Janney Montgomery Scott, LLC v. Lynn, 2015-02371
| Decision Date | 28 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | 2015-02371 |
| Citation | 2017 NY Slip Op 05208 |
| Parties | Janney Montgomery Scott, LLC, plaintiff, v. John W. Lynn, appellant, Sterling National Bank, respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL
LEONARD B. AUSTIN
(Index No. 35307/14)
John W. Lynn, Pomona, NY, appellant pro se.
McCabe & Mack, LLP, Poughkeepsie, NY (Cory A. Poolman of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (William A. Kelly, J.), dated February 10, 2015. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Sterling National Bank which was for summary judgment declaring that it was the rightful owner of funds in a collateral account.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In December 2000, Provident Bank, a predecessor of the defendant Sterling National Bank (hereinafter Sterling), provided Lynn Homes, Inc. (hereinafter the corporation), with a commercial loan that was personally guaranteed by the corporation's owner, the defendant John W. Lynn. Lynn subsequently agreed to provide Sterling with a security interest in approximately $115,000 of funds in the corporation's pension plan, of which Lynn served as trustee, as collateral for the commercial loan. These pension funds were held in a collateral account that was maintained by the plaintiff.
Following a default on the commercial loan, Sterling and Lynn provided the plaintiff with inconsistent instructions as to how the pension funds held in the collateral account should be distributed. The plaintiff subsequently commenced this interpleader action against Sterling and Lynn to determine the ownership of the pension funds. Thereafter, Sterling moved for summary judgment, seeking, inter alia, a declaration that it, and not Lynn, was the rightful owner of the funds in question. The Supreme Court granted that branch of Sterling's motion and directed the plaintiff to release the challenged funds to Sterling. Lynn appeals.
We reject Sterling's contention that the appeal must be dismissed for lack of aggrievement. The Supreme Court determined that Sterling, and not Lynn, is entitled to the challenged funds in the collateral account maintained by the plaintiff. Thus, Lynn, as the non-prevailing claimant in the interpleader action, who opposed the motion, is an aggrieved party and may appeal from the order granting Sterling's motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 5511; Matter of Richmond County Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 11 AD2d 236, 239, affd 9 NY2d 913; cf. Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144, 156).
However, contrary to Lynn's contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that Sterling was the rightful owner of the challenged funds. Sterling established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853) by submitting evidence demonstrating that Lynn pledged the pension funds in...
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