Jamison v. Howard

• Decision Date: 07 October 1980
• Docket Number: No. 21309,21309
• Citation: 271 S.E.2d 116,275 S.C. 344
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: William C. JAMISON, Respondent, v. George HOWARD, Jr., and James Hallums, Defendants, of Whom George Howard, Jr., is Appellant.

Page 116

271 S.E.2d 116

275 S.C. 344

William C. JAMISON, Respondent, v. George HOWARD, Jr., and James Hallums, Defendants of Whom George Howard, Jr., is Appellant.

No. 21309.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Oct. 7, 1980.

J. D. Todd, Jr. and Bradford N. Martin, both of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, for appellant.

Jefferson V. Smith, Jr., of Carter, Philpot, Johnson & Smith, Greenville, for respondent.

James D. Calmes, III, Greenville, for defendant Hallums.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice:

Plaintiff William C. Jamison brought this action against George Howard, Jr. and James Hallums, defendants, to recover damages suffered as the result of a gunshot wound inflicted at the direction of Hallums. This court heretofore reversed the granting by the trial judge of summary judgment to defendant Howard and remanded the case for trial. See Jamison v. Howard, 271 S.C. 385, 247 S.E.2d 450 (1978). Upon trial Jamison, who was made a paraplegic as a result of the shooting, was awarded a verdict of $356,000.00 actual damages, plus $144,000.00 punitive damages against both Hallums and Howard. Only Howard appeals; we affirm.

At trial the crucial issue as relates to the liability of Howard was whether Hallums was in pursuit of a collection of money owed Howard's party shop at the time of the shooting such that Hallums was acting as agent for Howard. There is no appeal from the implicit finding of the jury that Hallums ordered his friend, Morgan, to kill Jamison. He wounded him instead.

The uncontroverted evidence at trial showed that Howard was the owner of Howard's Party Shop and employed Hallums as its manager. Jamison was the operator of the Chocolate City Lounge and on two or three occasions had purchased beer and wine from the party shop. On those occasions, Jamison would not pay for the merchandise until he had sold it at his lounge. Jamison testified that it was his understanding that these were credit purchases from the party shop. Hallums testified that on these occasions he had personally paid the cash drawer and permitted Jamison to owe him (Hallums), and that Jamison did not owe Howard any amount.

In December of 1975 Jamison bought $189.00 worth of beer and wine in such a transaction at the party shop. He was unable to repay the debt promptly because of financial difficulties. On at least two occasions Hallums spoke to Jamison about payment of the debt and both admit the conversations were of a friendly nature. Further, both admit that an extension of time was granted by adding another $20.00 to the outstanding debt. The circumstances surrounding the extension are in dispute. The testimony becomes contradictory when the events of January 26, 1976 are related.

Jamison testified as follows:

(1) Hallums and his friend Morgan came to Jamison's apartment to collect the money due;

(2) Hallums said Howard wanted his money or else wanted to see Jamison downtown;

(3) Jamison refused to pay the money or to go downtown;

(4) Hallums then handed a gun to Morgan with an order to kill Jamison; and

(5) Morgan shot Jamison, rendering him a paraplegic.

Morgan disappeared and has not been apprehended. Hallums denied that he knew anything about the attack on Jamison and asserted an alibi defense. Howard testified that he had authorized no credit sales of beer and wine, since such transactions are against state law and that Jamison owed him nothing. He bolstered Hallums' alibi testimony.

At appropriate stages of the trial, counsel for Howard moved for a nonsuit, for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It was argued that the evidence did not make a jury issue warranting a finding that Hallums was the agent of Howard in attempting the collection. The trial judge denied all motions, holding that the jury and not the judge, should determine the agency question. Howard excepts to these rulings.

Before discussing the directed verdict issue, we first consider Howard's exception contending that certain testimony was improperly admitted into evidence. The testimony to which Howard objects involves statements allegedly made by Hallums to Jamison immediately prior to the shooting. Jamison testified on direct examination:

"A. Mr. Hallums said that George wanted his money.

....

"A. He (Hallums) told me George wanted his money or he wanted to see me downtown.

....

"A. He said that George wanted his money and he had to have his money."

Howard objected to this entire line of testimony on the ground that it was hearsay as to him and should not be permitted. Even if hearsay as to him, the judge was not required to exclude it. It was definitely admissible against Hallums. If this action had been against Hallums alone, it would hardly be argued that the testimony was inadmissible as it relates to the charge against Hallums. Beyond debate, evidence may be admissible for one purpose though inadmissible for other purposes. I Wigmore on Evidence § 13. Likewise, evidence may be admissible against one defendant and inadmissible against another. Player v. Thompson, 259 S.C. 600, 193 S.E.2d 531 (1972). In such a situation the evidence should be admitted. The party objecting to the evidence can be protected by requesting the judge to instruct the jury as to the purpose for which the evidence is being submitted. No such charge was requested or given at the time the evidence was admitted or at the time of the general charge of the law to the jury by the judge. Further, no objection was made to the failure of the judge to give such instruction.

The issues and the facts in the case before us and those in the case of Lazar v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 197 S.C. 74, 14 S.E.2d 560 (1941), are similar in many ways. In that case the manager of the A & P Store committed an assault and battery upon one of the store's competitors. Therein this court quoted, with approval, 6 C.J.S. Assault and Battery, § 40, p. 857:

"Where it is material to show that motive of the assailant or the existence of malice or ill will on his part, in order to enhance the damages or for any other lawful purpose, prior occurrences and both his prior and subsequent declarations, actions, and conduct, as well as those which accompany the act are legitimate evidence for that purpose."

As relates to the directed verdict issue, we agree with the argument of Howard to the effect that a denial of summary judgment does not necessarily mean that a directed verdict should be denied also. The two motions are akin in the sense that the granting of either holds as a matter of law that a party is not entitled to prevail. Summary judgment speaks in terms of "no genuine issue of fact." Directed verdict speaks in terms of "the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the whole of the evidence." A ruling on a motion for summary judgment and a ruling on a motion for a directed verdict must stand upon the showing which has been made to the court at the time the motion is submitted.

Summary judgment by the trial judge was reversed by this court because we were of the opinion that genuine issues of fact did exist. Denial of the motion for a directed verdict must be sustained because the evidence is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference on the agency issue. When the whole of the evidence is considered, we cannot say as a matter of law that reasonable men...