Jaramillo v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver, 24979

• Decision Date: 01 February 1971
• Docket Number: No. 24979,24979
• Citation: 480 P.2d 841,173 Colo. 459
• Parties: Daniel L. JARAMILLO, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, State of Colorado, and the Honorable Henry E. Santo, one of the Judges thereof, Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 841

480 P.2d 841

173 Colo. 459

Daniel L. JARAMILLO, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,

State of Colorado, and the Honorable Henry E.

Santo, one of the Judges thereof, Respondents.

No. 24979.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Feb. 1, 1971.

Rollie R. Rogers, State Public Defender, Bryan Morgan, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for petitioner.

James D. McKevitt, Dist. Atty., Gregory A. Mueller, Asst. Dist. Atty., Jarvis W. Seccombe, Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., Thomas P. Casey, Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for respondents.

GROVES, Justice.

The petitioner was charged with aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon in the respondent court. His petition to dismiss the charges was denied. We issued a rule to show cause why the court had jurisdiction. We agree with the position of the petitioner that the respondent district court lacked jurisdiction.

The robbery took place on April 2, 1970, at which time the petitioner was 17 years of age. On May 11th, a petition was filed in the Denver juvenile court under the Colorado Children's Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code) alleging that the petitioner was a delinquent child, and based upon his alleged participation in the aforementioned robbery. The petitioner became 18 on May 13, 1970. Thereafter, the information was filed in the district court charging the petitioner with the same aggravated robbery and with conspiracy to commit the robbery. Upon motion of the district attorney, the juvenile court dismissed the proceedings. In its order of dismissal the juvenile court found that it lacked jurisdiction.

It is the petitioner's position that the juvenile court had exclusive, original jurisdiction under the Code; that such exclusive jurisdiction continued past the 18th birthday, and that the district court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction. The district attorney, appearing for the respondents, submits that at All times the district court had exclusive jurisdiction.

This matter involves an interpretation of certain provisions in the Code and, in turn, this interpretation must rest upon our determination of the General Assembly's intent. The Code defines a child as 'a person under eighteen years of age' and continues as follows:

"Adult' means a person eighteen years of age or over, except that any minor eighteen years of age or over under the continuing jurisdiction of the court, or who is before the court for an alleged delinquent act committed prior to his eighteenth birthday * * * shall be referred to as a child.' 1967 Perm.Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 22--1--3(3) and (4).

This statute in its definition of 'delinquent child' states that the definition 'shall not apply to crimes of violence punishable by death or life imprisonment where the accused is fourteen years of age or older.' 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 22--1--3(17)(b). The Code further provides as follows:

'A child shall be charged with the commission of a felony only as provided in subsection (4)(a) of this section, except for crimes of violence punishable by death or life imprisonment where the accused is fourteen years of age or older.' 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 22--1--4(4)(b).

The Code also contains a provision that when the juvenile court finds that it would be contrary to the best interests of the child or the public to retain jurisdiction it may enter an order waiving jurisdiction, whereupon a criminal information may be filed in the district court. 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 22--1--4(4)(a) and 22--3--8(1) and (4).

The penalty for aggravated robbery (in the case of a person who is more than 18 years of age at the time of sentencing) is 'not less than four years, or for life.' 1967 Perm.Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40--5--1(2)(a). Thus, the question is whether a term of not less than four years, or for life, is embraced within punishment by 'death or life imprisonment.' If so, then the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction and the district court possessed it. If not, jurisdiction is in the juvenile court and the district court is without jurisdiction.

We have studied and puzzled over the following authorities: People v. District Court, 164 Colo. 437, 435 P.2d 763 (1967); Garcia v. District Court, 157 Colo. 432, 403 P.2d 215 (1965); O'Day v. People, 114 Colo. 373, 166 P.2d 789 (1946); Croswell v. People, 74 Colo. 547, 223 P. 51 (1924); Cummings v. State, Ind., 251 N.E.2d 663 (1969); People v. Murch, 263 N.Y. 285, 189 N.E. 220 (1934); Lubchuk v. County Court, 31 Misc.2d 922, 222 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1961); and State ex rel. Campbell v. Wood, 151 W.Va. 807, 155 S.E.2d 893 (1967). Upon completion of the study of these and other authorities cited by the parties, we have found ourselves as much in the dark as to the legislative intent as when we commenced.

We mention,...