Janini v. London Townhouses Condo. Ass'n

Decision Date01 February 2022
Docket Number355191
PartiesDAOUD MOUSA JANINI and FERYAL JANINI, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. LONDON TOWNHOUSES CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellant, and JAMES PYDA, Defendant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

UNPUBLISHED

Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 19-008520-NO

BEFORE: CAVANAGH, P.J., AND SHAPIRO AND GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM

London Townhouses Condominium Association (defendant), appeals by leave granted[1] the trial court's order granting in part and denying in part its motion for summary disposition. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion for summary disposition of plaintiffs' premises liability claim[2] because plaintiffs' status as co-owners of their condominium unit prevents them from filing a premises liability claim against defendant. We reverse the trial court's order denying summary disposition of plaintiffs' premises liability claim.

Plaintiffs Daoud Mousa Janini (Daoud) and Feryal Janini (Feryal) sued defendant and James Pyda[3] for injuries suffered by Daoud when he fell in defendant's development in Westland, Michigan. Plaintiffs own and reside in a condominium unit that is part of defendant's condominium complex. Defendant is an association of the co-owners of the condominiums in the complex that manages and operates the condominium complex on behalf of the owners. Defendant is responsible for the management, maintenance, and administration of the common elements of the condominium complex, including the sidewalks and parking lot. On March 16, 2019, between 8:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., Daoud walked out of his condominium to throw garbage in a dumpster. He walked along the sidewalk and across the parking lot. On the way to the dumpster, Daoud slipped and fell on the pavement, which was covered with snow and ice. Daoud saw the snow that was covering the pavement and he knew that ice could have been underneath the snow. When he slipped and fell, Daoud struck the back of his head against the ice on the pavement.

On July 18, 2019, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant for breaching its duty to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk and parking lot of the condominium complex. On August 21 2019, defendant filed an answer to plaintiffs' complaint and asserted affirmative defenses, including the open and obvious danger defense.

On April 9, 2020, defendant filed its motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), in which it argued that plaintiffs' claims sounded in premises liability only. Moreover, defendant argued that, under Francescutti v Fox Chase Condo Ass n , 312 Mich.App. 640; 886 N.W.2d 891 (2015), plaintiffs were precluded from bringing a premises liability claim because they were owners of the condominium unit, and thus, they were co-owners of the common areas of the condominium complex. Finally, defendant argued that even if plaintiffs had a viable premises liability claim, defendant was not liable for the dangerous condition of the sidewalk because the condition was open and obvious.

On May 5, 2020, plaintiffs filed their response to defendant's motion for summary disposition. First, plaintiffs argued that defendant's promise to provide maintenance of its common sidewalks rendered it liable to plaintiffs for failing to remove snow and ice from them. Second, plaintiffs argued that defendant's motion for summary disposition should be denied because "the applicable law completely supports plaintiffs' contention that the hazard posed by the snow- and ice-covered sidewalk was effectively unavoidable under the circumstances." Therefore, plaintiffs concluded defendant breached its common law and contractual duties, and that breach was a proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries.

The trial court considered defendant's motion without oral argument, and on August 10, 2020, the trial court issued an order granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion for summary disposition. The trial court stated "Granted in part, denied in part. All of [plaintiffs'] claims are dismissed except the premises liability claim as there exists genuine issues of fact." On August 25, 2020, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court on October 8, 2020.

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied defendant's motion for summary disposition of plaintiffs' premises liability claim because plaintiffs, as owners of a condominium unit in the complex, were also co-owners of the common areas of the condominium complex where Daoud slipped and fell, and because Daoud was neither a licensee nor an invitee, there was no duty owed to Daoud by defendant under premises liability. We agree.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich. 152, 159; 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019). "A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) . . . tests the factual sufficiency of a claim." El-Khalil, 504 Mich. at 160. "When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Id. "A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact." Id. "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." Id., quoting Johnson v VanderKooi, 502 Mich. 751, 761; 918 N.W.2d 785 (2018). This Court also reviews de novo the interpretation of statutes, Cox v Hartman, 322 Mich.App. 292, 298; 911 N.W.2d 219 (2017), and the trial court's determination whether a duty exists. Hill v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 492 Mich. 651, 659; 822 N.W.2d 190 (2012).

In a premises liability action, the plaintiff must establish the elements of negligence, being (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries, and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages. Goodwin v Northwest Michigan Fair Ass'n, 325 Mich.App. 129, 157; 923 N.W.2d 894 (2018). However, a claim of premises liability arises "merely from the defendant's duty as an owner, possessor, or occupier of land." Lymon v Freedland, 314 Mich.App. 746, 756; 887 N.W.2d 456 (2016).

The initial inquiry when analyzing a claim of premises liability is to establish the duty owed by the possessor of the premises to a person entering the premises. Hoffner v Lanctoe, 492 Mich. 450, 460; 821 N.W.2d 88 (2012). The element of duty in a negligence action ordinarily is a question of law to be decided by the trial court. Hill, 492 Mich. at 659. The duty a possessor of land owes to a person who enters upon the land depends upon whether the visitor is classified as an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser. Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich. 591, 596-597; 614 N.W.2d 88 (2000). An invitee is a person who enters upon the land of another by an invitation which carries with it an implied representation, assurance, or understanding that reasonable care has been used to prepare the premises and to make the premises safe for the invitee's presence. Id. A plaintiff will be deemed to be an invitee only if the purpose for which the person was invited onto the owner's property was "directly tied to the owner's commercial business interests." Id. at 603-604. The possessor of land owes the greatest duty to an invitee, being the duty to use reasonable care to protect the invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm posed by a dangerous condition on the premises. Hoffner, 492 Mich. at 460. The possessor of the premises breaches that duty of care when he or she knows or should know of a dangerous condition on the premises of which the invitee is unaware, and fails to fix, guard against, or warn the invitee of the defect. Lowrey v LMPS & LMP J, 500 Mich. 1, 8; 890 N.W.2d 344 (2016). The plaintiff must demonstrate that "the premises possessor had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition at issue." Id. A premises possessor generally has no duty to remove open and obvious dangers. Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich. 512, 516; 629 N.W.2d 384 (2001).

A licensee is a person who enters the land of another by the consent of the property possessor. Stitt, 462 Mich. at 596. "A landowner owes a licensee a duty only to warn the licensee of any hidden dangers the owner knows or has reason to know of, if the licensee does not know or have reason to know of the dangers involved." Stitt, 462 Mich. at 596. A possessor of land does not owe a duty to a licensee to inspect or to repair to make the premises safe for the licensee's visit. Kosmalski v St John's Lutheran Church, 261 Mich.App. 56, 65; 680 N.W.2d 50 (2004).

In Francescutti, the plaintiff, a condominium co-owner, slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk while walking his dog in a common area of the condominium complex. The plaintiff filed a premises liability action against the defendant condominium association alleging that he was an invitee with respect to common areas of the complex. The condominium association argued that the plaintiff was a licensee. This Court rejected both arguments, stating as follows:

But neither the parties nor the trial court provide any authority for the proposition that the status of an owner of a condominium unit is either an invitee or a licensee with respect to the common areas of the development. Nor were we able to find any such authority. But this question can easily be resolved by looking at the definitions of those terms. "A 'licensee' is a person who is privileged to enter the land of another by virtue of the possessor's consent," while "[a]n 'invitee' is 'a person who enters upon the land of another upon an invitation . . . .' "
The key to the resolution of this case is the phrase in
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