Jankovsky v. Halladay Motors

• Decision Date: 08 March 1971
• Docket Number: No. 3891,3891
• Citation: 482 P.2d 129
• Parties: Tim K. JANKOVSKY, a/k/a Timothy Jankovsky, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. HALLADAY MOTORS, a corporation, Keith G. Jankovsky and Trilba A. Jankovsky, Appellees (Defendants below).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 129

482 P.2d 129

Tim K. JANKOVSKY, a/k/a Timothy Jankovsky, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. HALLADAY MOTORS, a corporation, Keith G. Jankovsky and Trilba A. Jankovsky, Appellees (Defendants below).

No. 3891.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 8, 1971.

Ted Simola, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Paul B. Godfrey, Cheyenne, for appellee Halladay Motors.

No appearance in Supreme Court for appellees Keith G. Jankovsky and Trilba A. Jankovsky.

Before McINTYRE, C. J., and PARKER, McEWAN and GRAY, JJ.

Chief Justice McINTYRE delivered the opinion of the court.

Action was brought by Tim K. Jankovsky, a minor, to disaffirm a contract allegedly entred into with Halladay Motors. Summary judgment was granted by the district court to Halladay Motors, and Tim Jankovsky has appealed.

We find no dispute in the pertinent facts and hence no genuine issue of fact to be tried. Findings of fact are often considered unnecessary, if not out of place, in connection with summary judgments. See 3 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1242, p. 201 (Rules Edition). In this instance however, the trial court has made lengthy findings of fact, which we deem important and helpful in making clear the basis for its decision. We therefore set out these findings in full:

'(a) That a 'Used Car Order' was prepared by the Defendant, Halladay Motors, Inc., on November 29, 1968, which described the purchaser of the 1968 Oldsmobile as being Keith Jankovsky, 607 East 8th Street, Loveland, Colorado.

'(b) That a 'Vehicle Invoice' was prepared by the Defendant, Halladay Motors, Inc., on November 30, 1968, which Invoice indicated the purchaser to be Keith Jankovsky.

'(c) That Keith G. Jankovsky and Trilba A. Jankovsky are the natural parents of the plaintiff, Tim K. Jankovsky, and said parties reside in Loveland, Colorado.

'(d) That the vehicle in question is a 1968 Oldsmobile, Id. No. 344878M165459, and said vehicle was titled in the name of Leland Sanders under Wyoming Certificate of Title No. 2-367187.

'(e) That counsel for all parties have stipulated to the validity of the said Certificate of Title issued to Leland Sanders and to the fact that the said Certificate of Title indicates the following on the reverse side:

1. Title was assigned by Leland Sanders to Halladay Motors, Inc. on November 29, 1968.

2. Title was assigned by Halladay Motors, Inc. to Keith G. and Trilba A. Jankovsky, 607 East 8th Street, Loveland, Colorado on November 29, 1968.

3. An application for Certificate of title was not made until January 31, 1969, and the said application is signed under oath by Tim Jankovsky.

'(f) That the new title, No. 2-390369, was issued by the State of Wyoming to Keith G. and Trilba A. Jankovsky on January 31, 1969.

'(g) That a 1966 Sunbeam automobile was traded in on the Oldsmobile in question and said Sunbeam was titled in the State of Colorado in the name of Keith and Trilba A. Jankovsky.

'(h) That on November 30, 1968, Keith Jankovsky and Trilba A. Jankovsky assigned the title to the Sunbeam to Halladay Motors, Inc. under oath.

'(i) That subsequent to November 30, 1968, Keith G. Jankovsky and Trilba A. Jankovsky purchased a general automobile liability and comprehensive policy on the Oldsmobile from an agent in Loveland, Colorado, and said policy was issued and placed in the name of Keith G. Jankovsky and Trilba A. Jankovsky.

'(j) That an 'Installment Note, Security Agreement and Financing Statement' was executed by Timothy Jankovsky and Keith Jankovsky on November 29, 1968, by the terms of which a security interest in the 1968 Oldsmobile in question herein was granted to the Home State Bank of Loveland, Colorado, in order to secure a loan of $2,598.96, and said Security Agreement contained the following language: 'To secure the payment of the foregoing indebtedness, and any and all liabilities, direct, indirect, absolute, contingent, due or to become due, now existing or hereafter arising (all hereinafter called 'obligations') of the undersigned to the holder, the undersigned (hereafter sometimes called 'Debtor') grants to the holder (sometimes hereafter called 'Secured Party') a security interest in the following property and any and all additions, accessions and substitutions thereto or therefor (hereafter sometimes called 'Collateral').'

'(k) That application for the title to the vehicle was made pursuant to Sections 31-32 and 31-33, Wyoming Statutes, which statutes provide that the owner of a motor vehicle shall not permit the operation of any vehicle upon any highway without first obtaining a certificate of title and that application for certificate of title shall contain the name and address of the person to whom the certificate of title shall be delivered.

'(1) That Section 31-37, Wyoming Statutes, provides that the transferee shall within ten days present a certificate, endorsed and assigned, to the County Clerk and make application for a new certificate.

'(m) That Section 31-30, Wyoming Statutes, defines the owner of a vehicle as a person who holds the legal title of the vehicle.

'(n) That the Plaintiff, Tim K. Jankovsky, having applied under oath for a Certificate of Title in the name of his parents, Keith G. and Trilba A. Jankovsky, the Plaintiff would be compelled to testify at the trial of the above-captioned action under oath contrary to his application for a Certificate of Title under oath.'

Based on the foregoing undisputed facts, the trial court ordered:

'(a) That the Plaintiff is estopped by his actions to assert the claim set forth in his Amended Complaint.

'(b) That to permit the plaintiff to proceed to trial upon his Amended Complaint would constitute a fraud upon the Court and the Defendant, Halladay Motors, Inc. '(c) That there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the Defendant, Halladay Motors, Inc., is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law.'

Plaintiff's Claim

The plaintiff's contention is that he alone negotiated with an agent of Halladay for the purchase of the 1968 Oldsmobile; that his parents did not see the car; and that plaintiff was therefore the one that contracted. Plaintiff says he caused title to be issued in the names of his parents for the sole purpose of obtaining more favorable treatment when insuring the automobile against liability and property loss. Plaintiff says he did not intend for any interest in the car to pass to his parents.

Just as plaintiff admittedly dealt with a salesman or agent for Halladay, so plaintiff could deal as an agent or the son of his parents. It was not necessary for the parents to personally see the automobile in order to purchase it. Of course, the parents may have acted as trustees or guardians for their son in purchasing the motor vehicle here involved. Whether they did or not is a matter between the son and his parents. It is not a matter for us to decide in the case with which we are dealing.

Estoppel

The district court chose to predicate its decision on the holding that plaintiff is estopped by his actions to assert the claim he attempts to make; and that to permit plaintiff to proceed to trial on such claim would constitute a fraud upon the court and Halladay Motors.

The doctrine of estoppel has as its purpose to prevent injury arising from actions or declarations which have been acted on in good faith and which would be inequitable to permit a party to retract. Pickett v. Associates Discount Corp. of Wyo., Wyo., 435 P.2d 445, 447; Pacheco v. Continental Casualty Company, Wyo., 476 P.2d 166, 168.

Whatever plaintiff's reasons for doing so may have been, he caused the 'Used Car Order' for the purchase in question to designate his father as the purchaser; he caused the 'Vehicle Invoice' to name his father as the purchaser; he caused the certificate of title for the vehicle being purchased to be assigned to his parents as the purchasers; he signed under oath an application for a new certificate of title, causing it to be issued to his parents as owners; he surrendered to Halladay Motors a trade-in vehicle which was titled in Colorado in the names of his parents; and he caused the title for the trade-in vehicle to be transferred by his parents directly to Halladay.

We will not dwell upon the fact that Financing was done in Colorado in the name of plaintiff and his father, or that insurance was obtained in the names of the parents as the insured, because these matters did not affect Halladay. It is important, however, to notice, as is mentioned in the trial court's findings, that § 31-30, W.S.1957, C.1967, defines the owner of a vehicle as the person who holds the legal title of such vehicle. And plaintiff caused the title in this case to be issued to his parents.

Our query is this: What could Halladay Motors have done which was not done in this case in order to make a safe contract with parents of a minor? We hardly see how it could safely have done otherwise than it did. In view of the hazards involved in contracting with a minor like plaintiff, we must assume Halladay would not have dealt if it had not been led to believe and understand that it was making the sale to plaintiff's...