Jaquith v. Massachusetts Baptist Convention

• Decision Date: 07 January 1899
• Parties: JAQUITH v. MASSACHUSETTS BAPTIST CONVENTION et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

172 Mass. 439

52 N.E. 544

JAQUITH v. MASSACHUSETTS BAPTIST CONVENTION et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 7, 1899

COUNSEL

H.J. Jaquith and W.R. Bigelow, for appellant.

Dudley P. Bailey, for appellees.

OPINION

HAMMOND J.

The conveyances, prior to October, 1896, affecting the property taken in chronological order, were as follows: The deed of August 15, 1894, from Pratt to Henry A. Davis; the mortgage of the same date from Davis to the Massachusetts Baptist Convention; a subsequent mortgage of the same date from Davis to Pratt, discharged on the records August 23, 1895; another mortgage, of September 6, 1894, from Davis to his father discharged December 7, 1894; a deed of December 4, 1894, from Davis to Richardson, and a deed of the same date from Richardson to Viola I., the wife of said Davis; a mortgage of April 18, 1896, from Viola and her husband to Marqueze; and a deed of September 2, 1896, from Viola and her husband to said Richardson. At the time of the foreclosure of the mortgage held by the Massachusetts Baptist Convention, which took place in October, 1896, the record title to the property stood in Richardson, subject to this mortgage and to the mortgage given to Marqueze. The Massachusetts Baptist Convention sold the premises at public auction to Lizzie E Pratt, wife of Ezra F. Pratt; and the Pratts gave a mortgage back to the Massachusetts Baptist Convention to secure their note for a part of the purchase money, and this mortgage is still held by the mortgagee. It is not denied by the plaintiff that the foreclosure proceedings were in due form. But the plaintiff says that the conveyances of December 4 1894, by which the record title to the property passed from Henry A. Davis to his wife, were without consideration, and void as to creditors, and that the conveyance of September 2, 1896, to Richardson was without consideration. It appears from the statement of agreed facts that there was no pecuniary consideration moving from the wife to the husband at the time he caused the title to pass to her. But, where a husband conveys land to his wife, the presumption is that it is a gift to her; and, although the presumption may be rebutted by evidence, we do not find in the facts agreed, or in the other evidence presented, sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption. It must stand as a gift to the wife, and the only remaining question on this part of the...