Jane Doe v. Harris Cnty., CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-2133

• Decision Date: 29 September 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-2133
• Parties: JANE DOE, Plaintiff, v. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS; NICHOLAS SOCIAS, Individually; and TAYLOR ADAMS, Individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

JANE DOE, Plaintiff, v. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS; NICHOLAS SOCIAS, Individually;and TAYLOR ADAMS, Individually, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-2133

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

September 29, 2017

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Jane Doe, brings this action against Harris County, Texas, and Harris County employees, Nicholas Socias ("Socias") and Taylor Adams ("Adams"), in their individual capacities, for damages based on allegations that defendants "(1) unconstitutionally deprived Plaintiff of (a) her protected liberty interests and (b) right to counsel and (2) failed or refused to provide her with even a scintilla of reasonable medical care."¹ Pending before the court are Nicholas Socias's Second Amended Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Socias's Second Amended MD") (Docket Entry No. 40), Defendant Harris County's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted ("Harris County's MD") (Docket Entry No. 43), and Plaintiff's Opposed Motion forLeave to File Her Fourth Amended Complaint ("Plaintiff's Motion to Amend") (Docket Entry No. 59). For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend will be denied, Socias's Second Amended MD will be granted, and Harris County's MD will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Plaintiff's Motion to File Fourth Amended Complaint

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a fourth amended complaint to allege the following "new and material facts:"

• Defendant Socias (or someone acting pursuant to his instructions) informed St. Joseph Medical Center that Plaintiff would be relocated to the Harris County Jail's Mental Health Unit;

• Defendant Socias (or someone acting pursuant to his instructions) informed St. Joseph Medical Center that said relocation was directed by the trial court;

• The trial court never made any ruling that Plaintiff should be moved to the Harris County Jail's Mental Health Unit; and

• Harris County refused to properly classify or treat Plaintiff despite having her medical records and medications at the time she was booked into its custody.²

Defendants oppose plaintiff's motion because plaintiff failed to attach a copy of her proposed amendments to her motion, and because she has failed to show good cause for the proposed amendments.³

Although plaintiff did not attach a proposed Fourth Amended Complaint to her motion, plaintiff has since submitted her proposed Fourth Amended Complaint.⁴ Accordingly, defendants' opposition based on plaintiff's failure to file a proposed Fourth Amended Complaint is moot.

A. Standard of Review

If a scheduling order has been entered establishing a deadline for amendments to pleadings, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides the standard for requests to amend that are filed before the scheduling order's deadline has expired, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) provides the standard for requests to amend that are filed after the scheduling order's deadline has expired. Marathon Financial Insurance, Inc., RRG v. Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d 458, 470 (5th Cir. 2009); Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2008).

Rule 15(a) states that "[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). "A decision to grant leave is within the discretion of the court, although if the court 'lacks a "substantial reason" to deny leave, its discretion "is not broad enough to permit denial."'" State of Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (5th Cir.1995) (quoting Jamieson By and Through Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985)). Rule 15(a) provides "a strong presumption in favor of granting leave to amend." Financial Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 291 (5th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, "[d]enial of leave to amend may be warranted for undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of a proposed amendment." United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 270 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Foman v. Davis, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230 (1962)).

"Rule 16(b) provides that once a scheduling order has been entered, it 'may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent.'" Marathon, 591 F.3d at 470 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)). "The good cause standard requires the 'party seeking relief to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.'" S&W Enterprises, L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting 6A Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1522.1 (2d ed. 1990)). To determine whether the moving party has established good cause, courts consider four factors: "(1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice."Marathon, 591 F.3d at 470 (quoting Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 2003)). If a movant establishes good cause to extend the scheduling order, courts analyze the motion to amend under Rule 15(a). S&W Enterprises, 315 F.3d at 535. Because a Docket Control Order ("Scheduling Order") was entered in this case on September 30, 2016 (Docket Entry No. 22), Rule 16(b)'s standard applies, and the plaintiff must show good cause to amend.

B. Plaintiff Fails to Show "Good Cause"

1. Plaintiff Has a Reasonable Explanation for Delay

Plaintiff argues that

[a]fter conferring with a consulting expert on June 22, 2017, Plaintiff's counsel became fully aware of the import of the newly alleged facts. . . Specifically, Plaintiff's consulting expert explained certain markers and notations in Plaintiff's medical records. Plaintiff's counsel did not understand the import of said markers or the implications thereof until their discussion with said expert on June 22. Prior to that conversation, Plaintiff could neither have guessed nor responsibly alleged that Socias represented to her mental health providers that she would be relocated to the Mental Health Unit of the Harris County Jail.⁵

Plaintiff argues that

[t]he statute of limitations has not run, Plaintiff is entitled to bring a new claim against Defendant Socias based on the newly acquired information (insofar as he engaged in an independently non-prosecutorial act which deprived her of her constitutional rights under color of state law), and said case would properly be consolidated herewith. As a result, Plaintiff respectfully requests leave to file her Fourth Amended Complaint because shewas incapable of discovering the newly required facts in a more expedient manner through no fault of her own.⁶

Asserting that plaintiff has had access to her own records since they were generated in December of 2015,⁷ defendants argue that the plaintiff's medical records are not newly acquired information,⁸ and that plaintiff should not be allowed to amend her pleadings a fourth time "based on the fact that she just read her own medical records from 2015 and discovered an entry that she wants to include in her lawsuit."⁹ Plaintiff replies that her

counsel first requested [her] medical records from St. Joseph Medical Center on July 1, 2016. For nearly nine months, St. Joseph Medical Center failed to comply with [her] lawful requests for her medical records. St. Joseph Medical Center even refused to comply with a federal subpoena for the records []. Finally, in March of 2017, St. Joseph Medical Center provided the requested records. Plaintiff's counsel then forwarded these records to Plaintiff's expert for review. Plaintiff's counsel then learned of the relevant facts therein, the import thereof, and the implication of Plaintiff's scores on the Global Assessment of Functioning scale in a conference call with her expert on June 22; Plaintiff's motion for leave was filed two weeks later on July 6, 2017.¹⁰

Based on the verification signed by plaintiff's attorney, the court concludes that despite acting diligently to acquire hermedical records from St. Joseph's Medical Center, that plaintiff did not acquire those records until March of 2017, and that the facts that plaintiff seeks leave to assert could not have been asserted by the November 21, 2016, deadline for filing motions to amend established by the court's September 30, 2016, Scheduling Order. Defendants have neither argued nor cited any evidence from which the court could conclude that the plaintiff was aware of the facts on which her proposed amendments are based before the deadline for amending pleadings expired, or that had plaintiff acted diligently she could have acquired those facts from another source in time to meet the deadline for amending pleadings. The court is therefore persuaded that plaintiff has offered a reasonable explanation for delay in seeking leave to amend, and that this factor weighs in favor of granting her motion. See Southwestern Bell, 346 F.3d at 547 (denying leave to amend upon finding that "[movant] was aware of the contract that forms the basis of its proposed amendment months in advance of the deadline and does not offer a satisfactory explanation for its delay in seeking leave to amend").

2. The Proposed Amendments Are Not Important

Plaintiff argues that her "proposed amendments are immeasurably important because they (inter alia) permit her to hold the proper parties accountable for their respective misdeeds,"¹¹ andthat "these new facts further expand upon Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant Socias was acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction and/or in a non-prosecutorial function."¹² Plaintiff argues that "Defendant Socias' material misrepresentations concerning a non-existent judicial decree . . . cannot be construed as a...