Janezic v. State

• Decision Date: 20 March 1998
• Citation: 723 So.2d 730
• Parties: Eileen JANEZIC v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

723 So.2d 730

Eileen JANEZIC v. STATE.

CR-94-2338.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 20, 1998.

Opinion on Return to Remand August 14, 1998.

On Remand from the Alabama Supreme Court

BASCHAB, Judge.

In accordance with the Alabama Supreme Court's opinion, 723 So.2d 725 (Ala.1997), we remand this cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with that opinion. Due return, including a transcript of the remand proceedings, shall be made to this court within 90 days of the release of this opinion.

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

LONG, P.J., and McMILLAN and BROWN, JJ., concur.

COBB, J., concurs specially.

COBB, Judge, concurring specially.

This case is a tragedy for all concerned. Nothing anyone can say or write can diminish the suffering of the family of a beloved minister gunned down by Eileen Janezic, an extremely mentally ill woman. Off her psychotropic medication and, in my opinion, in a severe psychotic state, Janezic killed an innocent man. Although the appeal has gone from our court to the Alabama Supreme Court, the question still remains: Was Eileen Janezic legally insane when she took the life of Rev. Jerry Simon?

This case was originally assigned to Judge Patterson, and while he was working on an opinion to circulate to the other judges on this court, I was working on Click v. State, 695 So.2d 209 (Ala.Cr.App.1996), which involved a young man who suffered from an extensive and protracted incurable mental illness and who had been taken off his powerful psychotropic and antidepressant medication. As I worked on Click, I became concerned that the standard for overturning a jury verdict of guilt in a case in which the defendant has pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity was too stringent.

"We may only reverse a judgment based on a jury's verdict where an insanity defense is presented `in those cases where the proof of insanity is overwhelming and uncontradicted.'"

Click v. State, 695 So.2d at 235 (emphasis added) quoting Boyle v. State, 229 Ala. 212, 222, 154 So. 575, 583 (1934).¹

In spite of the voluminous evidence showing that Click suffered from a schizoaffective disorder, the State produced evidence minimizing his mental illness and supporting its contention that Click could appreciate the nature and quality of his actions at the time of the crime. Consequently, precedent required that we affirm the conviction.

Judge Patterson drafted an outstanding opinion, in reversing Janezic's conviction and holding that not only had the State not met its burden in overcoming Janezic's insanity defense, but also that Janezic's constitutional rights had been violated because she was clearly not competent to stand trial. Unfortunately, Judge Patterson's opinion received only one concurrence—mine. Judge Taylor then wrote the majority opinion, affirming Janezic's conviction of murder and her sentence of life imprisonment. Judge Patterson crafted an eloquent and well-reasoned dissent, which I joined.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama, this court's judgment affirming the case was reversed and the case remanded. Unfortunately the Supreme Court did not address Janezic's claim that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to rebut the evidence supporting her insanity defense. By failing to rule on the insanity issue and remanding the case for a retroactive competency determination and a possible retrial, the Supreme Court, I believe, has left open the possibility that Janezic will be twice placed in double jeopardy. Hence, I feel compelled to write specially, although I can find no precedent for a such special writing. Nevertheless, I write to suggest that the Chief Justice order this case transferred to the Supreme Court of Alabama for a final determination, pursuant to § 12-3-14,² Code of Ala.1975. So long as the case is on remand from the Supreme Court, that Court retains jurisdiction over the matter, and may therefore, ex mero motu, take the necessary steps to prevent further injustices from occurring. See Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986)

.

In its decision, authored by Justice Maddox,³ the Supreme Court remanded this case to us for us to remand to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether Eileen Janezic was competent at the time of her trial. The Supreme Court's opinion stated: "[I]f the circuit court determines that a meaningful retrospective determination is no longer possible, then Janezic's conviction must be reversed and a new trial may be granted when and if Janezic is competent to stand trial." Ex parte Janezic, 723 So.2d 725, 730 (Ala. 1997) (emphasis added). I believe that if the trial court finds that Janezic was incompetent to stand trial or determines that a meaningful retrospective determination is no longer possible, then certain constitutional requirements must necessarily be met before she can be tried again. Before Janezic can be retried, double jeopardy principles require a final disposition of the issue whether the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut Janezic's evidence of insanity.⁴

The United States Supreme Court held in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), that double jeopardy principles prohibit a second trial after the prosecution has failed once to present sufficient evidence to rebut a defendant's insanity defense. See also, U.S. Const. amend. V; and Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. I, § 9.

The defendant in Burks was convicted in a federal court of robbery after a jury trial in which he raised the defense of insanity. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed Burks's conviction, holding that the prosecution had failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut Burks's showing that he was insane at the time of the offense. However, the Court of Appeals did not order that a judgment of acquittal be entered; instead, the Court ordered the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Burks appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which held that the Court of Appeals had erred by failing to order the entry of a judgment of acquittal.

The Burks Court held, as follows:

"By deciding that the Government had failed to come forward with sufficient proof of petitioner's capacity to be responsible for his criminal acts, [the Court of Appeals] was clearly saying that Burks' criminal culpability had not been established. If the District Court had so held in the first instance, as the reviewing court said it should have done, a judgment of acquittal would have been entered and, of course, petitioner could not have been retried for the same offense. See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 82,

S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629 (1962); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 24 S.Ct. 797, 49 L.Ed. 114 (1904). Consequently, as Mr. Justice Douglas correctly perceived in Sapir [v. United States, 348 U.S. 373, 75 S.Ct. 422, 99 L.Ed. 426 (1955)], it should make no difference that the reviewing court, rather than the trial court, determined the evidence to be insufficient, see

348 U.S., at 374,

75 S.Ct. at 422. The appellate decision unmistakably meant that the District Court had erred in failing to grant a judgment of acquittal. To hold otherwise would create a purely arbitrary distinction between those in petitioner's position and others who would enjoy the benefit of a correct decision in the District Court. See Sumpter v. DeGroote, 552 F.2d 1206, 1211-1212 (7th Cir.1977).

"The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. This is central to the objective of the prohibition against successive trials. The Clause does not allow `the State ... to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,' since `[t]he constitutional prohibition against "double jeopardy" was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.' Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957); see Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387-388, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 1061-1062, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975)

; United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 554, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971).

"....

"... [R]eversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt, or innocence of the defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct. When this occurs, the accused has a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished. See Note, Double Jeopardy: A New Trial After Appellate Reversal for Insufficient Evidence, 31 U.Chi.L.Rev. 365, 370 (1964).

"The same cannot be said when a defendant's conviction has been overturned due to a failure of proof at trial, in which case the prosecution cannot complain of prejudice, for it has been given one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble. Moreover, such an appellate reversal means that the government's case was so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury. Since we necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury's verdict of acquittal—no matter how erroneous its decision—it is difficult to conceive how society has any greater interest in retrying a defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty.

"....

"... Since we hold today that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing c

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