Janaki v. Christus Spohn Cancer Ctr. - Calallen
| Decision Date | 08 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | NUMBER 13-20-00127-CV |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
| Parties | DR. LALITHA MADHAV JANAKI, Appellant, v. CHRISTUS SPOHN CANCER CENTER - CALALLEN AND CHRISTUS SPOHN CANCER CENTER - SHORELINE, Appellees. |
DR. LALITHA MADHAV JANAKI, Appellant,
v.
C.H. WILKINSON PHYSICIAN NETWORK D/B/A CHRISTUS PHYSICIAN GROUP, Appellee.
DR. LALITHA MADHAV JANAKI, Appellant,
v.
CHRISTUS SPOHN HOSPITAL - CORPUS CHRISTI AND CHRISTUS SPOHN HOSPITAL CORPUS CHRISTI - SHORELINE, Appellees.
On appeal from the 319th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Hinojosa and Silva
Opinion by Justice Silva
Appellant Dr. Lalitha Madhav Janaki brought suit against appellees C.H. Wilkinson d/b/a Christus Physician Group (CPG); Christus Spohn Hospital - Corpus Christi, Christus Spohn Hospital Corpus Christi - Shoreline (collectively, the Hospitals); and Christus Spohn Cancer Center - Calallen, and Christus Spohn Cancer Center - Shoreline (collectively, the Cancer Centers) for retaliation against Dr. Janaki for reporting potential Medicare fraud. Appellees each filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the statutory relief sought by Dr. Janaki was inapplicable to each party as a matter of law. The trial court granted each appellee's motion for summary judgment. By three issues, one applicable to each set of appellees, Dr. Janaki asserts the trial court erred by granting the motions for summary judgment because appellees should be treated as a "single integrated enterprise," thus allowing the statutory relief pleaded. We affirm.
Dr. Janaki, a radiation oncologist, was employed by CPG as a physician providing cancer treatment to patients at the Hospitals and Cancer Centers. Dr. Janaki's employment contract with CPG began on June 27, 2014, and, throughout her employment, she maintained privileges1 with the Hospitals and Cancer Centers. In December 2016, Dr. Janaki began raising concerns with CPG and the Hospitals regarding the Hospitals' use of Medicare physician billing numbers and services for physicians who no longer provided services at the Hospitals.2 On August 18, 2017, Dr. Janaki was calledinto a meeting with a representative from CPG and a human resource official from the Hospitals. At the meeting, CPG informed Dr. Janaki that it was terminating her employment because of her behavior and quality of patient care.
On August 30, 2017, Dr. Janaki's then-counsel received a letter from CPG's regional counsel stating that "[t]he hospital informed CPG that it no longer wanted Dr. Janaki to provide services under the CPG contract." Dr. Janaki subsequently filed a petition against appellees, alleging they retaliated against her in violation of Texas Health and Safety Code § 161.134, which prohibits retaliation against an employee of a hospital, mental health facility, or treatment facility for reporting violations of law. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.134.
Each appellee filed a traditional motion for summary judgment. CPG sought summary judgment on the basis that § 161.134 only protects against retaliation by "hospitals, mental health facilities, and treatment facilities" none of which described CPG. Id. § 161.134(a). The Cancer Centers and Hospitals sought summary judgment on the basis that § 161.134 only provides relief for employees of hospitals and treatment facilities and that Dr. Janaki was not an employee of any of their facilities or businesses. See id. In response, Dr. Janaki alleged that CPG, the Hospitals, and the Cancer Centers operated as "a single, integrated enterprise" as set out by the Fifth Circuit in discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701F.2d 397, 403-04 (5th Cir. 1983) ().
After a hearing, the trial court asked each side to provide the court with supplemental briefing. Following the submission of each party's supplemental briefing, the trial court granted each appellee's motion for summary judgment and entered a take-nothing judgment in favor of appellees. This appeal followed.
We review the trial court's summary judgment de novo. Provident Life & Accident Ins. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). "When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor." Id. When the trial court's order does not specify the grounds for its summary judgment, "we must affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious." Id. at 216. "[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a). "A fact is 'material' only if it affects the outcome of the suit under the governing law." W. Trinity Props., Ltd. v. Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 92 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.); see also Garrigues v. Hardie, No. 13-18-00418-CV, 2020 WL 4812636, *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Aug. 13, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). "A movant who conclusively negates at least one essential element of a cause of action is entitled to summary judgment on that claim." IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. 2004).
Texas is an at-will employment state. Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 885 (Tex. 2014). At-will employment allows both employers and employees to "terminate their relationship at any time for any reason unless they contractually agree otherwise." Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 358 (Tex. 2019) (citing Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 885-86). However, there are exceptions to at-will employment. See Cont'l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 453 (Tex. 1996); see, e.g., Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) () see also Word v. N. Jones Reg'l Health Sys., No. 05-06-00881-CV, 2007 WL 2421500, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Statutes protecting workers from retaliatory discharge are exceptions to the common law doctrine of employment at will."). One exception to at-will employment is that:
A hospital, mental health facility, or treatment facility may not suspend or terminate the employment of or discipline or otherwise discriminate against an employee for reporting to the employee's supervisor, an administrator of the facility, a state regulatory agency, or a law enforcement agency a violation of law, including a violation of this chapter, a rule adopted under this chapter, or a rule of another agency.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.134(a). A covered entity that retaliates against an employee is liable to that employee for injunctive relief, damages, or both. Id. § 161.134(b). Damages include actual damages, including those for mental anguish, exemplary damages, and reasonable attorney's fees. Id. § 161.134(c), (d). Section 161.134 applies to retaliation for reporting violations of federal law, such as the Medicare complaints voiced by Dr. Janaki, here. See id. § 161.134(a) (); see also U.S. ex rel. Smart v. Christus Health, 626 F. Supp. 2d 647, 657 (S.D. Tex. 2009) ().
The elements of a retaliatory discharge claim under § 161.134 are: (1) the plaintiff was an employee of a hospital, mental health facility, or treatment facility; (2) the plaintiff reported a violation of law; (3) the plaintiff reported the violation to a supervisor, an administrator, a state regulatory agency, or a law enforcement agency; (4) the report was made in good faith; and (5) the plaintiff was suspended, terminated, disciplined or otherwise discriminated against by the covered entity. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.134; Barron v. Cook Child.'s Health Care Sys., 218 S.W.3d 806, 810 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).
Conversely, § 161.135 prohibits a hospital, mental health facility, or treatment facility from retaliating against a non-employee in a similar manner but does not provide for relief as extensive as that provided for in § 161.134. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 161.134(c)-(e), 161.135(d)-(e). Under this section, it is a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff was retaliated against if "before the 60th day after the date on which the plaintiff made a report in good faith, the hospital, mental health facility, or treatment facility . . . transfers, discharges, punishes, or restricts the privileges of the person . . . ." Id. § 161.135(c) (emphasis added).
Under §§ 161.134-.135, "hospital" includes a general hospital or a special hospital. See id. §§ 161.131(3), 241.003(7). A general hospital is:
an establishment that offers services, facilities, and beds for use for more than 24 hours for two or more unrelated individuals requiring diagnosis,treatment, or care for illness, injury, deformity, abnormality, or pregnancy; and regularly maintains, at a minimum, clinical laboratory services, diagnostic X-ray services, treatment facilities including surgery or obstetrical care or both, and other definitive medical or surgical treatment of similar extent.
Id. § 241.003(5). A special hospital is:
an establishment that (1) offers services, facilities, and beds for use for more than 24 hours for two or...
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