Jansson v. Stamford Health, Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. No. 3:16-cv-260 (CSH) |
| Parties | SAMANTHA JANSSON, Plaintiff, v. STAMFORD HEALTH, INC. d/b/a STAMFORD HOSPITAL, STAMFORD HOSPITAL, STAMFORD ANESTHESIOLOGY SERVICES, P.C., VANTAGEPOINT LLC d/b/a VANTAGEPOINT HEALTHCARE ADVISORS, MICHAEL COADY, SHARON KIELY, SAL MANCINO and THERESA BOWLING, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S THIRD MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT [DOC. 150]
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Samantha Jansson brings this employment discrimination action, alleging that she was wrongfully terminated by her two former employers, Stamford Hospital (including Stamford Health, Inc., doing business as Stamford Hospital) and Stamford Anesthesiology Services P.C. ("SAS"). The Court has recounted the facts of the case in its previous ruling, familiarity with which is assumed. See Jansson v. Stamford Health, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-260 (CSH), 2017 WL 1289824, at *1-3 (D. Conn. Apr. 5, 2017).
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's third motion to amend the complaint. Doc. 150. Plaintiff's path to this request to amend is convoluted in that, upon entry of the Court's Ruling on her previous motion to amend, she first failed to read the attached Ruling and filed an "Amended Complaint" containing claims and parties the Court had dismissed from the action. As Defendants noted in their Objection to the pending motion, "Plaintiff continued to include each and every one of the Dismissed Counts the Court had ordered removed from the Amended Complaint and also included all of the Dismissed Parties that the Court had ordered removed from the case." Doc. 155, at 5 (citing Doc. 139).
After Defendants' counsel demanded that Plaintiff stipulate to the dismissal of counts and parties in accordance with the Court's Ruling [Doc. 138], Plaintiff moved for an extension of time until May 12, 2017, to file a new Amended Complaint "in accordance with the Court's Order of April 5, 2017," due to the fact that "Plaintiff's lead counsel"was not fully aware of the parameters of the Court's Order when the Amended Complaint was filed on April 28, 2017."1 Doc. 140.
Responding to Plaintiff's request to extend time, various defendants consented to the extension provided Plaintiff would file an Amended Complaint in compliance with the Court's order - i.e., one that excluded the dismissed counts and parties. See Doc.141, 142, 145. Despite the Court's order in July 2016 that any amended complaint was to be filed "forthwith," Plaintiff intimated in her reply brief that she believed that she had the right to re-plead various causes of action that the Court had found deficient in her Proposed Amended Complaint. Doc. 143.
On May 4, 2017, although the Court granted Plaintiff's motion for extension of time, it directed her to file an amended complaint in the form directed by the applicable Ruling. Doc. 146. The Court specifically stated: Doc. 146.
Moreover, "in considering any such motion [to amend], in addition to the possibility of 'futility' of the claims, the Court must assess whether there is 'good cause' for the amendment because such a motion would fall outside the previously set deadlines to amend the Complaint (6/30/2016), pursuant to the Court's [38] Scheduling Order, as expanded for one amendment by [56] Order, granting leave to amend (7/15/2016))." Id. In so ordering, the Court stated that it would examine whether Plaintiff "has demonstrated diligence . . . and whether the amendment would not significantly prejudice [defendants]." Id.
Two weeks later, on May 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed yet another noncompliant amended complaint [Doc. 149], including the dismissed parties as defendants but setting forth no causes of action. Defendants' counsel then contacted Plaintiff's counsel to advise of Defendants' "intention to move to dismiss the facially invalid Amended Complaint," which resulted in Plaintiff filing a "Notice of Revised Amended Complaint." Doc. 152, 152-1. That Notice stated that her May 12, 2017 Amended Complaint—filed to "correct" the non-compliant April 28, 2017 Amended Complaint - was inadvertently filed without any causes of action included. Four days later, on May 30, 2017, Plaintiff filed a "Revised" Amended Complaint," which is now the operative complaint in this action. Doc. 153.
On May 12, 2017, prior to filing the Revised Amended Complaint, Plaintiff filed the current motion requesting leave to amend her previous, deficient Amended Complaint [Doc. 149], with aseventy-page, fifteen count "Proposed Second Amended Complaint." Doc. 150.
After more than 15 months of litigation and the Court's sixty-page Ruling delineating which counts failed to state a claim, Plaintiff now seeks to replace the operative Revised Amended Complaint [Doc. 153] with this new pleading. Her "new" claims include the following: retaliation and interference under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2617, against Stamford Hospital (Count Nine); claims for aiding and abetting under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act ("CFEPA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(5), against VantagePoint LLC, Michael Coady, Salvatore Mancino, Theresa Bowling, and Stamford Hospital (Counts Ten to Fourteen); and interference under Title VII against Stamford Hospital (Count Fifteen).2
These additional claims include claims against defendants whom the Court dismissed from the action, directing the Clerk to terminate them upon the filing of a compliant amended complaint. Moreover, these claims encompass claims that were dismissed "for failure to state a claim" in that Ruling as well.3
Needless to say, the manner in which Plaintiff has filed her various amended complaints has led to chaos and confusion among the parties, including which parties will remain in the case and which causes of action will go forward or be necessarily eliminated for failing to state a claim. This Ruling resolves Plaintiff's third motion to amend with finality to end the confusion regarding Plaintiff's claims so that the case may proceed.
II. DISCUSSION
A party may only amend its pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving it.4 Plaintiff's present motion to amend is her "third" such motion and is thus governed by Rule 15(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., which provides that "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave" and "[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires."5 Plaintiff's motion to amend is energetically opposed by Defendants so she has no written consent from the opposing parties to amend. She must, therefore, seek the Court's leave.
In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), the United States Supreme Court articulated the relevant standard for a court to determine whether to grant a party's request to amend his or her pleading under Federal Civil Rule 15(a). In particular, the Foman court stated: "In the absence of any apparent or declared reason - such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc. - the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 'freely given.'" 371 U.S. at 182. "Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules." Id.
The Second Circuit consistently applies Foman in favor of motions to amend. See, e.g., Knife Rights, Inc. v. Vance, 802 F.3d 377, 389 (2d Cir. 2015) () (quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182); Kroshnyi v. U.S. Pack Courier Servs., Inc., 771 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2014) () (quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182); Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013) () (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182); Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) ().
As this Court has previously stated, ...
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