Jansson v. Department of Corrections

• Decision Date: 21 March 1986
• Docket Number: Docket No. 81789
• Citation: 147 Mich.App. 774,383 N.W.2d 152
• Parties: Gustave Eric JANSSON, Paul D. Duffy, Jr., Patrick Somerville, Harry A. Hosack and William D. Gilbert, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 152

383 N.W.2d 152

147 Mich.App. 774

Gustave Eric JANSSON, Paul D. Duffy, Jr., Patrick

Somerville, Harry A. Hosack and William D.

Gilbert, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 81789.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 18, 1985.

Decided Oct. 17, 1985.

Released for Publication March 21, 1986.

Gustave E. Jansson, Paul D. Duffy, Jr., Patrick Sommerville, Harry A. Hosack and William D. Gilbert, in pro. per.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and Louis J. Porter and Michael J. Moquin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant-appellant.

Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and T.M. BURNS, and CAPRATHE ^*, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs, who are or were inmates of the Department of Corrections (department) serving sentences for sex offenses, brought this action in the circuit court to enjoin the department from excluding sex offenders as a group from eligibility for placement in community correction centers and work camp programs. After a show cause hearing, the lower court ruled that the department lacked statutory authority to exclude sex offenders as a class from community placement and must determine the eligibility of such offenders on a case-by-case basis. Relying on this court's opinion in Luttrell v. Dep't of Corrections, 116 Mich.App. 1, 321 N.W.2d 817 (1982), rev'd 421 Mich. 93, 365 N.W.2d 74 (1984), reh. den. 422 Mich. 1201 (1985), the lower court found that M.C.L. Sec. 769.2a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1074(1) does not authorize the department to institute and enforce a policy of blanket preclusion of sex offenders from eligibility for community placement and work camp programs and that, in the absence of such authorization, the blanket preclusion policy is in contravention of the legislative intent of M.C.L. Sec. 791.265a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.2325(1), the community placement statute, and M.C.L. Sec. 791.265c; M.S.A. Sec. 28.2325(3), the work camp statute. The department appeals as of right. This Court granted a stay pending resolution of this appeal.

The only issue is whether M.C.L. Sec. 769.2a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1074(1) authorizes the department to exclude sex offenders from community placement residence programs. We hold that it does.

We find that M.C.L. Sec. 769.2a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1074(1) both directly and indirectly supports the department's policy of excluding sex offenders from community placement residence programs. We read the statute as an express directive of the Legislature to the department that it may not consider sex offenders eligible for community residential programs. We also believe that the statute indirectly supports the department's policy both because the department is required to carry out the sentences imposed by the courts and because the statute is an expression of legislative policy regarding sex offenders.

I Direct Support of the Department's Policy

The lower court found that the statute in question is directed exclusively to sentencing courts and has nothing to do with the department's power. It based this finding on the context of the statute, concluding that because the statute is located among the statutes governing sentencing by trial courts, it must be directed solely to those courts. We find that interpretation too restrictive.

The statute in question is located in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the chapter covering judgment and sentence. The location of a statute is not dispositive of to whom it is directed. This is particularly true of statutes concerning sentencing. The state's policy on sentencing makes it clear that no single branch of government has a monopoly on criminal sentencing. Statutes regarding sentencing are scattered throughout the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Corrections Code. The result of this statutory scheme is a continuum of laws regarding criminal offenses and punishments. No one provision of this continuum may be viewed in a vacuum. Each branch of government must cooperate with the others in sentencing, and no one branch can claim exclusivity over the sentencing policies of the state.

The express language of the statute belies the trial judge's conclusion that the statute in this case is directed exclusively to the sentencing courts:

"Whenever any person shall be lawfully sentenced by any court to imprisonment in the state prison, or in any county jail, for a sexual act or murder in connection with a sexual act, the person so sentenced shall not be eligible for custodial incarceration outside the state penal institution or the county jail building: Provided, That the warden of any state penal institution may authorize any person sentenced under this section to work outside the state penal institution on prison farms as operated by the state penal institution." (Emphasis added.)

Since part of the statute is directed to wardens of state penal institutions, we conclude that M.C.L. Sec. 769.2a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1074(1) is an express directive of the Legislature to the department that it shall not consider sex offenders eligible for community placement.

II Indirect Support of the Department's Policy

Even if one assumes that the statute is directed to sentencing courts only, we would still find that the statute supports the department's exclusion policy. Under M.C.L. Sec. 769.2a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1074(1) it is an implicit provision in every sex offender's sentence that the offender "shall not be eligible for custodial incarceration outside the state penal institution", except for prison farms. Since the department is required to execute lawful sentences imposed by the judiciary, the department must deny to sex offenders eligibility for community placement or work camp programs.

Furthermore, we believe that the statute supports the department's policy because it expresses legislative policy concerning placement of sex offenders. Therefore, the department director is justified in concluding, in his discretion, that sex offenders fall outside the category of...