Jarussi v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 28, Lake County

• Decision Date: 19 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-120,82-120
• Citation: 664 P.2d 316,40 St.Rep. 720,204 Mont. 131
• Parties: , 11 Ed. Law Rep. 1043 Louis J. JARUSSI, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SCHOOL DIST. NO. 28, LAKE COUNTY, Mont., said Board consisting of Lillian Strong, et al., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 316

664 P.2d 316

204 Mont. 131, 11 Ed. Law Rep. 1043

Louis J. JARUSSI, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SCHOOL DIST. NO. 28, LAKE COUNTY,

Mont., said Board consisting of Lillian Strong, et

al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. 82-120.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs March 10, 1983.

Decided May 19, 1983.

John Frederick, County Atty., Polson, for defendants and appellants.

Jon E. Ellingson and Nancy K. Moe, Missoula, for plaintiff and respondent.

HASWELL, Chief Justice.

A teacher recovered a judgment against the School Board for its violation of Montana's Open Meeting Law, wrongful termination of employment, and damages of $19,400, attorney fees and costs. The School Board appeals.

Plaintiff is Louie J. Jarussi, a nontenured high school principal and teacher in St. Ignatius, Montana. Defendant is the Board of Trustees of School District No. 28, Lake County.

Jarussi was first employed by the Board for the 1976-77 school year. During the 1977-78 school year, he was employed as a fulltime principal and Spanish teacher at a salary of $18,486. The record indicates he was an exceptional teacher and principal.

On February 1, 1978, Jarussi met with the Board and requested a salary of $21,000 for the following school year. The Board closed the meeting apparently to discuss Jarussi's request. Jarussi claimed he objected to the closure, but no such action was recorded in the minutes of the meeting. The Board thereafter returned to open session and offered Jarussi $19,200, the offer to be accepted by March 8.

Jarussi immediately contacted legal counsel to proceed against the Board for improperly closing the meeting. The Board's presiding officer expressed the Board's anger to Jarussi over his complaint and indicated it would not help his employment situation.

Jarussi claimed he verbally accepted the offer of employment on March 8. The Board disputed this, and no acceptance is noted in the minutes.

The preliminary budget, including a provision for Jarussi's position, was approved on March 15.

The Board met again on March 29. Part of the meeting was again closed without a determination that the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeded the merits of public disclosure. During the closure of the meeting the Board unanimously decided to withdraw its offer of employment to Jarussi. Thereafter, the meeting was opened, and a formal motion was approved withdrawing the salary increase previously offered Jarussi.

The Board never officially nor specifically eliminated Jarussi's position according to the Board's records.

On April 7, Jarussi demanded a statement of termination by the Board. The Board served notice of termination on April 21.

On April 28, Jarussi filed suit against the Board in three counts: (1) for violation of Montana's Open Meeting Law adversely affecting his rights and seeking to have the Board's decisions declared void; (2) failure to properly terminate him in violation of statute; and, (3) retaliation against him for exercising his rights under Montana's Open Meeting Law by withdrawal of the offer of employment.

In June Jarussi requested release from his existing contract of employment to seek other employment. He accepted a position in Alaska and reported to work in July.

Following a jury trial, judgment was entered awarding Jarussi $16,500 for his loss in selling his property, and $2,900 moving expenses. The judgment also included a determination by the District Court without a jury that the Board had violated Montana's Open Meeting Law and voided the decision of the Board withdrawing its previous offer of employment to Jarussi. The judgment included an award of attorney fees and costs. Following denial of its motion for a new trial, the Board appeals.

Three issues are raised on appeal:

1. Was Jarussi required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit in District Court?

2. Should a new trial have been granted because excessive damages were awarded under the influence of passion or prejudice?

3. Did the School Board violate Montana's Open Meeting Law?

The Board contends that Jarussi was required to exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing the Board's decision to the county superintendent of schools before seeking judicial relief in the courts, citing section 20-3-210, MCA, giving the county superintendent sole jurisdiction to decide this controversy.

We hold that Jarussi was not required to exhaust administrative remedies within the educational apparatus before filing suit in the District Court.

The District Court is expressly granted jurisdiction to void any decision in violation of Montana's Open Meeting Law. The pertinent statute provides:

"Voidability. Any decision made in violation of 2-3-203 [statutory implementation of Montana's Open Meeting Law] may be declared void by a district court having jurisdiction. A suit to void any such decision must be commenced within 30 days of the decision." (Bracketed descriptive phrase added.) Section 2-3-213, MCA.

We have previously upheld the jurisdiction of the District Court in actions to enforce Montana's Open Meeting Law. Board of Trustees, Huntley Project School Dist. 24 v. Board of County Commissioners, Yellowstone County (1980), Mont., 606 P.2d 1069, 38 St.Rep. 175. Further, statutory time constraints negate exhaustion of administrative remedies before the county superintendent of schools and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction.

Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to constitutional issues. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles (1944), 321 U.S. 144, 64 S.Ct. 474, 88 L.Ed. 635; 1 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law, § 185 at 484-490. Here, Jarussi claims violation of his constitutional right to observe the deliberations of the School Board under the right to know provisions of the Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 9. Constitutional questions are properly decided by a judicial body, not an administrative official, under the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Art. III, Section 1, 1972 Mont. Const.

Next, the Board contends that the jury awarded Jarussi excessive damages under the influence of passion and prejudice. The Board argues that the jury exercised no critical judgment in its award of economic damages to Jarussi, disregarded the disparity between his increased salary in Alaska compared to his salary in Montana, and had to "speculate wildly" concerning cost of living differences between Alaska and Montana, and that Jarussi's claim of economic losses lacked specificity. The Board points out that the jury award for loss on the sale of Jarussi's property was the midpoint in the range of Jarussi's testimony; awarded him actual costs including travel and lodging expenses for trial, all attorney fees and all court costs; that the minimal period of deliberation and the unanimous verdict indicate a passion and prejudice to punish the Board; and that the jury apparently disregarded the instruction that it could not award damages for pain and suffering, loss of consortium, mental distress, loss of reputation and could only award tangible pecuniary losses.

It is important to note that the jury awarded damages in this case for wrongful termination of Jarussi's employment, not for violation of Montana's Open Meeting Law. The damage award must be reasonable. Section 27-1-302, MCA. The damages must be supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Murray (1982), Mont., 656 P.2d 170, 39 St.Rep. 2257; Bjerum v. Wieber (1967), 149 Mont. 375, 427 P.2d 62. The law requires only that the trier of fact exercise calm and reasonable judgment and the amount of the award rests of necessity in the sound discretion of the trier of fact. Johnson v. Murray, supra. When there is strong evidence of the fact of damage, defendant should not escape liability because the amount of damage cannot be proven with precision. Johnson v. Murray, supra, citing Winsness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors (Utah 1979), 593 P.2d 1303.

Here Jarussi testified that he lost between $16,000 and $17,000 when he had to hastily sell most of his personal property in view of his move to Alaska. He testified he held a garage...