Janaszak DDS v. State

• Decision Date: 04 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 67749–7–I.,67749–7–I.
• Citation: 297 P.3d 723
• Parties: Joseph Eric JANASZAK DDS, a single person, Appellant, v. The STATE of Washington; the Washington State Department of Health, an agent of the State of Washington; Mary Selecky, Secretary, Department of Health, in her official capacity; the Health Professions Quality Assurance Commission, an agent of the State of Washington and the Washington State Department of Health; and the Washington State Dental Quality Assurance Commission, an agent of the State of Washington and the Washington State Department of Health; John Davis DDS, member, Washington State Department of Health, Dental Quality Assurance Commission, in his individual and official capacities; Kirby Putscher, Deputy Executive Director, Department of Health Dental Quality Assurance Commission, in her official and individual capacities; Lorin Peterson DDS, member, Department of Health, Dental Quality Assurance Commission, in his official and individual capacities; Pramod Sinha DDS, member, Department of Health, Dental Quality Assurance Commission, in his official and individual capacities; Robert Faine DDS, member, Department of Health, Dental Quality Assurance Commission, in his official and individual capacities; Jane and John Doe, members of the Department of Health, Dental Quality Assurance Commission, in their official and individual capacities; Chyma Miller Smith, Investigator, Department of Health, in her official and in her individual capacity, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

297 P.3d 723

Joseph Eric JANASZAK DDS, a single person, Appellant,

v.The STATE of Washington; the Washington State Department of Health, an agent of the State of Washington; Mary Selecky, Secretary, Department of Health, in her official capacity; the Health Professions Quality Assurance Commission, an agent of the State of Washington and the Washington State Department of Health; and the Washington State Dental Quality Assurance Commission, an agent of the State of Washington and the Washington State Department of Health; John Davis DDS, member, Washington State Department of Health, Dental Quality Assurance Commission, in his individual and official capacities; Kirby Putscher, Deputy Executive Director, Department of Health Dental Quality Assurance Commission, in her official and individual capacities; Lorin Peterson DDS, member, Department of Health, Dental Quality Assurance Commission, in his official and individual capacities; Pramod Sinha DDS, member, Department of Health, Dental Quality Assurance Commission, in his official and individual capacities; Robert Faine DDS, member, Department of Health, Dental Quality Assurance Commission, in his official and individual capacities; Jane and John Doe, members of the Department of Health, Dental Quality Assurance Commission, in their official and individual capacities; Chyma Miller Smith, Investigator, Department of Health, in her official and in her individual capacity, Respondents.

No. 67749–7–I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

Jan. 7, 2013.

Publication Ordered March 4, 2013.

John Cornelius Versnel III, Eric Toshiro Duncan, Lawrence and Versnel PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Edward Sydney Winskill, Attorney General of Washington, Olympia, WA, for Respondents.

LEACH, C.J.

¶ 1 Dr. Eric Janaszak appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his lawsuit against the State of Washington, the Washington Department of Health, and other state officials and employees. His complaint alleged negligent and intentional misconduct relating to the investigation and temporary summary restriction of his dental license. Because the respondents have immunity, either absolute or qualified, against many of Janaszak's claims and he cannot establish the necessary elements of his remaining claims, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 In early 2006, two female patients filed complaints with the Department of Health, accusing Dr. Eric Janaszak of professional misconduct. They alleged that he pursued sexual relationships with them while they were his patients, initiated sexual encounters with them during scheduled appointments, billed them for dental services not actually performed during those appointments, and sent one patient's account to collections when she refused to pay.

¶ 3 After the Washington Dental Quality Assurance Commission (Commission) authorized an investigation, Washington Department of Health (Department) investigator Chyma Miller–Smith conducted one. Over the next eight months, Miller–Smith interviewed the complainants, as well as Dr. Janaszak, his office manager, his dental assistant, and other potential witnesses. In September 2006, Miller–Smith submitted a report to the Department. She did not make any disciplinary recommendation to the Commission and played no role in the Commission's disciplinary decision-making process.

¶ 4 After reviewing Miller–Smith's report, the Department filed an ex parte motion with the Commission, seeking an order prohibiting Janaszak from treating adult female patients pending further disciplinary proceedings. The Commission instead prohibited Janaszak from treating female patients aged 12 and older. It published notice of the disciplinary action on the Department's web site. Soon afterward, the Commission assigned Miller–Smith to investigate a third complaint made against Janaszak by a former employee who also alleged sexual misconduct. Meanwhile, after being deposed, the original two complainants stopped cooperating with the disciplinary proceedings. The Commission withdrew the summary practice restrictions and charges against Janaszak.

¶ 5 Janaszak sued the State of Washington, the Department, the Secretary of Health, the Health Professions Quality Assurance Commission, and the Commission. He also sued five members of the Commission and Miller–Smith, each in their personal and professional capacities.¹ He asserted federal and state constitutional claims, a state statutory violation, and multiple common law claims. The trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims. Janaszak appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 This court reviews summary judgment orders de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court.² Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.³ A genuine issue of material fact exists if reasonable minds could differ regarding the facts controlling the outcome of the litigation.⁴

¶ 7 A defendant moving for summary judgment may meet his burden by showing an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.⁵ If the defendant makes this initial showing, the inquiry shifts to the party with the burden of proof at trial, the plaintiff.⁶ If the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, the trial court should grant the motion for summary judgment.⁷

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 Janaszak asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He also asserted claims based upon alleged violations of article I, sections 3, 5, and 7 of the Washington Constitution and RCW 18.130.080. Finally, he asserted common law claims for defamation/false light, intentional interference with a business expectancy, negligent investigation, negligence, outrage, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The respondents claim immunity against many of these claims and the absence of any evidence to support at least one essential element of each other claim. We agree.

¶ 9 This case presents several issued about the State's immunity from lawsuits. Immunity is not merely a defense to liability, but “an ‘entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.’ ” ⁸ Because the respondents rely upon both the common law and statutes to support their immunity claims, we begin with a brief overview of the guiding laws and principles.

The Scope of Sovereign Immunity in Washington

¶ 10 “At common law, the State was immune from lawsuit.” ⁹ The Washington State Constitution requires that the legislature determine when and where the State may be sued.¹⁰ In 1963, our legislature largely waived the State's immunity from tort claims. RCW 4.92.090 provides, “The state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation.” RCW 4.96.010 makes similar provisions for suit against municipalities and other subdivisions of the State. ¹¹

¶ 11 While the courts construe this legislative waiver of sovereign immunity broadly,¹² common law immunities, both absolute and qualified, still exist. Absolute immunity protects an entity completely against suit, while qualified immunity can be lost if it is abused.¹³ Courts generally confine absolute privilege to those circumstances where public service and the administration of justice require complete immunity.¹⁴

¶ 12 Courts look to the function being performed, instead of the person who performed it, to determine if immunity applies.¹⁵ The application of judicial immunity illustrates this approach. At common law, judges have absolute immunity for acts performed within their judicial capacity.¹⁶ This immunity does not exist for the benefit of the judge; rather, it protects the administration of justice by ensuring that judges can decide cases without fear of personal lawsuits.¹⁷ Thus, the immunity only applies when a judge acts in a judicial capacity with color of jurisdiction.¹⁸

Respondents Are Immune from Janaszak's Claims under the Uniform Disciplinary Act

¶ 13 Janaszak contends that the State failed to comply with mandatory procedures for disciplinary investigations conducted under RCW 18.130.080. This statute is part of the Uniform Disciplinary Act (UDA), chapter 18.130 RCW, which provides standardized procedures for the enforcement of laws for licensed health and health-related professionals.¹⁹ The respondents assert statutory and common law quasi-judicial immunity against this claim. We agree that the respondents have statutory immunity.

¶ 14 The UDA includes a grant of statutory immunity for officials carrying out their duties under the act. RCW 18.130.300(1) provides, “The secretary, members of the boards or commissions, or individuals acting on their behalf are immune from suit in any action, civil or criminal, based on any disciplinary proceedings or other official acts performed in the course of their duties.” On its face, this statute grants absolute immunity for acts performed in the course of a covered individual's duties. Additionally, RCW 18.32.0357 addresses the duties and powers of the Dental Quality Assurance Commission and states that “[t]he members of the commission are immune from suit in an action, civil or criminal, based upon its disciplinary proceedings or other official acts performed in good faith as members of the commission.” This statute grants a qualified immunity.

¶ 15 Janaszak argues that statutory immunity does not bar his claim because Miller–Smith acted outside the scope of her official duties and did not follow Department procedures in conducting her investigation and because the Commission and its members did not act in good...