McCready v. Hoffius
| Decision Date | 22 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. 108995,No. 16,108996,16 |
| Citation | 459 Mich. 131,586 N.W.2d 723 |
| Parties | Kristal McCREADY and Keith Kerr, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John HOFFIUS and Terry Hoffius, Defendants-Appellees. Rose BAIZ and Peter Perusse, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John HOFFIUS and Terry Hoffius, Defendants-Appellees. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
We granted leave in this case to determine whether the defendants violated the Civil Rights Act, 1 when they refused to rent to the unmarried plaintiffs. We conclude that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of their marital status in violation of the Civil Rights Act. Defendants' constitutional freedom of religion rights 2 do not supersede the plaintiffs' civil rights under the act. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and direct the circuit court to enter summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs.
Defendants John and Terry Hoffius, a married couple, own residential property in Jackson, Michigan, which they rent. In June 1993, plaintiffs Kristal McCready and Keith Kerr answered defendants' advertisement about the property. Defendants refused to rent it to these plaintiffs when they learned that McCready and Kerr were single, but intended to live together. Similarly, plaintiff Rose Baiz telephoned defendants about the property a month later. Defendants refused to rent to Baiz, also, when they learned that she was not married to plaintiff Peter Perusse, yet planned to live with him. Defendant John Hoffius told these plaintiffs that unmarried cohabitation violated his religious beliefs.
Plaintiffs filed two separate complaints with the Jackson Fair Housing Commission. Testers from the commission posed as potential renters and contacted defendants. Defendants did not ask the martial status of all the testers. However, they refused to permit unmarried couples to inspect the apartments, claiming that the units were available only to married couples. They stated that usually they did not rent to unmarried couples.
Plaintiffs filed two separate actions in circuit court. Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing in part that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, because the Civil Rights Act does not protect unmarried cohabitation. Defendants argued alternatively that, if the act protects unmarried cohabitation, it is unconstitutional, because it would force defendants to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs against unmarried cohabitation. Plaintiffs also filed summary disposition motions.
The motions were heard separately, but decided similarly. Both circuit court judges opined that the cases involved statutory interpretation, and both declined to address the constitutional issues. The judges noted that the Civil Rights Act protects status, not conduct. They opined that unmarried cohabitation was unprotected conduct. Accordingly, they determined that the Civil Rights Act does not protect unmarried cohabitation. Both granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which consolidated the appeals and affirmed the circuit court decisions. 3 This Court granted plaintiffs' applications for leave to appeal. 4
In granting the defendants' motions for summary disposition, neither circuit court specified the basis for its order. This Court reviews orders granting summary disposition de novo. Groncki v. Detroit Edison Co., 453 Mich. 644, 649, 557 N.W.2d 289 (1996). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and make all legitimate inferences in that party's favor. Skinner v. Square D Co., 445 Mich. 153, 162, 516 N.W.2d 475 (1994).
The determination whether the Court of Appeals properly interpreted the meaning of "marital status" as used in the act is another question of law that we review de novo. Cardinal Mooney High School v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 437 Mich. 75, 80, 467 N.W.2d 21 (1991).
The Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination based on marital status. The question before us is whether the state's interest in providing equal access to housing to all regardless of their membership in prescribed categories supersedes defendants' religious rights. It is complicated by the existence of an antiquated and rarely enforced statute prohibiting lewd and lascivious behavior. 5
First, we examine the language of the Civil Rights Act itself. It provides, in pertinent part:
(1) A person engaging in a real estate transaction, or a real estate broker or salesman, shall not on the basis of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, familial status, or marital status of a person or a person residing with that person:
(a) Refuse to engage in a real estate transaction with a person. [MCL 37.2502(1)(a); MSA 3.548(502)(1)(a).]
Being that the act is remedial, we construe it liberally. Dep't of Civil Rights ex rel. Parks v. General Motors Corp., 412 Mich. 610, 650, 317 N.W.2d 16 (1982). We strive to give effect to the Legislature's intent in drafting it. Turner v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 448 Mich. 22, 27, 528 N.W.2d 681 (1995).
The Court of Appeals noted correctly that the purpose of the act was to prevent discrimination based on membership in certain classes. It was intended to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases. 222 Mich.App. 210, 215, 564 N.W.2d 493 (1997); Miller v. C A Muer Corp., 420 Mich. 355, 362, 362 N.W.2d 650 (1984). However, we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals determination that the act does not protect the plaintiffs in this case.
The sole factor that defendants employed in determining that plaintiffs were unworthy of renting their available apartments was plaintiffs' marital status. The Legislature's intent to prohibit discrimination based on this factor is made clear by the inclusion of "marital status" in the act. "The language is simple, and its meaning is not difficult to comprehend." Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Service Co., 196 U.S.App.D.C. 50, 53, 605 F.2d 566 (1979). It seeks to prohibit discrimination "based on whether a person is married." Miller, supra at 363, 362 N.W.2d 650. Nothing in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act limits the term "marital status" to protecting married couples only.
When faced with a similar argument, that "marital status" does not include unmarried couples, the California Supreme Court recently determined that "[t]he statutory language banning discrimination based on 'marital status' naturally carries both meanings [married and unmarried]." Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm., 12 Cal.4th 1143, 1156, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 700, 913 P.2d 909 (1996). We agree. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts must apply the statute as written. Turner, supra at 27, 528 N.W.2d 681.
In this case, the defendants refused to rent to plaintiffs because their marital status is "single" and, therefore, unmarried. 6 We will not read the act to shield such a discriminatory act.
The defendants argue that they did not discriminate against plaintiffs because of their marital status; rather, they refused to rent to plaintiffs on the basis of their perception of plaintiffs' conduct.
In Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm., 7 the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted the definition of marital status as used in its statute, one similar to Michigan's, which prohibits discrimination in real estate transactions. 8 In Swanner, the court affirmed an Anchorage Equal Rights Commission order that the landlord's policy against renting to unmarried couples constituted unlawful discrimination based on marital status. The landlord would have rented his properties to certain couples had they been married, and refused to rent to them after learning they were single. The court concluded that the landlord had unlawfully discriminated on the basis of marital status. Id. at 278.
When the Alaska Supreme Court decided Swanner, the Alaska Legislature had already struck down its statute prohibiting cohabitation. That court's analysis of "marital status" is still instructive to this Court. The landlord in Swanner argued, as the landlords argue here, that he did not discriminate against anyone on the basis of marital status. Rather, he asserted, he discriminated because of the applicant's conduct, and such discrimination is not prohibited by the statute.
The court in Swanner found that the landlord "cannot reasonably claim that he does not rent or show property to cohabitating couples based on their conduct (living together outside of marriage) and not their marital status when their marital status (unmarried) is what makes their conduct immoral in [the landlord's] opinion." Id. at 278, n. 4. We agree with this analysis.
Here, the defendants contend that their refusal to rent to plaintiffs was based on plaintiffs' conduct, not on their status, and that this discrimination is legally acceptable. We find that defendants' reasoning defies "legal examination and legislative resolve alike." Dane Co. v. Norman, 174 Wis.2d 683, 693, 497 N.W.2d...
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