Jaquez v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 25 May 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. CV 15-3838 AJW
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: YAZMIN ALEJANDARA JAQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

YAZMIN ALEJANDARA JAQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Case No. CV 15-3838 AJW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION

May 25, 2016

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Plaintiff filed this action seeking reversal of the decision of the defendant, the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner"), denying plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. The parties have filed a Joint Stipulation ("JS") setting forth their contentions with respect to each disputed issue.

Administrative Proceedings

In an October 16, 2013 written hearing decision that constitutes the Commissioner's final decision in this case, the ALJ found that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a range of sedentary work, and that her RFC did not preclude her from performing alternative work available in significant numbers in the national economy. The ALJ therefore concluded that plaintiff was not disabled at any time through the date of his decision. [Administrative Record ("AR") 21-41].

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Standard of Review

The Commissioner's denial of benefits should be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Stout v. Comm'r, Social Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). "Substantial evidence" means "more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). "It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court is required to review the record as a whole and to consider evidence detracting from the decision as well as evidence supporting the decision. Robbins v. Social Sec. Admin, 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006); Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999). "Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld." Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954 (citing Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Severity determination

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding that the plaintiff did not suffer from a medically determinable, severe mental impairment and in failing to utilize the psychiatric review technique outlined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a, 416.920a. [JS 5-20].

At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determines whether plaintiff has any severe, medically determinable physical or mental impairments that meet the durational requirement. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.920(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). A medically determinable impairment is one that "result[s] from result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. A physical or mental impairment must be established by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by your statement of symptoms . . . ." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 416.908. The ALJ evaluates the existence and severity of a claimant's mental impairment(s) by utilizing a "special technique," also referred to as the "psychiatric review technique." In assessing severity, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant's medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments significantly limits his or her physicalor mental ability to do "basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521 (a), 416.921(a)¹; Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686-687 (9th Cir. 2006). The ALJ is required to consider the claimant's subjective symptoms in making a severity determination, provided that the claimant "first establishes by objective medical evidence (i.e., signs and laboratory findings) that he or she has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) and that the impairment(s) could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptom(s)." SSR 96-3p, 1996 WL 374181, at *2.

"An impairment or combination of impairments may be found not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work." Webb, 433 F.3d at 686. The ALJ "may find that a claimant lacks a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments only when [that] conclusion is clearly established by medical evidence." Webb, 433 F.3d at 687 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The ALJ found that plaintiff had severe physical impairments, but that she "fail[ed] to establish a medically determinable mental impairment, let alone a 'severe' one." [AR 31]. The ALJ acknowledged that plaintiff "claimed to have neuropsychiatric related problems," including "depression" and "anxiety," and that there was treating and other medical evidence in the record arguably supporting the existence of a severe, medically determinable mental impairment. [See AR 30-31].

First, plaintiff received mental health treatment from Warren Procci, M.D., Ph.D., a psychiatrist, beginning in March 2011. Plaintiff's treating orthopedist referred her to Dr. Procci in February 2011 for complaints of anxiety, stress, and depression secondary to chronic pain and disability. [AR 604]. The ALJ found that, "viewed in a light favorable to the claimant, records from Dr. Procci's medical firm arguably verify [plaintiff's] attendance at appointments over a period of slightly more than 12 months between March of 2011 and April of 2012." [AR 30, 641-667, 1012-1022].

Second, in June 2011, Dr. Procci completed a written mental disorder assessment form based on apsychiatric evaluation he conducted on March 30, 3011. [AR 30, 642-646, 650-665]. As part of his evaluation, Dr. Procci interviewed plaintiff, reviewed medical records, conducted a mental status examination, and reviewed the results of nine psychological tests.² [AR 650-655]. Dr. Procci's diagnoses were: (1) adjustment disorder, with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, chronic; (2) insomnia type sleep disorder due to pain; (3) psychological factors affecting medical condition; and (4) pain disorder associated with a general medical condition - orthopedic. [See AR 30-31, 642-646]. He reported that plaintiff exhibited psychological symptoms including anxiety, depression, tearfulness, sleep disorders, anger, social withdrawal, forgetfulness, low self-esteem, lack of self-confidence, difficulty making decisions, and problems concentrating. [AR 643, 646]. Dr. Procci also opined that

due to the magnitude of plaintiff's psychological symptoms, somatic preoccupation and experience of chronic pain, her ability to cope with routine work stressors is limited. Her physical and emotional symptoms would affect her attendance and productivity. Anxiety, depression, anger, and low self-esteem would have a negative affect [sic] on all interpersonal relationships, including those in an employment setting

[AR 646]. Plaintiff was "currently participating in weekly psychotherapy sessions" prescribed by Dr. Procci [AR 642, 663]. Her prognosis was "guarded," and Dr. Procci did not expect significant change within the next 12 months. [AR 642]. He opined that plaintiff had been temporarily totally disabled since September 16, 2010.³ [AR 663].

Third, Dr. Tashjian, a nonexamining state agency psychiatric consultant who reviewed plaintiff's treatment records, opined that plaintiff had medically determinable, severe "affective disorders" that caused mild restrictions of daily living, moderate difficulties maintaining social functioning, moderate difficulties maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, and no episodes of decompensation of extended duration. [AR 30, 121-122]. Dr. Tashjian found that plaintiff's severe affective disorders limited plaintiff's mental RFC to understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple work-related tasks in a work setting with reduced interpersonal contact. [AR 125-127].

The ALJ rejected the treating and nonexamining source evidence in determining that plaintiff did not have a medically determinable, severe mental impairment. In so doing, the ALJ "appears to have applied a more stringent legal standard than is warranted by law. We have defined the step-two inquiry as 'a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.'" Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996)).

The ALJ characterized plaintiff's mental health treatment as "limited at best" because she declined prescription medication she was offered for anxiety, nervousness, depression, and sleep dysfunction. [AR 30, 730]. However, plaintiff testified that she attended approximately 30 psychotherapy sessions and that she also saw Dr. Procci for followup appointments. The record also indicates that Dr. Procci referred her for biofeedback therapy, which she underwent on 10 to 12 occasions. [AR 747, 1012-1021]. The ALJ acknowledged that plaintiff attended mental health treatment appointments for over a year. [AR 30, 83-84].

Plaintiff's medication history may be relevant to the credibility of her subjective symptoms, and "[c]redibility determinations do bear on evaluations of medical evidence when an ALJ is presented with conflicting medical opinions or inconsistency between a claimant's subjective complaints and his diagnosed conditions." Webb, 433 F.3d at 688. However, Dr. Procci did not "dismiss [plaintiff's] complaints as altogether unfounded" merely because she underwent therapy and did not take psychotropic medication, and "there is no inconsistency between [plaintiff's] complaints" and Dr. Procci's opinion that is "sufficient to doom [plaintiff's] claim as groundless under the de minimis standard of step two." Webb, 433 F.3d at 688 (citing Batson v. Comm'r of Soc....