Jarvis v. Kansas Commission on Civil Rights, 47515
| Decision Date | 07 December 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 47515,47515 |
| Citation | 215 Kan. 902,528 P.2d 1232 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Albert JARVIS, Appellee, v. KANSAS COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
In an appeal from an order of the district court granting a declaratory judgment and an injunction against the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights from continuing or persisting in its efforts to require the respondent to pay moneys to complainant either in a conciliation conference or at a public hearing, the record is examined and it is held: The judgment and injunction should be set aside on the ground the administrative remedies provided by the Kansas Act Against Discrimination have not been exhausted.
David Ryan, Topeka, argued the cause, and Vern Miller, Atty. Gen., and Charles S. Scott, Topeka, were with him on the brief for appellants.
William Scott, Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
This appeal is brought by the defendant, Kansas Commission on Civil Rights, hereinafter referred to as Commission, to set aside an order of the district court granting a declaratory judgment and an injunction against the Commission from continuing or persisting in its efforts to require the respondent to pay moneys to the complainant either in a conciliation conference or at a public hearing. The Commission's principal argument before this court requires us to reexamine the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and consider its application to the facts of the instant case.
The present controversy arose from an allegation of housing discrimination. Complainant Joyce Haskins, a white woman with three children from her marriage with a black man, moved into an apartment owned by respondent Albert Jarvis, on February 19, 1971. Prior to the expiration of her six months' lease, however, Jarvis served Mrs. Haskins with a thirty-day eviction notice requiring her to vacate the premises by July 19, 1971. On August 16, 1971, Jarvis obtained a judgment in the magistrate court evicting the complainant and she subsequently moved her family out of the apartment.
On or about July 30, 1971, complainant Haskins filed a housing discrimination complaint with the Commission charging respondent with having evicted her because of the race of her children, in violation of the Kansas Act Against Discrimination, K.S.A. 44-1016(a). The Commission determined that probable cause existed for crediting the allegations of the complaint and notified respondent that on September 23, 1971, it would attempt to eliminate or correct the alleged discriminatory housing practice by the informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion, as required by K.S.A. 44-1019(c). The conciliation conference was held with members of the Commission's staff and respondent's attorney present. After considerable discussion, efforts to reach an agreement failed because the Commission insisted upon reimbursement of complainant for specified damages listed in the proposed conciliation agreement. Respondent refused to agree to pay any compensatory damages as he felt the Commission was without legal authority to require damages in a conciliation conference. Thereafter, the Commission notified respondent that it would hold a public hearing on February 25, 1972, pursuant to K.S.A. 44-1019(d).
Three days prior to the scheduled date for the hearing, respondent sought and obtained a restraining order of the district court enjoining the Commission from holding any public hearings on this matter, and declaring the Commission to be without authority to award compensatory damages. Subsequently, the court permanently enjoined the Commission from continuing or persisting in its efforts to require respondent to pay moneys to complainant, either in a conciliation conference or at a public hearing. It is the validity of that order that the Commission now questions.
The Kansas Act Against Discrimination, K.S.A. 44-1001 et seq., declares it to be the policy of this state to eliminate and prevent discrimination in all employment relations, in places of public accommodations, and in housing. The provisions of the act are to be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof. (44-1006.) To protect these rights, 44-1003 provides for the creation of a state commission havidng the power to eliminate and prevent such discrimination. Under 44-1004 the Commission on Civil Rights is given a broad list of functions, powers and duties, including the following:
'(3) To adopt, promulgate, amend and rescind suitable rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this act, and the policies and practices of the commission in connection therewith.
'(4) To receive, initiate, investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging discrimination in employment, public accommodations and housing because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin or ancestry.
'(6) To include any term in a conciliation agreement as could be included in a final order under this act.
'(8) To issue such final orders after a public hearing as may remedy any existing situation found to violate this act and prevent its recurrence.'
In K.S.A. 44-1019 the administrative procedure for handling a complaint is set forth in detail. Briefly stated, any person who feels he has been discriminated against may file a complaint with the Commission. Upon receipt of such complaint, the Commission has ten days in which to furnish a copy thereof to the person, or persons, who allegedly committed the discriminatory practice. Thereafter, the Commission shall promptly commence an investigation into the matter, as provided in K.S.A. 44-1005, to determine whether probable cause exists for crediting the allegations of the complaint. If it is determined that probable cause exists, the Commission is directed to attempt to eliminate or correct the discrimination by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion. The Commission is authorized to enter into formal conciliation agreements between the parties, which may include in the...
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