Janovic v. Janovic, 1D00-3463.
Decision Date | 15 March 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 1D00-3463.,1D00-3463. |
Citation | 814 So.2d 1096 |
Parties | Michael JANOVIC, Appellant, v. Dora JANOVIC, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
W. Joel Boles and Tracey Scalfano Witt of Wilson, Harrell, Smith, Boles & Farrington, P.A, Pensacola, for Appellant.
Glenn K. Allen and Jennifer W. Fites of Glenn K. Allen, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee.
Michael Janovic (former husband) raises three issues in this appeal from an order entitled "Qualifying Court Order" rendered on July 18, 2000. We find no merit in the third issue concerning the calculation of retirement pay awarded to Dora Janovic (former wife) and affirm as to that issue without further discussion. We restate the other two issues as follows: 1) Whether entry of the Qualifying Court Order violates the United States Supreme Court's holding in Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989), concerning the distribution of military disability retirement benefits; and 2) whether entry of the Qualifying Court Order constitutes an impermissible postjudgment modification of the equitable distribution scheme contained in the parties' dissolution of marriage judgment. We conclude that the order on appeal does not violate the holding in Mansell, as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court in Abernethy v. Fishkin, 699 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1997), because the order does not distribute disability retirement benefits nor does the record demonstrate that the husband will be required to utilize his disability benefits in order to comply with the Qualifying Court Order. We also conclude that the order constitutes permissible enforcement of an existing final judgment as it does nothing more than enforce the parties' property settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the consent final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We therefore affirm.
In April of 1999, the trial court entered a consent final judgment of dissolution of marriage terminating the parties' nineteen-year marriage. The judgment awarded the husband half of the retirement benefits earned by the wife during the marriage, and the wife half of the retirement benefits earned by the husband during the marriage. No alimony was awarded. The trial court specifically reserved jurisdiction in the judgment "to enter Qualified Domestic Relations Order(s) or other necessary order(s)" so as to distribute the parties' awarded share in one another's retirement benefits.
Less than one year after entry of the consent final judgment, the former husband was discharged from the Navy and waived a portion of his retirement benefits in favor of receiving veterans' disability benefits. Following this change in the former husband's financial status, the former wife filed a motion to enforce the final judgment and equitable distribution or, in the alternative, for judgment against the former husband to reimburse her for money overpaid to the husband. After a hearing on her motion, the trial court entered the order on review. The former husband has not provided a transcript of the hearing on the former wife's motion. The order on appeal provides in pertinent part as follows:
This order contains the same language used in the final judgment of dissolution entered in Abernethy v. Fishkin, 699 So.2d 235 (Fla.1997). The judgment in Abernethy was, however, entered prior to the award of disability benefits to the former husband. See id. at 237-38. The order in the instant case was entered after the award of disability benefits to the former husband.1 The former husband argues on appeal that entry of this order violates federal law, as discussed in Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989), and constitutes an impermissible modification of the original consent final judgment. We disagree.
In Mansell, the United States Supreme Court addressed the extent to which state courts "may treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay waived by the retiree in order to receive veterans' disability benefits." Mansell, 490 U.S. at 583, 109 S.Ct. 2023. In Abernethy, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted Mansell as prohibiting military personnel from assigning military disability benefits by settlement agreement and precluding state courts from enforcing such agreements. Abernethy, 699 So.2d at 236. The supreme court in Abernethy explained, "[T]he Court [in Mansell] held that the USFSPA [Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act] does not grant state courts the power to treat as divisible property military retirement pay which has been waived to receive veteran's disability benefits." Id. at 239.
As in Abernethy, at the time of the initial dissolution decree and equitable distribution of property in this case, the trial court distributed only non-disability military pension benefits. Thus, as the supreme court concluded in Abernethy with regard to the final judgment at issue there, we conclude that the challenged order does not violate the requirement of Mansell that disability benefits should not be considered as marital property during equitable distribution. See Abernethy, 699 So.2d at 239-40
.
109 S.Ct. 2023. Paragraph 16 of the order quoted above, however, creates an ambiguity in the order as to whether the former husband's disability retirement benefits are being considered part of the former husband's disposable retired pay. To the extent the order may be interpreted to create an obligation on the part of the former husband to use his disability retirement benefits to satisfy his indemnification obligation to the former wife, we consider the order to have no legal effect. Pursuant to this determination, the order on its face does not violate the dictates of Mansell as interpreted in Abernethy. As there is no transcript of the evidentiary proceedings to support the former husband's argument that his indemnification obligation would have to be satisfied with proceeds from his disability retirement benefits, there is no validity to the argument that the order as applied violates the dictates of Mansell as interpreted in Abernethy.
The order also appears to require the former husband to indemnify the former wife for any reductions in his military retirement pay. Such indemnification does not violate the dictates of Mansell. See Abernethy, 699 So.2d at 240
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