Jasniowski v. Rushing

• Citation: 222 Ill.Dec. 871,287 Ill.App.3d 655,678 N.E.2d 743
• Decision Date: 31 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 1-95-0365,1-95-0365
• Parties: , 222 Ill.Dec. 871 Ron JASNIOWSKI and A. Avana Electric Motors, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Benson RUSHING and City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 743

678 N.E.2d 743

287 Ill.App.3d 655, 222 Ill.Dec. 871

Ron JASNIOWSKI and A. Avana Electric Motors, Inc. Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Benson RUSHING and City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-95-0365.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Sixth Division.

March 31, 1997.

Rehearing Denied April 30, 1997.

Judgment vacated October 2, 1997.

Jordan Lorence, Fairfax, VA, Thomas Appel, Lansing, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Shari J. Engelken, Michael A. Parks of Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Karen Berman, Clyde E. Murphy, of Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., Chicago, for Defendant-Appellee Benson Rushing.

Susan S. Sher, Corporation Counsel, Lawrence Rosenthal, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Chicago, for Defendant-Appellee City of Chicago.

Justice THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs, Ron Jasniowski (Jasniowski) and A. Avana Electric Motors, Inc. (Avana), appeal from the circuit court's final order on their petition for common law writ of certiorari. In the circuit court, the plaintiffs sought review of an order of the City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations (the Commission) granting relief in favor of the respondent, Benson Rushing (Rushing), on the grounds that they had discriminated against him because of his marital status in violation of the Fair Housing Regulations of the City of Chicago. Chicago Municipal Code § 5-8-010 et seq. (1990). Specifically, plaintiffs would not rent an apartment to Rushing because he and a woman named Mary Tews (Tews) planned to live in the apartment together, but were not married. The circuit court affirmed the decision of the Commission. The plaintiffs now seek appellate review pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1). 155 Ill.2d R. 303(a)(1). We affirm the decision of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

Avana is a secular, for-profit, subchapter S corporation engaged in the business of repairing and selling electric motors. Jasniowski is Avana's president, sole officer, and sole shareholder. Jasniowski's mother, Martha Jasniowski, owns a building comprised of both commercial space and a residential apartment. Martha Jasniowski leases the entire building to Avana. The lease between Avana and Martha Jasniowski allows Avana to occupy the building and authorizes Avana to sublease the apartment. The lease does not contain any religious restrictions regarding sublessees.

In June 1992, Avana publicly advertised the apartment for rent in Chicago, Illinois. Rushing and Tews submitted an application to lease the apartment, indicating they were married. Jasniowski initially decided to rent them the apartment. Rushing and Tews, however, were unable to produce the requested proof of marriage and they decided to pursue other housing. Although Jasniowski did not refuse to rent to Rushing and Tews directly, he admits that he would not have leased the apartment to them because they were not married. He maintains that renting to an unmarried couple would conflict with his religious beliefs against sexual relations outside of marriage. He further contends that his religious beliefs render him a "steward" over his property and, therefore, he must manage his property according to his understanding of the Bible.

On July 23, 1992, Rushing filed a complaint with the City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations, alleging that Jasniowski had discriminated against him because of his marital status. At the pre-hearing conference, the hearing officer properly allowed Rushing's oral motion to add Avana as a respondent. After a full hearing on the merits, the Commission found that Jasniowski held sincere religious beliefs and that he refused to rent the apartment to Rushing and Tews because they were not married but planned to live there together. The Commission determined that Jasniowski's refusal to rent to Rushing constituted discrimination on the basis of marital status in violation of the Fair Housing Regulations of the City of Chicago. Chicago Municipal Code § 5-8-010 et seq. (1990). The Commission rejected Jasniowski's claim that the ordinance burdens his free exercise of religion. The Commission awarded Rushing damages and attorney fees totaling approximately $14,000. The circuit court affirmed the Commission's decision.

DISCUSSION

The first issue on appeal is whether the Chicago Fair Housing Regulations, which prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of marital status, prevent a person from refusing to rent an apartment to an unmarried, cohabiting couple. Five state supreme courts have addressed this question in one form or another. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 979, 115 S.Ct. 460, 130 L.Ed.2d 368 (1994); Smith v Fair Employment & Housing Commission, 12 Cal.4th 1143, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 700, 913 P.2d 909 (1996); Attorney General v. Desilets, 418 Mass. 316, 636 N.E.2d 233 (1994); State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn.1990); County of Dane v. Norman, 174 Wis.2d 683, 497 N.W.2d 714 (1993).

A threshold issue is how to define discrimination against an unmarried, cohabiting couple. We agree that the discrimination at issue is based on marital status, not the conduct of the prospective tenants. Accord Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 874 P.2d 274, 278 n. 4 (Alaska 1994); Attorney General v. Desilets, 418 Mass. 316, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (1994). Assuming both married and unmarried couples engage in the same conduct, the only distinction is that one couple has the status of "married" whereas the other couple is "unmarried." Jasniowski's religious objection is that allowing a man and woman to cohabit as an unmarried couple promotes fornication. We accept the Commission's factual determinations that Jasniowski's religious beliefs were sincerely held and that Rushing and Tews constituted an unmarried, cohabiting couple.

Thus, the question is whether the Chicago Fair Housing Regulations (Chicago ordinance or ordinance) prevent Jasniowski from refusing to rent the apartment to an unmarried, cohabiting couple. Section 5-8-030C of the ordinance provides that "[I]t shall be an unfair housing practice and unlawful for any owner, lessee, sublessee, * * * [t]o refuse to sell, lease or rent, any real estate for residential purposes within the city of Chicago because of * * * marital status * * * of the proposed buyer or renter." Chicago Municipal Code § 5-8-030C (1990). Section 5-8-040 explains that "marital status" has the same meaning as described in chapter 2-160 of the Chicago human rights ordinance, which defines "[m]arital status" as "the legal status of being single, married, divorced, separated or widowed." Chicago Municipal Code § 2-160-020(f) (1990).

The Commission determined that "marital status" in the ordinance extends housing discrimination protection to unmarried cohabiting couples and that Jasniowski's refusal to rent to Rushing constituted a violation of the ordinance. Because the Commission is the agency charged with enforcing the ordinance, its determination as to the intent and scope of the ordinance is entitled to substantial deference. Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill.2d 230, 239, 215 Ill.Dec. 664, 668, 664 N.E.2d 61, 65 (1996).

When an ordinance is clear, a court is bound by its plain language and meaning. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center, 158 Ill.2d 76, 81, 196 Ill.Dec. 655, 657, 630 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1994). Jasniowski argues that "marital status" protects individuals who are married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed, but does not extend protection to unmarried couples. Conversely, Rushing and the City of Chicago argue that renting to a man and a woman who are married, while refusing to rent to a man and a woman who are unmarried, by definition, constitutes "marital status" discrimination. Because the meaning of "marital status" is unclear, we look to other indicia of legislative intent to determine the statutory meaning. From this review, we have no doubt that the Chicago City Council intended to protect unmarried cohabiting couples from housing discrimination within the City of Chicago.

Remedial legislation generally is afforded a liberal interpretation. Tandy Corp. v. Human Rights Commission, 264 Ill.App.3d 828, 832, 202 Ill.Dec. 186, 189, 637 N.E.2d 725, 728 (1994). Chicago passed its first fair housing ordinance in 1963, to prohibit housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry. Chicago Municipal Code ch. 198.7-B (eff. September 11, 1963). Illinois passed the Illinois Human Rights Act to protect against unlawful discrimination in employment, real property transactions, access to financial credit, and public accommodations. Pub. Act 81-1216, eff. July 1, 1980.

Over the years, both the Chicago ordinance and the Illinois Human Rights Act have been broadened to protect a wide array of groups subject to potential housing discrimination. The Chicago ordinance assures "full and equal" housing opportunity to all residents of Chicago and protects the following categories from discrimination: "race, color, sex, age, religion, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military discharge status or source of income." (Emphasis added.) Chicago Municipal Code § 5-8-010 (1990).

The breadth of categories included in the ordinance indicates that Chicago intended to provide universal protection from housing discrimination to all its residents, in whatever combination. Inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected category is particularly enlightening. The inclusion of sexual orientation implies that the City Council understood unmarried cohabitants to be protected. Chicago Municipal Code ch. 198.7B (amended December 21, 1988, to include, inter alia, sexual orientation); County of Dane v. Norman, 174 Wis.2d 683, 497 N.W.2d 714, 722 (1993) (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). Thus, we...