Jarrell v. Valenza, CASE NO. 1:16-CV-188-ECM (WO)

• Decision Date: 17 August 2018
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1:16-CV-188-ECM (WO)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
• Parties: GEORGE EDWARD JARRELL, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF DONALD VALENZA, et al., Defendants.

GEORGE EDWARD JARRELL, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF DONALD VALENZA, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:16-CV-188-ECM (WO)

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

August 17, 2018

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION¹

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the court on a complaint filed by George Edward Jarrell ("Jarrell"), a pre-trial detainee confined in the Houston County Jail at the time he initiated this case, challenging the adequacy of medical treatment provided to him for injuries sustained during his arrest on September 20, 2014 immediately prior to his confinement in the jail. Doc. 1 at 2-3. Jarrell names Donald Valenza, the Sheriff of Houston County, Alabama, and Jason Smoak, a Certified Physician's Assistant employed at the jail, as defendants.² He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights.

The defendants filed an answer, special report and supporting evidentiary materials — including affidavits and certified medical records — addressing Jarrell's inadequate medical treatment claim. In these documents, the defendants assert Jarrell received appropriate treatment for his injuries as determined by the jails medical professionals and they adamantly deny acting with deliberate indifference to Jarrell's medical needs.

The court issued an order directing Jarrell to file a response to the arguments set forth by the defendants in their special report and advising him that his response should be supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other appropriate evidentiary materials. Doc. 17 at 3. The order specifically advised the parties that "at some time in the future the court may treat the defendants' report . . . [as] either a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment[.]" Doc. 17 at 3. In addition, the order specifically cautioned the parties that "unless within ten (10) days from the date of this order a party files a response in opposition which presents sufficient legal cause why such action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for the plaintiff filing a response to the order] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special report and any supporting evidentiary materials as a [dispositive] motion, and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion in accordance with the law." Doc. 17 at 4 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Jarrell filed a sworn response to this order on June 28, 2016 in which he challenges the treatment decisions made by defendant Smoak. Doc. 18.

Pursuant to the directives of the orders entered in this case, the court deems it appropriate to treat the defendants' report as a motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, the sworn complaint and the plaintiff's response in opposition, the court concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ. P. ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").³ The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] ofmaterial fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Williamson Oil Company, Inc. v. Phillip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that moving party bears the initial burden of establishing there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) (same). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. The moving party discharges his burden by showing that the record lacks evidence to support the nonmoving party's case or that the nonmoving party would be unable to prove his case at trial. Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011).

When the defendants meet their evidentiary burden, as they have in this case, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) ("If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it."). Once the moving party meets its burden, "the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or sworn statements],or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact. Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-94 (internal quotation marks omitted). This court will also consider "specific facts" pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts "must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage." Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted).

To proceed beyond the summary judgment stage, an inmate-plaintiff may not rest upon his pleadings but must produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" which would be admissible at trial supporting each essential element of his claim. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). "If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. "A mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of ashowing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted). Conclusory allegations based on a plaintiff's subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that grant of summary judgment is appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond "his own conclusory allegations" challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Mere verification of party's own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment."); Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value."). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 ("[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate.); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine disputeof material fact exists). At the summary judgment stage, this court must "consider all evidence in the record . . . [including] pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc. — and can only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that no genuine [dispute] of material fact exists." Strickland v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at...