Janusiak v. Cooper
Decision Date | 22 August 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 19-1198,19-1198 |
Citation | 937 F.3d 880 |
Parties | Jeanette M. JANUSIAK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Sarah COOPER, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Shelley M. Fite, Attorney, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF WISCONSIN, INC., Madison, WI, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Daniel J. O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Wisconsin Department of Justice, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before Kanne, Hamilton, and Scudder, Circuit Judges.
After an infant died in the care of petitioner Jeanette Janusiak, a Wisconsin jury found her guilty of first-degree intentional homicide. On direct appeal, state courts rejected her argument that statements she made during an interrogation were involuntary and should have been suppressed. Janusiak then asserted that argument in federal court in her petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied relief. We affirm.
On appeal, Janusiak contends her statements were coerced by (1) comments that law enforcement made to her about keeping access to her children, (2) the length and other features of the interrogation, and (3) her vulnerability as a pregnant woman and mother. We affirm because the state appellate court reasonably applied the correct standard to determine that Janusiak’s statements were voluntary.
The facts about Janusiak’s case are drawn from the state-court record. Janusiak called 911 to report that Payten Shearer, a friend’s baby in her care, was not breathing. Paramedics took Payten to the hospital while officers talked to Janusiak. The police returned about eight hours later, and Janusiak, then eight months pregnant, agreed to go to the police station for an interview. Police questioned her about Payten’s death for about seven hours. Toward the end of the interrogation, Janusiak made statements about what happened to Payten that were used to impeach her testimony at trial. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals court described the interrogation as follows:
State v. Janusiak , 876 N.W.2d 178, 367 Wis. 2d 349, ¶¶ 3–6 (Wis. App. 2016) (footnote omitted).
Janusiak was charged with first-degree intentional homicide. Before trial, she moved to suppress a video recording of the interrogation. The trial court denied the motion, and the recording was shown to the jury to undermine her credibility with her inconsistent story.
The state appellate court described the testimony received at the suppression hearing and the trial court’s ruling on Janusiak’s motion:
Janusiak , 367 Wis. 2d 349, ¶¶ 3–6, 876 N.W.2d 178 (footnote omitted). We have viewed and compared the video with the transcript. The state appellate court’s description and the transcript are materially consistent with the video.
Besides using Janusiak’s inconsistencies from the interrogation to undermine her credibility, the State relied heavily on testimony from medical experts that implicated Janusiak. A radiologist testified that Payten’s skull was fractured in three places and that a fall from a bed would be unlikely to cause those injuries. A pediatrician specializing in child abuse testified that Payten had bruising on her chest and back in a pattern resembling an adult hand, and that these injuries, among others (such as detached retinas ), had occurred shortly before the paramedics started treating Payten. The pediatrician also concluded that Payten had been sodomized with an object and had suffered "definite abusive head trauma, child physical abuse that led to [her] demise." The experts relied on the facts that Janusiak was Payten’s primary caregiver for the three days preceding Payten’s injuries and was, according to Janusiak herself, the only adult in the home the night that she called 911. The State also introduced evidence that Payten’s blood was found on a wall of the bedroom, on the bed, and on a washcloth stuffed under the mattress.
Janusiak’s defense focused on testimony from her and her medical expert. She insisted that she never hit or sodomized Payten and that Payten had not fallen off a bed. She said that she changed her story during the interrogation only because the officers "scared me, and they told me, basically the truth wasn’t enough, so if I knew what happened to Payten, and an accident happened, then I can go home to my children." She described her physical condition during the interrogation as "very far along in pregnancy and physically exhausted." Her medical expert testified that the iron content of Payten’s blood, the "healing characteristics" of Payten’s head, and delay between injury and symptoms in some infants suggested that Payten’s injuries were inflicted "a few days prior to Payten’s collapse."
The jury found Janusiak guilty of first-degree intentional homicide, and she was sentenced to life in prison. In her direct appeal in state court, she argued that her statements during the interrogation were coerced in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. She gave three reasons: First, the officers and a social worker threatened to separate her from her children if she did not satisfy them, a tactic that she said was barred by Lynumn v. Illinois , 372 U.S. 528, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963). Lynumn overturned a conviction for unlawful marijuana use that was based in part on a confession that the police obtained by threatening Lynumn that unless she "cooperated," they would take her children from her and stop the state’s financial aid to the children. Second, the threats, the length of the interrogation, her pregnancy, and the officers’ promises to let her see her children if she cooperated, combined to create an unduly coercive atmosphere for any defendant. Third, she was particularly vulnerable to coercion because of her pregnancy and status as a mother of four young children.
The appellate court affirmed for several reasons. It first determined Janusiak was not "particularly vulnerable to police pressures and tactics." Janusiak , 367 Wis. 2d 349, ¶ 15, 876 N.W.2d 178. The court cited her age of 24, high-school education, five prior experiences with the police, calm demeanor ("she had ceased crying and was calm by the time the officers began to question her"), absence of exhaustion, and officers’ repeated offers of breaks, food, and drink. ¶¶ 9, 13, 15. The court noted that "[a]dvanced pregnancy might be a contributing factor if combined with other pertinent facts ..., but Janusiak fails to point to any such pertinent facts." ¶ 15.
In addition, the circumstances of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Winfield v. Dorethy
...that presumption, a petitioner must show that the finding was unreasonable by clear and convincing evidence. Id. ; Janusiak v. Cooper , 937 F.3d 880, 888 (7th Cir. 2019). A finding cannot be unreasonable if "reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question.......
-
State v. Barlow
...the child's support from the state or conditioning future interactions on cooperation. [Citations omitted]." Janusiak v. Cooper , 937 F.3d 880, 891 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining the lessons learned from Lynumn). But that is not the case here. Hagen's alleged threats did not force Barlow to de......
-
Wilber v. Thurmer
...is presumed to be correct, and that presumption can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. § 2254(e)(1) ; Janusiak v. Cooper , 937 F.3d 880, 888 (7th Cir. 2019) ("The petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that the findings were unreasonable."). Although habeas co......
-
Sánchez v. Vill. of Wheeling
...Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of an involuntary statement against a criminal defendant." Janusiak v. Cooper , 937 F.3d 880, 888 (7th Cir. 2019) ; see Jackson v. Curry , 888 F.3d 259, 265 (7th Cir. 2018) ("The Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth Amendment's Self......