Jarrard v. State
| Decision Date | 18 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 63899,63899 |
| Parties | JARRARD v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Michael C. Garrett, Augusta, for appellant.
Bill Lumpkin, Asst. Dist. Atty., Sam B. Schley, Jr., Dist. Atty., Charles R. Sheppard, Asst. Dist. Atty., Augusta, for appellee.
Chester Jarrard was convicted in three counts of a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act and sentenced to three concurrent ten year terms, five to be served followed by five years on probation. Jarrard brings this appeal enumerating three alleged errors. Held :
1. Jarrard complains that the trial court erred in denying a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty at the conclusion of the state's evidence.
Under the evidence, the jury was warranted in concluding that on October 14, 1980, a United States Marshal went to the residence occupied by Jarrard, his wife and one boarder to serve a bench warrant calling for Jarrard's arrest for failure to appear at a trial. Upon entering the house, the marshal observed in plain view numerous items of contraband (i.e., water pipes for use in smoking marijuana, "roaches" in the fireplace, and other items of a like character.) The marshal notified county authorities. It was established that the house was known to the authorities, that Jarrard was one of the known residents, and that Jarrard had been observed entering and leaving the premises on many occasions. When the county authorities arrived, a search of the premises uncovered a box containing marijuana seeds in the hall downstairs, and in the room occupied by Jarrard and his wife, a man's sock in which was found a quantity of methamphetamine and a small medicine vial upon which appeared appellant's name in which was found a quantity of quaalude (methaqualone).
Under such evidence, the jury was warranted in concluding that the methaqualone and methamphetamine found in Jarrard's room, the former in a sock used by a man and the latter in a bottle containing his name as sufficiently connected to him to warrant a conclusion that Jarrard was the possessor thereof or at least a joint possessor with the other occupant of that room, his wife. There was no evidence that any other person had access to the room or its contents. As to the marijuana seeds, though they were found in a common area of the house, there was evidence that Jarrard smoked marijuana in the house and more particularly in pipes which Jarrard conceded belonged to him. At the minimum, such evidence logically established that Jarrard was a joint possessor with the other residents of the items that were found in the house that was leased by the Jarrards and which indisputably was under his and his wife's control inasmuch as they rented a portion of the house to a boarder.
In reviewing the overruling of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, the proper standard to be utilized by this court is the "any evidence" test (Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371, 219 S.E.2d 743) and only where there is no conflict in the evidence and a verdict of acquittal is demanded as a matter of law, is it error for a trial court to refuse to direct a verdict of acquittal. Merino v. State, 230 Ga. 604, 198 S.E.2d 311; Allen v. State, 137 Ga.App. 302, 303, 223 S.E.2d 495. Certainly under the evidence presented, there was evidence to warrant submitting the issue to the jury. Moreover, we are satisfied that any rational trier of fact would have been warranted in concluding beyond reasonable doubt that Jarrard possessed the contraband drugs knowingly, exclusively or at least jointly. Baldwin v. State, 153 Ga.App. 35, 37, 264 S.E.2d 528. We find no merit in this first enumeration of error.
2. Jarrard also argues that the trial court erred in not, sua sponte, directing a mistrial, when the state asked a witness if Jarrard was a member of the "Pagan Motorcycle Club" (enumeration 1). Appellant contends the simple asking of the question ...
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