Jarrel v. Bomag
Decision Date | 22 May 1989 |
Docket Number | No. C-3-85-882.,C-3-85-882. |
Citation | 728 F. Supp. 468 |
Parties | William JARREL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOMAG, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
James H. Lagos, Springfield, Ohio, for plaintiffs.
Frederick G. Cloppert, Columbus, Ohio, for Intern. Union.
Richard A. Durose, Dayton, Ohio, Ronald L. Mason, Columbus, Ohio, Smith & Schnacke, Dayton, Ohio, for BOMAG (U.S.A.)
DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT BOMAG'S AND DEFENDANT UAW'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. # 10, DOC. # 14); JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED FOR BOTH DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST PLAINTIFFS; TERMINATION ENTRY
This case is before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment by Defendant BOMAG and Defendant United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Workers of America (the "UAW" or "Union"). For the reasons set forth below, summary judgment is granted for both Defendants.
Plaintiffs are former employees of BOMAG (U.S.A.), a division of AMCA International Corporation ("BOMAG") at the Springfield, Ohio, plant. As employees of BOMAG, Plaintiffs were members of the UAW and third party beneficiaries of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (the "contract" or "CBA") between BOMAG and the UAW. With the exception of James H. Clark, all the Plaintiffs were laid off sometime during the years 1981 or 1982. Plaintiff Clark was laid off on December 21, 1984 with a group of other BOMAG employees not parties to this suit.
In connection with this latter group of lay offs, the UAW filed a grievance with BOMAG asserting that these former employees were entitled to severance pay under article II, sections 2 and 3 under the CBA which provided:
At the time the Union filed the grievance on behalf of the employees laid off in 1984, it did not include the Plaintiffs who were laid off in 1981 and 1982. Citing article II, section 3 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, BOMAG explained that the reason for this was "the Union and the company were in agreement that the contract language for severance pay did not cover employees who were not on the payroll at the time of the alleged `complete discontinuance of plant operations' in December, 1984" (see Doc. #21, p. 5).
On March 12, 1985, grievances were filed on behalf of the Plaintiffs (except Clark) by the Union committeeman concerning BOMAG's failure to provide severance pay for their layoffs during 1981 and 1982. These grievances were rejected at a management union meeting held on April 16, 1985. On April 18, BOMAG officials notified the Union committeeman in writing that it was denying the Plaintiffs' grievances for two reasons. First, the company was not in violation of the severance pay provision under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, as there had not been a "complete discontinuance of operations nor relocation of the plant within or beyond a radius of 50 miles from the present location" since 11 employees were still working in the plant at the time Plaintiffs were laid off; and, secondly, the grievances were not timely filed under article V, section 5 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement which provides that an employee's grievance must be filed within one week of the time of the event giving rise to the grievance or within one week after the aggrieved party learns of the occurrence.
Following rejection of the grievance, the Union committeeman attempted to submit the Plaintiffs' grievance to arbitration on May 6, 1985. This request was also denied by BOMAG as untimely since article 4, section 4 of the CBA requires requests for arbitration to be made in writing to the other party, "not more than 15 days after receipt of the other party's final, written answer under step 3" (rejection of the grievance).
The next significant event occurred on July 20, 1985 at which time BOMAG and the UAW entered into a new CBA effective for the years 1985 through 1988. Under the new CBA, Plaintiffs' recall rights were terminated. On July 25, 1985, BOMAG notified each of the Plaintiffs that his name was being removed from the seniority list.
Plaintiffs filed suit in the Clark County Court of Common Pleas on October 29, 1985. This case was removed to the Federal District Court on November 22, 1985.
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege what the Court views as two separate claims for relief. Count One alleges that BOMAG breached the CBA by failing to give them severance pay after laying them off. In Count Two, ¶ 11, the Plaintiffs claim that the Union breached its duty of fair representation to them by failing to press their March 12, 1985 grievance (concerning BOMAG's failure to provide severance pay) through to arbitration.1 In Count Two, ¶ 12, the Plaintiffs claim that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by signing a new CBA with BOMAG which terminated their recall rights.
This Court reads Count One and Count Two, ¶ 11, to assert a hybrid § 301 unfair representation claim against BOMAG and the UAW. A hybrid § 301 claim actually comprises two causes of action: a suit against the employer under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 ("LMRA") for breach or violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a suit against the Union for the Union's breach of its duty of fair representation — a duty judicially implied under § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) and § 301 of the LMRA. The Court construes Count Two, ¶ 12, to assert an unfair representation claim against the Union only. This Court has jurisdiction over both claims. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183-87, 87 S.Ct. 903, 913-15, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) ( ); and Storey v. Local 327, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 759 F.2d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1985) ( ).
Both Defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss with supporting affidavits. Since the motions have relied upon materials outside the pleadings, the Court considers these motions as Motions for Summary Judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Each Defendant claims that for those Plaintiffs laid off in 1981 and 1982, the action is barred by the running of the statute of limitations, and that Plaintiff Clark's hybrid § 301 claim should be dismissed because he failed to exhaust the remedies available to him under the CBA. Only Defendant UAW argues that the Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their internal Union remedies as to both claims of unfair representation against the Union and that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. The Court will consider each of these arguments seriatim.
Since the Court views Plaintiffs' Complaint as alleging essentially two claims — a hybrid 301/unfair representation claim and an unfair representation claim against the Union only — the statute of limitations period for each of these claims is relevant.
In Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held that a hybrid § 301 unfair representation claim is subject to the six-month statute of limitations applicable to unfair labor practice claims under § 10(b) of the NLRA 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). In this same connection, the Sixth Circuit has adopted the view that § 10(b) is applicable to all unfair representation claims regardless of the nature or presence of a § 301 claim. See Adkins v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach., 769 F.2d 330, 335 (6th Cir.1985). Thus, the six-month statute of limitations governs both Plaintiffs' hybrid § 301 claim and the non-hybrid unfair representation claim against the Union. Accordingly, since this...
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