Gebretsadike v. Dist. of Columbia
| Decision Date | 30 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-1951-RCL |
| Parties | AWOKE GEBRETSADIKE, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
In this civil rights suit, plaintiff Awoke Gebretsadike, pro se, alleges that defendants, the District of Columbia and several of its officers (together, “the District”), violated his statutory and constitutional rights by denying him pandemic unemployment assistance (“PUA”) benefits and failing to make the application for those benefits, or assistance in completing the application process, available in his native language Amharic. Before the Court is the District's motion to dismiss. ECF No. 8.
For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part the District's motion to dismiss. Specifically, the Court will DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Counts I and III-VI of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and Count VII for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court will not dismiss Count II.
Gebretsadike is a resident of the District of Columbia whose “nation of origin language” is Amharic. Compl. at 2, ECF No 1-2. He “used to have a living income from [his] selfemployment prior to” the COVID-19 pandemic, but “the health measures [the] government took affected [his] living income,” which depended on “tourists . . . enter[ing] into the country.” Id.
Due to the impact that public health measures in early 2020 had on his work, Gebretsadike applied for PUA administered by the D.C. Department of Employment Services (“DOES”) pursuant to the CARES Act. Id. He was initially placed on a “waiting list,” eventually gaining access to the PUA application on April 27, 2020. Id. Gebretsadike did not find the application “easy to understand or fill [out,]” especially because he had “never been in these state[] run unemployment systems before.” Id. Accordingly, he “contacted [DOES] a lot of times for help and clarification” but received no help. Id. In particular, DOES did not provide the application or instructions in Amharic, and “[g]etting the applications interpreted and/or clarifying the jargon[] was [a] quite difficult task.” Id. Nevertheless, Gebretsadike was able to complete the application by April 29, 2020, and he “continued to take the weekly actions necessary to keep qualifying for benefits.” Id.
When “DOES started depositing payments,” Gebretsadike found himself receiving his benefits later than expected. Id. at 3. “[O]ther claimants started receiving payments within five days,” but “DOES held [his] payments.” Id. He “tried to contact DOES,” but he was unable to receive Amharic-language assistance. Id. He then “tried to get professional interpreter[s] from other states and reached [out] to DOES for help.” Id. DOES eventually paid him on June 8, 2020, over a month after he filed his application. Id. When he received his payment, it was less than what “other language and English speaking applicants who are less experienced” than him received. Id. DOES “made payments retroactively based on the [CARES Act] for other people but not for [him].” Id. He “repeatedly reached [out to] DOES for help and explanation” to no avail. Id.
Furthermore, DOES “sent [Gebretsadike an] email” on June 8, 2020 suggesting that his “applications for these benefits have been processed,” but “without any kind of information or notice” as to how “to dispute their decision or denials,” or any explanation of the basis for DOES's decision. Id. He “tried to reach [out] to different authorities [he] could think of that could help,” but was unable to resolve the issue. Id.
Eventually, Gebretsadike received a letter stating DOES's initial determination of his benefits, but that letter had “no description of [the] factual and legal basis,” simply instructing Gebretsadike “to apply for redetermination.” Id. at 6-7. He “applied for their re-determination process,” but received no hearing or interview, and, as of the time of the complaint, two years later, still had not received “any final decisions” on that administrative appeal. Id. at 7.
Gebretsadike originally filed this action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on May 19, 2022, alleging seven counts: (1) discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; (2) retaliation for protected activities in violation of Title VI; (3) inadequate procedures in violation of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause; (4) retaliation for protected speech in violation of the First Amendment; (5) discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause; (6) failure to make unemployment payments when due or provide a hearing in violation of Title III of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504; and (7) failure to make timely unemployment benefit determinations in violation of various D.C. statutes and regulations. See Compl. at 13-28. The District removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and 1446 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c). See Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1.
The District filed its motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) on August 12, 2022. ECF No. 8. Gebretsadike filed his opposition on September 12, 2022. ECF No. 9. The District filed its reply on September 19, 2022. ECF No. 10. The motion to dismiss is now ripe for review.
A defendant in a civil action may move to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face if it “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A court evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) “motion presumes that the complaint's factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiffs favor.” Alemu v. Dep't of For-Hire Vehicles, 327 F.Supp.3d 29, 40 (D.D.C. 2018). However, “[a] court need not accept a plaintiffs legal conclusions as true,... nor must a court presume the veracity of legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations.” Id. (citation omitted).
A defendant in a civil action may also move to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” A court considering such a motion must take all the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Doe v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 453 F.Supp.3d 354, 361 (D.D.C. 2020). “However, those factual allegations receive closer scrutiny than they do in the Rule 12(b)(6) context,” and the court “may look to documents outside of the complaint in order to evaluate whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain a claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It is the “[p]laintiff [who] bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Am. Farm Bureau v. EPA, 121 F.Supp.2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2000).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for any person “depriv[ed] of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.” A municipality such as the District may be liable under § 1983 only if it was a “policy or custom” of that municipality that caused the violation of the plaintiffs rights. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694(1978).
Thus, a court considering a § 1983 claim against a municipality, sometimes called a ''Monell claim,” “must conduct a two-step inquiry”: Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). There are four “ways in which a ‘policy' can be set by a municipality to cause it to be liable under § 1983: [1] the explicit setting of a policy by the government that violates the Constitution, ... [2] the action of a policy maker within the government, ... [3] the adoption through a knowing failure to act by a policy maker of actions by his subordinates that are so consistent that they have become a ‘custom,' ... [4] or the failure of the government to respond to a need (for example, training of employees) in such a manner as to show ‘deliberate indifference' to the risk that not addressing the need will result in constitutional violations.” Id. at 1306-07 (citations omitted).
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “However, even though a pro se complaint must be liberally construed, the complaint must nonetheless present a claim on which ...
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