Jarrard v. State
| Decision Date | 12 October 1949 |
| Docket Number | 16842. |
| Citation | 55 S.E.2d 706,206 Ga. 112 |
| Parties | JARRARD v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Joseph G. Collins, B. Frank Whelchel, Gainesville for plaintiff in error.
Jeff C. Wayne, Sol. Gen., Howard T. Overby, Gainesville, Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Frank B. Stow, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
Claude Jarrard was indicted, tried, and convicted of murder of William Turner, and sentenced to electrocution. The defenses relied upon by the defendant were insanity and justifiable homicide, acting under the fears of a reasonable man. To the overruling of his motion for a new trial as amended, based upon the general grounds and 24 special grounds, the defendant excepted. Held:
1. No proper foundation having been laid for the introduction of evidence as to the mental condition of the defendant's sister, the exclusion of evidence with reference thereto, as complained of in the first ground of the amended motion for a new trial, was not error. Hackney v. State Ga.Sup.1949, 55 S.E.2d 704.
2. The second ground of the amended motion complains because the trial court permitted the solicitor general, on cross examination of the witness for the defendant, to ask the witness if the defendant was drinking at a time when he was at the home of the witness. This was not error in view of the testimony of this witness as to the conduct of the defendant at that time, and upon which the witness had in part predicated his opinion that the defendant was insane. This did not tend to put the character of the defendant in issue, and the ruling complained of was not erroneous for any reason assigned. Peek v. State, 155 Ga. 49(3), 116 S.E. 629; Smith v. State, 148 Ga. 467, 96 S.E. 1042; Owensby v. State, 149 Ga. 19, 98 S.E. 552, 553. The ruling here made is also applicable in principle to the assignment of error in the third ground of the amended motion for a new trial.
3. Sanity or insanity is a proper subject for opinion evidence, and where the question under examination, and to be decided by the jury, shall be one of opinion, any witness may swear to his opinion or belief, giving his reasons therefor. Code, § 38-1708; Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 115(4), 117, 72 S.E. 922.
4. Ordinarily, the sufficiency of the reasons given by witnesses for their opinion as to a person's sanity or insanity cannot be determined as a matter of law by the court, but is a question for the jury. Frizzell v. Reed, 77 Ga. 724(5); Hubbard v. Rutherford, 148 Ga. 238, 96 S.E. 327; Pennington v. Perry, 156 Ga. 103(9), 118 S.E. 710; Espy v. Preston, 199 Ga. 608, 34 S.E.2d 705.
5. One of the defenses relied upon by the defendant was that of insanity. A non-expert witness offered by the defendant testified: that he had associated with the defendant sufficiently to form an opinion as to his sanity or insanity; that the witness had a conversation with the defendant about a year or year and a half ago; that they talked some little bit; that he could not remember the details of the conversation or the subjects discussed; that, from the way the defendant talked, the witness observed that he didn't talk like he used to; that up to that time he had not noticed anything wrong with the defendant, but that he had known him before and talked with him before, and that he didn't talk then like he had on the last occasion. After stating these facts, the witness was asked by counsel for the defendant to state his opinion as to the sanity of the defendant, whether he was of sound or unsound mind. To this question counsel for the State objected on the ground that 'the proper foundation for an opinion on behalf of this witness has not been laid.' This objection the trial court sustained and declined to permit the witness to answer the question propounded, and error is assigned thereon in the fifth ground of the amended motion for a new trial. Held:
(a) Under the preceding rulings, the trial court erred in sustaining the objection urged, and in excluding the testimony offered. The opinion of the witness was admissible, and the weight and credit to be given to it was a question for the jury in the light of the facts given by the witness, upon which the opinion was predicated.
(b) The assignment of error in the first ground of the amended motion, based on a similar ruling, shows no cause for reversal, because the witness there detailed additional facts and was allowed to and did express his opinion.
6. The evidence in this case discloses, among other things, that on the date of the homicide, the deceased, together with his father and two brothers, was riding along a public road in an automobile being driven by the deceased; that they passed the defendant, who was walking along the road in the opposite direction; that immediately after passing the defendant, the driver of the automobile stopped the car and began backing it towards the defendant for a distance variously estimated at from a few steps to one hundred yards, the evidence being in conflict as to whether this was done under the impression on the part of the driver that the defendant had made some request of those in the automobile, or whether it was on the initiative of the driver of the automobile without anything being said by the defendant. One of the defenses relied upon by the defendant was that of self-defense, acting under the fears of a reasonable man that his life was in danger or that a felony was about to be committed upon him by the deceased. On the trial, the defendant offered to prove by the witness, Jewell Ingram, that, shortly after the deceased William Turner had separated from his wife, who was the daughter of the defendant, and while the wife of the deceased was living at the home of the witness, William Turner made the statement to the witness 'that he didn't like what Claude Jarrard [the defendant] had done in making him marry his daughter, and now that she was gone, the first time he saw or had an opportunity to get Claude Jarrard, he was going to do it;' and that the witness had communicated this threat to the defendant prior to the date of the homicide. This testimony as to the threats was excluded on the objection of the solicitor general. Held:
(a) Provocation by threats will in no case be sufficient to free the person killing from the crime of murder, or reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter, when the killing is done solely for the purpose of resenting the provocation thus given, Cumming v. State, 99 Ga. 662, 27 S.E. 177; Green v. State, 195 Ga. 759, 25 S.E.2d 502; but, where the killing is claimed to have been done on account of a reasonable fear in the mind of the slayer, threats accompanied by menaces, though the latter do not amount to an actual assault, may in some instances be sufficient to arouse the fears of a reasonable man that his life is in danger, or that a felony is about to be perpetrated upon him. In all such cases the motive with which the slayer acted is for determination by the jury; and if it be claimed that the homicide was committed, not in a spirit of revenge, but under the fears of a reasonable man, it is for the jury to decide whether or not the circumstances were sufficient to justify the existence of such fear. Cumming v. State, supra; Willingham v. State, 169 Ga. 142, 149 S.E. 887; Warrick v. State, 125 Ga. 133, 53 S.E. 1027.
(b) Under the preceding rulings, as applied to the facts of this case, threats made by the deceased against the defendant and communicated to the defendant prior to the killing, were admissible, and the trial court erred in excluding the evidence with reference thereto, as complained of in ground seven of the amended motion for a new trial.
(c) The court did not err in excluding self-serving declarations made by the defendant to this same...
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