Jaro, Inc. v. Shields, 45696

Decision Date26 February 1971
Docket NumberNo. 1,No. 45696,45696,1
PartiesJARO, INC. et al. v. Robert SHIELDS et al
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Northcutt, Edwards, Doss & Germano, M. Ken Doss, Atlanta, for appellants.

Harry J. Beecham, Decatur, for appellees.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

BELL, Chief Judge.

The Act of March 8, 1968, Ga.L.1968, pp. 127-129 (Code Ann. § 3-1006 et seq.), provides for a statute of limitations for actions to recover damages for deficiencies in connection with improvements to real property. Section 1 of the Act states that 'No action to recover damages for any deficiency in the survey or plat, planning, design, specifications, supervision or observation of construction or construction of an improvement to real property * * * shall be brought * * * more than eight years after substantial completion of such an improvement.' Section 6 defines the phrase 'substantial completion' as the date when construction was sufficiently completed so that the woner could occupy for the use for which it was intended. Plaintiffs brought this action in November, 1969, to recover damages for defendants' negligence in making a survey and plat of plaintiffs' property in July 1960 upon which plaintiffs built a home. Defendants pleaded the statute of limitation in bar. Plaintiffs answered defendants' interrogatory that the residence was completed on August 12, 1960, and occupied by them on that date. The sole issue on appeal is whether the cited statute applies to this case. Held:

The statute can only apply if it may be construed as having a retrospective application. A statute of limitation is remedial in nature. The legislature can constitutionally provide for the retrospective application of a remedial statute provided a time be fixed subsequent to the passage of the statute which allows citizens affected by it a reasonable time to protect their rights. Code § 102-104; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Toombs County, 187 Ga. 544(4), 1 S.E.2d 411. It has been held by the Supreme Court and this court that a statute is not to be construed retroactively in operation unless the language of the statute imperatively requires it. Walker County Fertilizer Co. v. Napier, 184 Ga. 861, 193 S.E. 770; Leathers v. Turner, 75 Ga.App. 62, 41 S.E.2d 921. The statute in this case is completely silent on the question of retrospective application. Thus, applying the foregoing rule, the statute of limitation in this case cannot be construed...

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19 cases
  • Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Flewellen
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • December 1, 1982
    ...is not to be construed retroactively in operation unless the language of the statute imperatively requires it." Jaro, Inc. v. Shields, 123 Ga.App. 391, 392, 181 S.E.2d 110 (1971). It is my opinion that "the language of [Code Ann. § 56-3404b(b) ] is plain and subject to only one construction......
  • Hanflik v. Ratchford
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • February 25, 1994
    ...Quinn v. Stafford, 257 Ga. 608, 362 S.E.2d 49 (1987); Allrid v. Emory Univ., 249 Ga. 35, 285 S.E.2d 521 (1982); Jaro v. Shields, 123 Ga.App. 391, 181 S.E.2d 110 (1971)); see also Dinh v. Rust Int'l Corp., 974 F.2d 500, 501-02 (4th Cir.1992) (accord). Thus, the constitutionality of the retro......
  • LFE Corp. (Automatic Signal Div.) v. Edenfield
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 29, 1988
    ...582, and thus under certain conditions can be applied retroactively. See e.g., Hatcher, supra; OCGA § 1-3-5. In Jaro, Inc. v. Shields, 123 Ga.App. 391, 181 S.E.2d 110, this court held that "[a] statute of limitation is remedial in nature." Id. at 392, 181 S.E.2d 110. Statutes of repose are ......
  • Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • January 6, 1989
    ...Georgia law prohibits a statute from having retroactive effect unless the statute expressly provides for it. See, Jaro, Inc. v. Shields, 123 Ga.App. 391, 181 S.E.2d 110 (1971); O.C.G.A. § 1-3-5. Under Georgia law a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff can first bring the action. U-Hau......
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