Jaske v. State, 677S473

• Decision Date: 15 August 1978
• Docket Number: No. 677S473,677S473
• Citation: 269 Ind. 196,379 N.E.2d 451
• Parties: Roger Allen JASKE, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 451

379 N.E.2d 451

269 Ind. 196

Roger Allen JASKE, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 677S473.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Aug. 15, 1978.

Douglas M. Grimes and Thomas V. Barnes, Gary, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., David Michael Wallman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

On December 9, 1976, appellant Jaske was found guilty by a jury in the St. Joseph Superior Court of murder in the first-degree, and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment by the court.

On the evening of April 22, 1975, appellant and decedent, Jeffrey Allen Harmon, were driving around in appellant's automobile when Harmon became angry because Jaske refused to loan him his automobile. A struggle ensued, at which time appellant claims that Harmon drew a knife. Jaske then obtained the knife and stabbed Harmon in the side. The struggle continued and appellant pushed Harmon out of the car and followed him on to the ground where he choked him. Jaske then took the body to a wooded area and left it. As appellant was driving away, he changed his mind and returned to the body to remove some ropes he had used to tie the deceased. He noticed that Harmon began to move, so he stabbed him several more times with the knife. He then discarded the knife in a nearby field and took the deceased's wallet so that it would appear to be a robbery.

Appellant raises three issues for our review. These issues concern: (1) whether the videotaped recording of a statement given by the appellant was unlawfully obtained and therefore inadmissible at trial even though a waiver of personal rights was executed by appellant; (2) whether the jury verdict was supported by substantial evidence of probative value on each element of the crime charged, including, but not limited to the cause of death of the victim, and; (3) whether the cumulative effect of the trial court's behavior deprived appellant of a fair trial and therefore constituted reversible error.

I.

Appellant Jaske first asserts that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress a videotaped recording of a statement he made, which he claims was obtained unlawfully. The appellant's basis for suppression of the statement is that he was allegedly held incommunicado by police prior to the taping of the confession. The record shows that when Jaske was booked by the police at 6:00 a.m. on April 25, 1975, he stated to Sheriff Nickell that he wanted to talk with a Mrs. Coombs. Mrs. Coombs was the appellant's landlady, and a person who he considered a friend. He stated that he wanted to tell her about his involvement in this matter before she heard about it on the news. The sheriff told him that she would probably be asleep, that the news would not come out until much later in the day, and that he would see to it that Jaske would get to talk to Mrs. Coombs later in the morning. Jaske then assisted police in recovering the victim's wallet, and was transported to Mrs. Coombs' home. After speaking with Mrs. Coombs, the appellant was returned to the sheriff's office where he was advised of his rights, executed a waiver, and made an oral statement which was videotaped.

Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress this videotaped statement before the trial court, and after a hearing the court denied this motion. The transcript of this hearing and ruling by the court is not included in the record before us. It is incumbent upon the appellant to present a sufficient record to permit an intelligent review of the issues, and the failure of the appellant to so include the transcript in this case is a waiver of this issue. State v. Brown, (1975) 263 Ind. 77, 324 N.E.2d 266; State v. Irvin, (1973) 259 Ind. 610, 291 N.E.2d 70; Dunbar v. State, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 191, 311 N.E.2d 447.

In examining the record, it is clear that the appellant did, in fact, receive his warning of personal rights, commonly called the Miranda rights warnings, and voluntarily waived and acknowledged his understanding of such rights in writing to the police at 3:00 a.m. on April 25, 1975. Following that, he voluntarily gave a verbal statement which the police videotaped setting out the facts stated above. The evidence shows clearly that appellant was cooperative with the police and that he voluntarily gave them the statements and helped them to locate the victim's wallet. He was also taken to his home where he talked to Mrs. Coombs during the noon hour of that same day and prior to his giving the videotaped statement at 2:00 p.m. There is evidence in the record that he was offered an attorney and declined to accept one, and that he was given the opportunity to make a phone call but did not do so. There is no evidence of duress or intimidation by the police in obtaining any of the statements involved here, and appellant does not claim that such was the case. Even if there is a conflict in the evidence as to the voluntariness of the statement, the reviewing court will not reweigh the evidence and set aside the decision of the trial court where it appears that substantial evidence was produced from which the trial court could find that the statements were freely and voluntarily given by the defendant. Lane v. State, (1977) Ind., 364 N.E.2d 756; French v. State, (1977) Ind., 362 N.E.2d 834. Appellant presents no reversible error in this issue.

II.

The appellant's next contention concerns the sufficiency of the evidence. His sole claim in this regard relates to the effect of conflicting testimony of expert medical witnesses as to the cause of death of the victim. It was apparent when viewing the body that there was very little external bleeding from the victim's stab wounds. The appellant raised the significance of this phenomenon through his expert witness, Dr. William H. Mott, who testified that it was his opinion that the victim died as a result of a ruptured spleen. Dr. Mott was further of the opinion that all of the clean stab wounds were inflicted after death, or at a point at which death was irreversible. Dr. J. C. Richter testified that he attended the autopsy and that the cause of death was due to multiple stab wounds, with a puncture of the heart being the final factor in bringing about the victim's death. He observed that the spleen was ruptured but it was impossible to tell whether the rupture was from a stab wound or a severe trauma. He did testify that the injury to the spleen could have resulted from a stab wound. He further stated that it was not unusual to see a body with nineteen stab wounds but no external bleeding. Dr. Kim, who performed the autopsy, stated that the reason why there was very little blood present externally was that the rupture of the spleen had caused large amounts of blood to escape into the abdominal cavity. He also testified that the rupture to the spleen could have been...