Janny v. Palmer
| Decision Date | 29 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-cv-02194-KLM |
| Parties | MARK JANNY, Plaintiff, v. TIM PALMER, Captain, Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, MR. RAMIREZ, Lieutenant, Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, JOSH BELINDER, Lieutenant, Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, MR. BERGLUND, Sergeant, Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, MS. PALORANTA, Sergeant, Larimer County Jail, in her individual capacity, MR. HARTEKER, Sergeant, Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, MR. SMOYER, Sergeant, Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, MR. SAULTS, Sergeant, Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, MR. LALICKER, Sergeant, Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, MR. PERANTEAUX, Sergeant, Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, MR. MEEKS, Corporal, Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, MR. BURCH, Corporal, Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, MS. WULFERT, Corporal, Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, MR. VILLARREAL, Corporal, Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, MS. MAHONEY, Corporal, Larimer County Jail, in her individual capacity, MR. BROWN, Corporal (logistics), Larimer County Jail, in his individual capacity, MS. GEE, Deputy, Larimer County Jail, in her individual capacity, JUSTIN SMITH, Larimer County Sheriff, in his individual and official capacity, ATTORNEY DOE, Larimer County Attorney Office, in their individual capacity, THE MUNICIPALITY OF LARIMER COUNTY, LARIMER COUNTY DEPUTIES 1-100, in their individual capacities, and JAIL SUPERVISORS 1-20, in their individual capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [#144]1 (the "Motion").2 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se,3 filed a Response [#152] to the Motion, and Defendants filed a Reply [#155]. The Court has reviewed the briefs, the entire case file, and the applicable law, and is sufficiently advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion [#144] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The majority of evidence underlying Plaintiff's ten remaining claims is discussed in connection with each claim in the Analysis below, and the Court here only addresses a few general points underlying the case. Plaintiff is an inmate currently incarcerated by the Colorado Department of Corrections ("CDOC") at Colorado State Penitentiary ("CSP"). However, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, he was held at the Larimer County Jail ("LCJ"), first as a pretrial detainee starting on February 8, 2016, and then as a convictedprisoner starting on July 27, 2017, through the time of his transfer to another facility on September 20, 2017.
Plaintiff was arrested and briefly detained at the LCJ in early October 2015 for a parole violation. Motion [#144] at 8; Response [#152] at 3. Plaintiff was again arrested and booked into the LCJ on February 8, 2016, on two outstanding felony warrants for aggravated robbery. Motion [#144] at 7-8; Response [#152] at 3. Plaintiff was convicted by a jury on July 27, 2017, sentenced on September 18, 2017, and transferred to a CDOC facility on September 20, 2017. Motion [#144] at 7-8; Response [#152] at 3; see also Defs.' Ex. A [#144-1]. Plaintiff submitted roughly 200-300 grievances and appeals during his stay at the LCJ between February 8, 2016, and September 20, 2017. Motion [#144] at 12; Response [#152] at 7.
Ten claims remain in this lawsuit.5 However, the precise legal basis for each of these claims is often unclear and/or asserted under a variety of constitutional amendments, including the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and/or state laws. Further, it is often unclear against which of the many named Defendants a given aspect of a claim is asserted. This issue is compounded by the fact, as further discussed below, that Plaintiff appears to have abandoned certain aspects of certain claims without explicitly saying so. Regardless, the Court has done its utmost to determine which aspects of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [#46] remain at issue at this stage of the lawsuit based on a liberal reading of Plaintiff's Response [#152, #152-1] in conjunction with Defendants' understanding of the remaining claims and the Court's own reading of the AmendedComplaint [#46].
As relief, Plaintiff seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages as well as declaratory relief and various injunctions against the Municipality of Larimer County (or, alternatively, Defendant Justin Smith in his official capacity as Larimer County Sheriff) to direct the LCJ to take, or refrain from taking, various actions. Am. Compl. [#46] at 111-13. In the present Motion [#144], Defendants seek dismissal and/or summary judgment in their favor on all claims.
Subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged by a party or raised sua sponte by the court at any point in the proceeding. See, e.g., Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 16-19, (1951); Harris v. Illinois-California Express, Inc., 687 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir. 1982); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns whether the Court has jurisdiction to properly hear the case before it. Dismissal of a federal claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction "is proper only when the claim is 'so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.'" Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)). Because "federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," the Court must have a statutory basis to exercise its jurisdiction. Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Statutes conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on federal courts are to be strictly construed. F. & S. Const. Co. v. Jensen, 337 F.2d 160, 161 (10th Cir. 1964). "The burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction."Id. (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is to assess whether trial is necessary. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment shall be granted if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the issue in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 277 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing substantive law. Id.
The burden is on the movant to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). When the movant does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, the "movant may make its prima facie demonstration [of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact] simply by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim." Id. at 671. If the movant carries the initial burden of making a prima facie showing of a lack of evidence, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to put forth sufficient evidence for each essential element of his claim such that a reasonable jury could find in his favor. See Anderson, 277 U.S. at 248; Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). The nonmovant must go beyond the allegations and denials of his pleadings and provide admissible evidence, which the Court views in the light mostfavorable to him. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A., 60 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Conclusory statements based merely on conjecture, speculation, or subjective belief are not competent summary judgment evidence. Bones v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004). The nonmoving party's evidence must be more than "mere reargument of [his] case or a denial of an opponent's allegation" or it will be disregarded. See 10B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 (4th ed. 2017).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court may consider only admissible evidence. See Johnson v. Weld Cty., Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2010). The factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Concrete Works, Inc., v. City & Cty. of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1517 (10th Cir. 1994). At the summary judgment stage of litigation, a plaintiff's version of the facts must find support in the record. Thomson v. Salt Lake Cty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2009). "When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Thomson, 584 F.3d at 1312.
Only documents that meet the evidentiary requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 may be considered for purposes of summary judgment. Rule 56(c) provides that:
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