Storey v. Local 327, Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers

• Decision Date: 29 March 1985
• Docket Number: No. 83-5747,83-5747
• Citation: 759 F.2d 517
• Parties: 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3273, 102 Lab.Cas. P 11,408 Robert Wayne STOREY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LOCAL 327, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America; and the Kroger Co., Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 517

759 F.2d 517

118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3273, 102 Lab.Cas. P 11,408

Robert Wayne STOREY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LOCAL 327, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,

CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS; International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and

Helpers of America; and the Kroger Co., Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 83-5747.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Jan. 7, 1985.

Decided March 29, 1985.

James W. Price, Jr. (argued), Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Cecil D. Branstetter, Branstetter, Kilgore & Stranch, C. Dewey Branstetter, Jr. (argued), Nashville, Tenn., for Local 327.

William N. Ozier, Nashville, Tenn., for Kroger.

L.N.D. Wells (argued), Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, Dallas, Tex., for Intern. Broth.

Before LIVELY, Chief Judge, and ENGEL and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

LIVELY, Chief Judge.

The question for decision in this appeal is whether a claim that a union breached its duty of fair representation during negotiations with an employer at a time when there was no collective bargaining agreement in effect states a cause of action within the jurisdiction of a federal court. The district court held that the conduct complained of was an unfair labor practice and that the claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The district court recognized that section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a) (1982) ¹ grants jurisdiction to district courts in suits for breach of contracts between employers and labor organizations, but held that this section does not apply in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement. We agree with the district court that section 301(a) of the Labor Act does not provide a basis for jurisdiction in this case, but conclude that jurisdiction over actions based on a union's breach of its duty of fair representation are not exclusively vested in the National Labor Relations Board, even though that breach may also be an unfair labor practice. This duty arises out of the exclusive power granted unions by section 9(a) of the Labor Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 159(a) (1982) ² and when breached gives rise to a claim within the jurisdiction of the district courts under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1337 (1982). ³ We reverse the order of the district court dismissing this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I.

A.

Suit was filed as a class action by ten employees of The Kroger Co. (Kroger) who claimed that Teamsters International and Teamsters Local 327 which represented their bargaining unit breached the union's duty to represent all members of the collective bargaining unit fairly, and charged that Kroger conspired with the union to "reduce" the conditions and benefits of their employment. More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Local 327 failed to represent the members of the union fairly in negotiating a collective bargaining agreement with Kroger, with the result that the union "bargained away substantial benefits relating primarily to seniority." The complaint charged the International Union with failing to furnish a skilled negotiator to aid in the negotiations when requested to do so by the negotiating committee. The negotiations took place after an earlier collective bargaining agreement between Kroger and Local 327 had expired.

The complaint also alleged that the business agent and president of Local 327 conspired with Kroger in formulating an agreement which contained terms and conditions which were contrary to union policies and which diminished the rights of the plaintiffs and the class they sought to represent (all unit members in two Kroger warehouses in the Nashville, Tennessee area). The complaint further alleged that Local 327 and its business agent and president fraudulently changed the results of a membership vote on the proposed collective bargaining agreement to reflect ratification when in fact the proposed agreement had been rejected. Finally, the complaint asserted that the agreement negotiated by Local 327 and Kroger contained a provision which discriminated against female members of the unit by prescribing a lower wage scale for unit employees in one of the warehouses than in the other. Virtually all employees in the warehouse with the lower wage rate were women.

B.

In their jurisdictional statement the plaintiffs relied upon sections 9(a) and 301 of the Labor Act in addition to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1337 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2201 (Declaratory Judgment Act). Paragraph 13 of the complaint stated, in part:

The actions of the Defendants in the collective bargaining were for arbitrary and capricious reasons and for the own self interests of the officers. Not only did defendant Kroger agree and accede to the contract of Defendants Local 327 and International, but actually conspired with them and thus became a party to the actions. Defendants Local 327 and International have failed and refused to adequately represent Plaintiffs and members of their class in collective bargaining and with employees and are thus in violation of the duty imposed upon said Defendant unions by Sec. 9(a) of NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 159(a).

As relief the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the conduct of the union defendants constituted a breach of their duty of fair representation to the plaintiffs and their class in collective bargaining with their employer and that Kroger's alleged conduct was an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(1). In addition, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the collective bargaining agreement executed March 8, 1983 between Local 327 and Kroger was null and void, an injunction to prevent the agreement's continuance in effect, "and that the Defendants be ordered to enter into new collective bargaining." Finally, the plaintiffs requested the court to order retroactive wage increases for the employees alleged to have been the subject of discrimination on the basis of sex.

II.

A.

The plaintiffs acknowledge that jurisdiction of the courts to hear many labor-related matters has been pre-empted by Congress and given to the National Labor Relations Board, but contend this is a proper case for judicial determination and that a court decision in its favor will not conflict with national labor policy. Arguing that the Supreme Court has permitted employees to sue unions pursuant to section 301 when the conduct complained of constituted both an unfair labor practice and a breach of the duty of fair representation, they quote Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 914, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967):

[T]he jurisdiction of the Court is no more destroyed by the fact that an employee as part and parcel of his Sec. 301 action finds it necessary to prove an unfair labor practice than it is by the fact that the suit may involve an unfair labor practice by the employer himself.

The plaintiffs also cite a similar statement by this court in Hill v. Iron Workers Local Union No. 25, 520 F.2d 40, 43 (6 Cir., 1975).

At oral argument counsel for the plaintiffs identified this court's decision in Farmer v. ARA Services, Inc., 660 F.2d 1096 (6 Cir., 1981), as the strongest case in support of their position. There are many similarities between Farmer and the present case. In Farmer a group of female employees charged their union and employer with negotiating collective bargaining agreements which contained unequal wage rates for sex-segregated classifications. The complaint charged violation of section 8(b) and 9(a) of the Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e, et seq. (1982). Specifically, the plaintiffs in Farmer charged the union with breach of its duty of fair representation in negotiating discriminatory collective bargaining agreements and in failing to represent the plaintiffs in grievance proceedings brought pursuant to those agreements. The plaintiffs in this case quote the following language from Farmer:

In addition to its failure to arbitrate claims, Local 1064 breached its duty of fair representation by negotiating and entering into collective bargaining agreements, the provisions of which either were not adequately explained to the membership prior to ratification or which varied from the terms as explained.

B.

The defendants contend that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction over claims of unfair labor practices. Under the preemption doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court in San Diego Buildings Trade Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), neither state nor federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over claims which implicate national labor policy. This is so because "Congress has entrusted administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience." Id. at 242, 79 S.Ct. at 778. The union defendants argue that failure of a union to comply with its section 9(a) duties as exclusive bargaining agent is a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A), ⁴ and thus an unfair labor practice. This being so, the defendants assert, the present case is clearly subject to application of the pre-emption doctrine enunciated in Garmon: When an activity is arguably subject to Sec. 7 or Sec. 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.

359 U.S. at 245, 79 S.Ct. at 779.

The union defendants also rely on language in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971), and Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 98 S.Ct. 1745, 56 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978), two decisions which deal with pre-emption. Arguing that the plaintiffs...