Other jurors making such revelations were. Even so, that doesn't mean the question asked was immaterial. It merely means that even with a positive response from other jurors to the same question, they were found acceptable based on their voir dire examination as a whole. In any event, this analysis focuses on the contents of the deception.
Far more important, in my view, is the fact that the juror's deception was intentional.4 Even though the trial court did not specifically find an intentional nondisclosure, its statements in the record seem to acknowledge that the court recognized that the nondisclosure was intentional but then considered whether, since other jurors with criminal relatives were left on the jury, the nondisclosure was material. But would the defense counsel have left the juror on the panel if he had known she intentionally deceived him on the issue?
The Supreme Court of Missouri in Williams v. Barnes Hospital, 736 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Mo.1987), states the rule recognized by many courts: Williams holds that it is only "where nondisclosure is found to be both unintentional and reasonable, the relevant inquiry becomes whether, under the circumstances, the juror's presence on the jury did or may have influenced the verdict so as to prejudice the party seeking a new trial."5
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Lebron v. State
...been influenced to peremptorily exclude the juror from the jury), review denied, 547 So.2d 1209 (Fla.1989); but cf. James v. State, 751 So.2d 682 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that a prospective juror's failure to disclose, during voir dire, that she had two close relatives who had been conv......
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Bolling v. State
...is so substantial that, if the facts were known, the defense likely would peremptorily exclude the juror from the jury. James v. State, 751 So.2d 682 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).... .... Omitted information has been considered relevant and material where it implies a bias or sympathy for the other ......
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Roberts ex rel. Estate of Roberts v. Tejada
...that if the facts were known, the defense may have been influenced to peremptorily challenge the juror from the jury. James v. State, 751 So.2d 682 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). See also De La Rosa (plaintiff entitled to a new trial where juror failed to disclose that he was a defendant in at least ......
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Murphy v. Hurst, 5D02-3047.
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