Jarrett v. State, s. 63682
| Decision Date | 16 February 1982 |
| Docket Number | 63683,Nos. 63682,s. 63682 |
| Citation | 161 Ga.App. 285,287 S.E.2d 746 |
| Parties | JARRETT v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Jack M. Carey, Gainesville, for appellant.
Jeff C. Wayne, Dist. Atty., Gainesville, for appellee.
In Case Number 63683, the defendant Jarrett appeals his conviction for the offense of secreting property to defraud another. See Code Ann. § 26-1504 (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1286). In Case Number 63682, the defendant appeals the failure to extend his appeal bond after a Birge hearing [Birge v. State, 238 Ga. 88, 230 S.E.2d 895]. Held :
1. The defendant contends that the evidence offered at trial was purely circumstantial and insufficient to convict him. The defendant was tried along with two codefendants. One of the codefendants was the owner of a boat covered by a policy of insurance which included loss for theft. The codefendant reported the boat as stolen, and when it was not recovered, collected $19,000 from the insurance company. The State, in the prosecution of the defendants, sought to establish a conspiracy with the basic scheme as follows. The owner of the boat reported the boat as stolen, but in fact, he had transferred it to another codefendant. This codefendant, who on trial contended that he purchased the boat from a named but otherwise unidentified party, then left the boat with the defendant Jarrett for safe keeping. The present defendant kept the boat on his property for approximately one year, after which he took the boat to a friend's house, where repair work was done on the boat, and then "tried it out" on Lake Lanier. Defendant Jarrett was arrested, after leaving Lake Lanier, while towing the boat with a pick-up truck.
Code Ann. § 26-1504 (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1286) provides: "A person commits the offense of damaging, destroying, or secreting property to defraud another person when he knowingly and with intent to defraud another person damages, destroys, or secretes any property of whatever class or character, whether the property of himself or of another person..."
The State had the burden of establishing guilty knowledge on the part of the defendant, and sought to do this by circumstantial evidence, including certain statements by the defendant at the time he was arrested and shortly thereafter. When first questioned, the defendant insisted that he was the owner of the boat. Some hours later, the defendant was again interrogated. At that time, according to the testimony of the officers present, the defendant admitted the boat was not his and stated that:
Counsel for defendant urges that a conviction is not sustainable because the evidence fails to show the boat was hidden. The testimony of the witnesses was conflicting but in composite tended to show: the boat was on defendant's land by a chicken house; the boat could not be seen from some areas of a road which passed nearby the land but could be seen from other vantage points; people had visited the defendant's land where it was in plain view.
The statute requires the "secreting" of property which means to hide or conceal; however, it does not mandate that the property be hidden in the literal sense of being unable to view it but only that it be placed where it is unlikely to be discovered. The jury was authorized to find that the defendant, acting in concert with the other defendants, secreted the property in question.
We find the proof offered in the case sub judice to be sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Prior to the admission of certain testimony by GBI Agent Henry, a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury. At that time, it was shown that the witness would testify from his notes. In these notes, the Agent was relating statements made to him by Mr. Ewell, a codefendant and the owner of the boat. They were as follows. First--"Mr. Ewell stated that he knew this was going to happen, because he knew the wrong people and had been with the wrong people." Second--"Mr. Ewell stated before leaving Stan's Car Lot that he was 'scared to death, and this wouldn't have happened if he had not been around the wrong people'." The third statement was--"Mr. Ewell stated he knew it looked bad because of the people involved." The trial judge overruled objections and motions for mistrial with regard to the first two statements. As the trial judge later stated, he ruled out the third statement.
After the rulings on the admissibility of the statement, the witness was questioned and instead of relating the statements which we have quoted above, made the following statement with regard to what Mr. Ewell said to him: "He stated to me that he knew this was going to happen, because he had been hanging around the wrong people, and the people involved." Subsequently, counsel for the defendant Ewell again interposed objection to the...
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...provides as follows: "It is not sufficient for the trial judge to consider only the amount of the victim's damages. Jarrett v. State, 161 Ga.App. 285(4) (287 SE2d 746) (1982). Pursuant to OCGA § 17-14-10, the court must also consider other factors, including '(1) The present financial condi......
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...of restitution. It is not sufficient for the trial judge to consider only the amount of the victim's damages. Jarrett v. State, 161 Ga.App. 285(4), 287 S.E.2d 746 (1982). Pursuant to OCGA § 17-14-10, the court must also consider other factors, including "(1) The present financial condition ......