Jamison v. State

• Decision Date: 15 November 2016
• Docket Number: No. 6, Sept. Term, 2016,6, Sept. Term, 2016
• Citation: 450 Md. 387,148 A.3d 1267
• Parties: William Todd Jamison v. State of Maryland
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

450 Md. 387

148 A.3d 1267

William Todd Jamison

v.State of Maryland

No. 6, Sept. Term, 2016

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

November 15, 2016

Argued by Darren M. Welch (Donald P. Salzman, Anand S. Raman, Washington DC), on brief, for Appellant.

Argued by Robert Taylor Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellee.

Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Hotten, Getty, Lynne A. Battaglia (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Battaglia, J.William Todd Jamison, Petitioner, was indicted in 1990 in Baltimore County on fifteen charges related to a sexual assault; the charges included: first degree rape, second degree rape, kidnapping, false imprisonment, first degree sexual offense, second degree sexual offense, third degree sexual offense, attempted murder, robbery, theft, assault, battery, and impersonating a police officer. Jamison, thereafter, entered an Alford plea¹ to first degree rape and kidnapping and was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 30 years.

In 2008, Jamison filed a Petition for DNA Testing, alleging that newly discovered slides containing cellular material from swabs taken from the victim's vulva, vagina, and endocervix needed to be tested:

41. The Slides constitute “scientific identification evidence” under Maryland Code of Criminal Procedure Section 8–201. The sperm on the Slides was apparently deposited by the sole suspect in this matter. A DNA test that excludes Mr. Jamison as the source of the sperm would compel the conclusion that he is innocent of the crimes for which he has been convicted and is incarcerated. Accordingly, the evidence in this case meets the standards for court-ordered DNA testing pursuant to Maryland Code of Criminal Procedure Section 8–201.

Judge Patrick Cavanaugh of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted Jamison's motion, and Orchid Cellmark of Dallas, Texas conducted the testing. Jamison, thereafter, filed a Motion to Vacate Conviction pursuant to Section 8–201 of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code (2008 Repl. Vol, 2009 Supp.).²

He contemporaneously filed a Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence pursuant to Section 8–301 of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code (2008 Repl. Vol., 2009 Supp.).³ The State responded on the merits but also raised the issue of Jamison's guilty plea as a defense:

11. In this case, the Defendant proceeded by way of a guilty plea. Even if the Cellmark evidence is reliable and admissible, its introduction into the guilty plea proceedings would not create a substantial possibility that Petitioner would not have been convicted based upon the overwhelming facts of guilt in this case.

Judge Vicki Ballou–Watts of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County held a hearing on the motions in November of 2014 and during the next year, denied them. Jamison filed a timely notice of appeal under Section 8–201(k)(6)⁴ in which he raised the following questions:

1. Did the Circuit Court err in holding that a petitioner under Section 8–201 must prove that it is “more than ... ‘likely’ ” that he would have been convicted but for new DNA evidence?

2. Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion when it found that the underlying DNA testing conducted by Cellmark was not reliable?

3. Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion when it found that evidence of DNA that matched neither the victim nor the defendant in the criminal action was not “favorable” to that defendant and did not produce a “substantial possibility” of a different result in that action?

4. Did the Circuit Court err when it rejected Dr. Perlin's probabilistic genotyping analysis of Appellant's expert as irrelevant and not generally accepted in the scientific community?

5. Did the Circuit Court consider improper factors in determining whether a new trial was warranted “in the interest of justice” under Maryland Code of Criminal Procedure Section 8–201(i)(3) ?

Before us, the State not only responds on the merits, but also asserts that Jamison cannot avail himself of a Petition for DNA testing because he entered a plea rather than going to trial. We agree.

Section 8–201 permits post-conviction petitions for DNA testing of “scientific identification evidence,” which is described in Section 8–201(a)(5) as evidence that:

(i) is related to an investigation or prosecution that resulted in a judgment of conviction;

(ii) is in the actual or constructive possession of a law enforcement agency or agent of a law enforcement agency; and

(iii) contains biological evidence from which DNA may be recovered that may produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of a convicted person of wrongful conviction or sentencing if subject to DNA testing.

Section 8–201(d) articulates those findings that a court must make before ordering DNA testing:

(d) Findings requiring DNA testing .—(1) Subject to subsection (e) of this section, a court shall order DNA testing if the court finds that:

(i) a reasonable probability exists that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing; and

(ii) the requested DNA test employs a method of testing generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.

If the results of the DNA testing are unfavorable or favorable, Section 8–201(i) defines the consequences:

(i) Disposition upon receipt of results. —(1) If the results of the postconviction DNA testing are unfavorable to the petitioner, the court shall dismiss the petition.

(2) If the results of the postconviction DNA testing are favorable to the petitioner, the court shall:

(i) if no postconviction proceeding has been previously initiated by the petitioner under § 7–102^[5]of this article, open a postconviction proceeding under § 7–102 of this article;(ii) if a postconviction proceeding has been previously initiated by the petitioner under § 7–102 of this article, reopen a postconviction proceeding under § 7–104^[6]of this article; or

(iii) on a finding that a substantial possibility exists that the petitioner would not have been convicted if the DNA testing results had been known or introduced at trial, order a new trial.

(3) If the court finds that a substantial possibility does not exist under paragraph (2)(iii) of this subsection, the court may order a new trial if the court determines that the action is in the interest of justice.

(4) If a new trial is granted, the court may order the release of the petitioner on bond or on conditions that the court finds will reasonably assure the presence of the petitioner at trial.

We acknowledge from the start that Section 8–201 is silent regarding whether a person who has pled guilty is permitted or prohibited from pursuing a post-conviction DNA test. Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia expressly permit those who have pled guilty to seek post-conviction DNA testing,⁷ and one state statute expressly prohibits those who have pled guilty from accessing post-conviction DNA testing.⁸ The legislative history of Section 8–201 suggests, however, that the Legislature did not intend for Section 8–201 to be available to those who have entered a guilty plea.

Before we forage into the woods of legislative intent,⁹ however, we must explore whether Jamison's Alford plea can be considered a guilty plea. We previously have concluded that an Alford plea equates to a guilty plea. In Bishop v. State , 417 Md. 1, 20, 7 A.3d 1074 (2010), we recognized that, “an Alford plea is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea” because “[l]ike a guilty plea and nolo [contendere ] plea, the Alford plea waives challenges to adverse rulings on pretrial motions and all procedural objections, constitutional or otherwise, limiting appeals to jurisdictional defects and challenges based on the propriety of the trial court's acceptance of the plea.” Bishop , 417 Md. at 20, 7 A.3d 1074 (citing Ward v. State , 83 Md.App. 474, 480, 575 A.2d 771 (1990) ). In Ward , cited in Bishop , the Court of Special Appeals recognized that, “we do not see how an Alford plea could be construed as anything short of a guilty plea.” Ward , 83 Md.App. at 479, 575 A.2d 771.

The colloquy conducted in 1990 by Judge Barbara Kerr Howe of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, when she took Jamison's Alford plea, reflects a rights' advisement for a guilty plea:

THE COURT: You understand that by pleading guilty you're giving up constitutional rights to which you would otherwise be entitled?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes

* * *

THE COURT: You understand that by speaking today and entering the guilty plea that you are, in all respects, indicating that you are guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He understands that, your Honor, but he—yeah.

THE COURT: I understand.

Judge Howe then explained to Jamison that, by pleading guilty, he was waiving various rights:

THE COURT: Do you understand that you are limited in your right to take an appeal from finding of guilt by this Court to four grounds? They can be whether or not this Court has proper jurisdiction; whether or not you're entering a plea voluntarily today; whether or not you would receive an illegal sentence from the Court and whether or not you have a competent attorney representing you. Do you plead guilty today of your own free will and without condition?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you believe that the evidence against you is very strong and that a guilty plea is in your best interests?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

* * *

THE COURT: All right. Where did this offense take place?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Baltimore County, your Honor.

THE COURT: In Baltimore County, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: You understand that if the State proves that the offense took place—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: (Nodding head yes.)

THE COURT: —any petition that you would make for right of appeal on that ground would probably not be particularly effective since Baltimore County would have been—proved to the satisfaction of any Court to have been the proper

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