Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc., 69 C 2252.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1971
• Docket Number: No. 69 C 2252.,69 C 2252.
• Citation: 325 F. Supp. 896
• Parties: Nicholas JANNES and Jannes Associates, Inc., an Illinois corporation, Plaintiffs, v. MICROWAVE COMMUNICATIONS, INC., an Illinois corporation, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

325 F. Supp. 896

Nicholas JANNES and Jannes Associates, Inc., an Illinois corporation, Plaintiffs, v. MICROWAVE COMMUNICATIONS, INC., an Illinois corporation, et al., Defendants.

No. 69 C 2252.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

January 8, 1971.

Thomas W. Conklin, Tasso H. Coin, and George E. Faber, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

Clarold L. Britton, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill., for Microwave Communications, Inc., Thomas J. Hermes, Leonard Barrett, Nick Philips and Philip Pree.

Jay Erens and Peter R. Monahan, Chicago, Ill., for William G. McGowan and Microwave Communications of America, Inc.

Francis J. Higgins, Bell, Boyd, Lloyd, Haddad & Burns, Chicago, Ill., for MCI New York West, Inc.

Reuben L. Hedlund, Donald G. Kempf, Jr., and Kirkland, Ellis, Hodson, Chaffetz & Masters, Chicago, Ill., for John D. Goeken.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

ROBSON, District Judge.

The defendants move to dismiss the second amended complaint in this action purportedly brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, and Rule 10(b)-5 promulgated thereunder. This court is of the opinion this action should be dismissed because of the plaintiffs' repeated and flagrant disregard of the directives set forth in Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

This 31-page complaint, the third such pleading filed in this action, consists of 33 paragraphs with 54 subparagraphs, replete with the plaintiffs' speculations, conclusions, arguments, and conjectures concerning the defendants' motives and conduct. The allegations are in rambling, narrative discourse. A detailed and redundant history of the plaintiffs' grievances against the defendants is also interspersed in the document. Lengthy recitations of evidentiary matter further confuse this pleading.¹

Rule 8(a) directs that a statement of a claim shall be short and plain. In addition, Rule 8(e) provides that each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and direct. Repeated filing of verbose, confused and redundant complaints warrants dismissal of the cause. In dismissing an action on these grounds, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed in its per curiam opinion that

"the present Second Amended Complaint * * * apparently alleges fraud and conspiracy in violation of civil rights. We use the word `apparently' because the complaint, though a Second Amended Complaint, is so verbose, confused and redundant that its true substance, if any, is well disguised." Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 966, 86 S.Ct. 458, 15 L.Ed.2d 370 (1965).

Similarly, a shareholder's derivative action purportedly brought under federal securities law was dismissed, inter alia, because

"the complaint openly and defiantly violates Rule 8(a) (2). It is not a `short and plain statement of the claim.' It is an extended embroidery of what, if true, would be mere evidence recited in perplexing and disjointed detail." Adair v. Schneider, 293 F.Supp. 393, 394 (S.D.N.Y.1968).

See also United States ex rel. Holland v. Maroney, 299 F.Supp. 262 (W.D.Pa. 1969); Martin v. Hunt, 29 F.R.D. 14 (D.Mass.1961). Furthermore, the pleading of bald conclusions unsupported by factual allegations will not save an otherwise fatally defective pleading. Greenstein v. Paul, 275 F.Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd 400 F.2d 580 (2nd Cir. 1968); International Harvester Co. v. Kansas City, 308 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. den. 371 U.S. 948, 83 S.Ct. 503, 9 L.Ed.2d 498 (1963).

The second amended complaint places upon the court and the defendants the burden of sifting out relevant matter and weeding out improper matter from that pleading in order to discern the claim or claims the plaintiffs are asserting. The court finds that the pleading is so unclear and confusing that its analysis with respect to the grounds asserted in the motions to dismiss is a practical impossibility. The defendants should not and cannot be required to answer such a substantially defective pleading. Pretrial discovery based upon such a nebulous pleading would be unmanageable and would present constant difficulties for the court and the parties.

In denying the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and ...