Jane Doe v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.

• Decision Date: 24 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-cv-1298 (KBJ),19-cv-1298 (KBJ)
• Citation: 453 F.Supp.3d 354
• Parties: Jane DOE, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

453 F.Supp.3d 354

Jane DOE, Plaintiff,

v.WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant.

No. 19-cv-1298 (KBJ)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed March 24, 2020

Matthew P. Tsun, Simeone & Miller, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Janice Lynn Cole, Office of General Counsel, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District Judge

Almost four years ago, Plaintiff Jane Doe boarded a red-line subway train at a stop in Glenmont, Maryland. During the ride, another passenger forced Doe behind a partition in one of the train cars and raped her at knife point. (See Complaint, ECF 1-4, at ¶¶ 5–7.) In the wake of this terrible crime, Doe filed a civil complaint against the operator of subway system—Defendant Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA")—alleging that WMATA had negligently failed to take steps to protect her from the assailant (a man who happened to be known to WMATA due to a prior incident involving sex-related misconduct in the subway system). (Id. ¶ 9).

Before this Court at present is WMATA's motion to dismiss Doe's complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (See Def.'s Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF 5-1). WMATA insists that it is immune from tort claims that arise out of its governmental functions, and that the negligence count at issue here qualifies as such. WMATA also points to the same theory of sovereign immunity as a bar to Doe's punitive damages count. For the reasons explained fully below, this Court concludes that WMATA is correct, and that sovereign immunity bars both of the claims that Doe has brought in the instant complaint. Consequently, and unfortunately for Doe, WMATA's motion to dismiss must be GRANTED , and Doe's complaint must be DISMISSED . An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will follow.

I. BACKGROUND¹

On April 12, 2016, Doe was a passenger on a WMATA red-line train in Glenmont, Maryland, when John Prentice Hicks, who was another passenger in that same train car, threatened Doe with a knife, forced her behind "a darkened and secluded partition" in the back of the train car, and raped her. (Compl. ¶¶ 6–7.) Approximately one week before this event, Hicks had masturbated in front of other WMATA patrons on another red-line train, and the incident had been reported to WMATA. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) WMATA allegedly identified Hicks following that first incident (id. ¶ 11), but it neither alerted its passengers about Hicks and his conduct nor attempted to prevent Hicks from using WMATA trains (id. ¶ 12). Hicks was not apprehended until after he attacked Doe. (Id. )

On April 4, 2019, Doe filed a civil complaint against WMATA in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Doe's complaint asserts one count of negligence (id. ¶ 21–26) and one count of punitive damages (id. ¶ 27–32). It also contains a series of allegations concerning WMATA's inaction following Hicks's public masturbation. Specifically, Doe's complaint alleges that: "[p]rior to the sexual abuse that is the focus of this lawsuit, [WMATA] had identified John Prentice Hicks as the person who exposed himself and masturbated on one of its trains" (id. ¶ 11), but WMATA "failed to take appropriate steps to either apprehend John Prentice Hicks prior to the incident, prevent him from using the WMATA system, or warn passengers of John Prentice Hicks'[s] potential presence and the danger to them" (id. ¶ 12). WMATA also allegedly failed to "take proper steps to ensure the safety of passengers on its trains; ... inform the employees including, but not limited to, attendants and personnel on the trains and at the train stations of the dangers of John Prentice Hicks; ... make reasonable efforts to protect Plaintiff against sexual abuse while she was a passenger on Defendant's train; ... ensure the peaceful completion of Plaintiff's journey; [or] ... exercise ordinary and reasonable care under the circumstances" (id. ¶ 18). Additionally, Doe's complaint alleges that WMATA's decisions with respect to the design of its cars were negligent because, although WMATA "knew or should have known that the darkened partitions on its trains behind which John Prentice Hicks assaulted Plaintiff allowed for potential assailants such as John Prentice Hicks to shield their behavior from view ... [and] created an environment in which crimes can more easily be committed" (id. ¶¶ 15–16), WMATA "fail[ed] to adequately remedy a known dangerous hazard" by "replac[ing] or remov[ing] the darkened and secluded partitioned areas of its trains" (id. ¶ 18).

On May 6, 2019, WMATA removed Doe's lawsuit to federal court under the WMATA Compact, which gives federal courts original jurisdiction over all legal actions against WMATA. (See Notice of Removal, ECF 1, at 2.) Shortly thereafter, WMATA filed a motion to dismiss Doe's complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (see WMATA's Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 5), which Doe opposes (see Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp'n"), ECF No. 8.)

In its motion, WMATA argues that Doe's complaint should be dismissed in its entirety under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. (See Def.'s Mot. at 1–2.) In particular, WMATA contends that any allegation relating to the agency's conduct following Hicks's public masturbation concerns WMATA's police activity, which is a quintessential governmental function for which WMATA may not be held liable (see id. ), and that the design of WMATA's subway cars is a discretionary function for which sovereign immunity has not been waived (see id. at 2). Doe responds that her allegations concern the various ways in which "WMATA as an organization failed to act reasonably" beyond the scope of its governmental functions. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 9.) Additionally, while WMATA invokes sovereign immunity as a shield against Doe's punitive damages count (see Def.'s Mot. at 10), Doe raises an "extraordinary circumstances" exception to the general rule that no implicit waiver of immunity for punitive damages will be recognized (see Pl.'s Opp'n at 14).

Following a hearing, this Court took WMATA's motion to dismiss—now ripe for decision—under advisement.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

In contrast to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires courts to ask whether the facts alleged suffice to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), Rule 12(b)(1) imposes on the court an "affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority," Abu Ali v. Gonzales , 387 F. Supp. 2d 16, 17 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A claim of sovereign immunity is appropriately decided pursuant to a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(1) because "[s]overeign immunity strips the court of jurisdiction[.]" Smith v. Scalia , 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 40 n.10 (D.D.C. 2014).

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court "treat[s] the complaint's factual allegations as true" and affords the plaintiff "the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Export–Import Bank of U.S. , 85 F. Supp. 3d 250, 259 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, those factual allegations receive "closer scrutiny" than they do in the Rule 12(b)(6) context. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, unlike when evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court that is assessing a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(1) may look to documents outside of the complaint in order to evaluate whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain a claim. See Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. F.D.A. , 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). With reference to evidence beyond the pleadings, the court can also "resolve factual disputes concerning jurisdiction." Smith v. W.M.A.T.A. , 290 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted).

B. WMATA's Immunity Under The WMATA Compact

Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia created WMATA pursuant to a "compact[,]" D.C. Code Ann. § 9–1107.01, with the goal of providing a regional transportation system that services the metropolitan area in and around Washington, D.C. See Delon Hampton & Assocs., Chartered v. W.M.A.T.A. , 943 F.2d 355, 357 (4th Cir. 1991). With respect to the transportation agency they created, these two states (and the District of Columbia) expressly conferred upon WMATA their own sovereign immunity. See Watters v. W.M.A.T.A. , 295 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2002). "Thus, unless WMATA's sovereign immunity has been waived, [a] district court lacks jurisdiction to enter a judgment against" it and, as a result, must dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(1). Id. at 39–40.

Notably, Section 80 of the WMATA Compact expressly waives WMATA's sovereign immunity under certain circumstances and retains it with respect to others. In this regard, that statute states that WMATA

shall be liable for its contracts and for its torts and those of its Directors, officers, employees[,] and agent[s] committed in the conduct of any proprietary function, in accordance with the law of the applicable signatory (including rules on conflict of laws), but shall not be liable for any torts occurring in the performance of a governmental function.

D.C. Code Ann. § 9–1107.01(80). Thus, the question of whether WMATA enjoys sovereign immunity from tort liability in any given case turns on whether the alleged tort was committed in the course of "any proprietary function," as opposed to "a governmental function." Id.

The D.C. Court of Appeals has noted that, "in general, the provision of mass transportation is a proprietary function within the meaning of the WMATA...