Junction City Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., Unified School Dist. No. 475, Geary County

• Citation: 955 P.2d 1266,264 Kan. 212
• Decision Date: 06 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 78126,78126
• Parties: , 158 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3052, 125 Ed. Law Rep. 1352 JUNCTION CITY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 475, GEARY COUNTY, Kansas, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Kansas

Page 1266

955 P.2d 1266

264 Kan. 212, 158 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3052,

125 Ed. Law Rep. 1352

JUNCTION CITY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 475, GEARY

COUNTY, Kansas, Appellee.

No. 78126.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

March 6, 1998.

Syllabus by the Court

1. An exception to the general rule regarding whether a case is moot exists if the case involves a question of public interest. Appellate courts are inclined to retain an appeal on this basis if the question involves one that is likely to arise frequently in the future unless it is settled by a court of last resort.

2. Questions involving whether an item is mandatorily negotiable under the Professional Negotiations Act, K.S.A. 72-5413 et seq., and the proper procedure for raising the matter are issues likely to recur throughout the state and evade review. Thus, we may answer such questions for the assistance of school boards and negotiating units in the future.

3. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of administrative law. A primary purpose of the doctrine is the avoidance of premature interruption of the administrative process. It is normally desirable to let the administrative agency develop the necessary factual background upon which its decisions are based. Since agency decisions are frequently of a discretionary nature or frequently require expertise, the agency should be given the first chance to exercise that discretion or to apply that expertise.

4. The declaratory judgment statute, K.S.A. 60-1701, does not provide jurisdiction over a case where administrative remedies have not been exhausted. The courts should not interfere with administrative proceedings and assume jurisdiction of declaratory judgment proceedings until administrative remedies have been exhausted.

5. The legislature's delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Department of Human Resources to decide whether an impasse exists and to institute resolution procedures includes the authority to determine preliminary matters such as negotiability, which is necessary for a determination of whether an impasse exists.

6. It is not unusual for the judicial construction of a statute to be affected by subsequent amendments to the statute. Such amendments may justify construction contrary to the court's previous interpretation.

7. The court-crafted procedure for determining whether a provision is negotiable, set forth in Chee-Craw Teachers Ass'n v. U.S.D. No. 247, 225 Kan. 561, 566-68, 593 P.2d 406 (1979), is no longer appropriate in light of the statutory changes in the Professional Negotiations Act, K.S.A. 72-5413 et seq. The determination regarding negotiability must be made by the Secretary of the Department of Human Resources, rather than permitting a declaratory judgment action to be filed in the district court.

David M. Schauner, Topeka, argued the cause, and Gregory C. Brownfield, Topeka, was with him on the briefs for appellant.

David P. Troup, of Weary, Davis, Henry, Struebing & Troup, L.L.P., Junction City, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.

David C. Cunningham, Topeka, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Association of School Boards.

LARSON, Justice:

This appeal raises a jurisdiction issue and the question of whether an involuntary transfer provision is mandatorily negotiable under the Professional Negotiations Act (Negotiations Act), K.S.A. 72-5413 et seq.

We first set forth sufficient facts to show how the issues have come before us.

The Junction City Education Association (Education Association) and the Board of Education of the Unified School District No. 475, Geary County, Kansas (Board), entered into negotiations for an agreement governing the terms and conditions for professional services for the 1996-97 school year.

A negotiated agreement for the 1995-96 school year contained the following provision:

"ARTICLE XIII--INVOLUNTARY TRANSFERS

"A. When it is determined by the personnel office that a teaching assignment must be changed within five (5) days of the first contract day of any school year, that teacher is eligible to receive additional compensation [of] $150. A different teaching assignment is defined as a change from one grade level or specialty to another, or the change from one classroom to another within the same school building.

"B. If such change requires a move from one building to another, that teacher is eligible to receive additional compensation of $300. A move is defined as a change from one grade level to another or to the same grade level in another building."

Negotiations regarding the 1996-97 agreement reached an impasse, and the parties jointly implemented impasse procedures pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5426 with the Secretary of the Department of Human Resources (Secretary) to resolve their disputes. One of the disputed issues was whether Article XIII from the 1995-96 agreement was mandatorily negotiable under the Negotiations Act.

Mediation was unsuccessful. A factfinder was appointed, and the factfinding hearing was imminent on October 17, 1996, when the Education Association filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination in the Geary County District Court that the involuntary transfer proposal was mandatorily negotiable. The Education Association requested an injunction requiring the Board to negotiate the terms of the involuntary transfer proposal.

The Education Association's petition asked that a summary hearing commence within 5 days. The Board moved to dismiss, alleging the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the failure of the Education Association to exhaust administrative remedies. The Board also filed a memorandum on the merits in opposition to the petition. A nonevidentiary hearing was held on November 1, 1996.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled it had jurisdiction pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1701, as well as Chee-Craw Teachers Ass'n v. U.S.D. No. 247, 225 Kan. 561, 566-68, 593 P.2d 406 (1979). The court further ruled that a provision for involuntary transfers is not a mandatorily negotiable item, nor is compensation for such transfers. The Education Association appeals the denial of its requested relief.

The Board has pointed out in its brief that the parties proceeded to factfinding and ultimately entered into a negotiated agreement for the 1996-97 school year which did not contain the involuntary transfer proposal.

Although it may be argued that by ultimately entering into a negotiated agreement for the 1996-97 school year the parties have rendered this appeal moot, see Shanks v. Nelson, 258 Kan. 688, 907 P.2d 882 (1995), this case appears to warrant an exception. In Allenbrand v. Contractor, 253 Kan. 315, Syl. p 3, 855 P.2d 926 (1993), we recognized an exception to the general rule regarding appellate review of moot issues:

"An exception to the general rule regarding whether a case is moot exists if the case involves a question of public interest. Appellate courts are inclined to retain an appeal on this basis if the question involves one that is likely to arise frequently in the future unless it is settled by a court of last resort."

An example of the application of this exception is Stauffer Communications, Inc. v. Mitchell, 246 Kan. 492, 789 P.2d 1153 (1990), where the hearings a reporter sought to attend had ended by the time the case was considered on appeal. The parties and the court agreed the situation would recur and continue to evade appellate review. Thus, we refused to dismiss the appeal as moot.

Questions involving whether an item is mandatorily negotiable under the Act and the proper procedure for raising the matter are issues likely to recur throughout the state and evade review. We elect to answer the jurisdictional and procedural issue raised for the assistance of school boards and negotiating units in the future. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 713, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).

The district court held, without analysis, that it had subject matter jurisdiction of this case pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1701 and Chee-Craw Teachers Ass'n v. U.S.D. No. 247, 225 Kan. at 566-68, 593 P.2d 406. Amendments to the Negotiations Act subsequent to the date of and in specific response to the Chee-Craw decision renders this conclusion suspect.

A question regarding jurisdiction is an issue of law over which we have unlimited review. Resolving this question involves statutory interpretation, which is also a legal issue. It is our function to interpret a statute to give it the intended effect. U.S.D. No. 279 v. Secretary of Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 247 Kan. 519, 524, 802 P.2d 516 (1990).

Chee-Craw held the Negotiations Act was designed "to statutorily define the scope of mandatory negotiations and to provide the impasse procedure as a tool to assist in reaching a negotiated agreement." 225 Kan. at 566, 593 P.2d 406. This court pointed out that K.S.A.1978 Supp. 72-5426(a) required a district court to hear impasse petitions within 5 working days and that "[a] speedy resolution of the impasse is the goal of the legislation." 225 Kan. at 567, 593 P.2d 406. We then declared:

"This all goes for naught if the basic issues as to what must be negotiated are not determined prior to declaration of impasse.... Inasmuch as negotiated agreements are 'package deals,' it is often difficult or impossible to make progress in negotiations while key proposals are involved in litigation as to whether they are mandatorily negotiable.

"In order to effectuate the intent of the Collective Negotiations Law it is imperative to break the present bottleneck in collective negotiations. To accomplish this, wherever possible, potential areas of dispute as to whether an item is mandatorily negotiable must be eliminated. Expeditious judicial determination of any remaining areas of dispute must be accomplished. We therefore establish the following rules of law...